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ABSTRACT
This thesis develops a basic framework for analyzing the
fiscal role of local government in less-developed countries,
and applies it in a comprehensive case study based on two
years of fieldwork in the Republic of Kenya.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in
strengthening local government in developing countries for a
variety of reasons. The public finance literature on the
topic, however, remains very limited. Economic theories and
models of local government have been formulated in the
context of the developed countries. Although many of their
basic principles are universally relevant, at least to some
degree, numerous diverse, extreme, and unique circumstances
limit the direct applicability of certain aspects of these
theories to the developing countries. The framework
.developed here takes into account a wide variety of
political, cultural, legal, constitutional, financial, and
institutional constraints relevant in less-developed
countries.
Most previous case studies of local government finance in
developing countries have focused on particular aspects of
the system or a few large cities--they have not been
comprehensive and have largely ignored small and rural local
authorities. In the study of Kenya, the fiscal role of small
and large urban and rural local authorities is analyzed and
evaluated, and an agenda for reforming the current system is
outlined. Information and insights gained from the Kenya
case study are used to clarify and highlight the unique
factors that must be taken into account in analyzing the
fiscal role of local government in developing countries.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Karen R. Polenske
Title: Professor of Regional Political Economy
and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The purpose of this research is to develop a basic
framework for identifying an appropriate fiscal role for
local government in developing countries and to apply it to a
single country. The framework will be used to conduct an
exploratory and evaluative study of the fiscal role of local
government in the Republic of Kenya.
The presumption underlying this study is that developing
countries tend to underutilize local levels of government or
to use them ineffectively.1 However, there is a growing
interest in developing or reviving local government in less-
developed countries. In order to undertake this task
effectively, there must be a reasonable methodology for
analyzing the structure of the public sector in these
countries, with particular emphasis on defining an
appropriate fiscal role for local government.
A major problem in articulating such a methodology is
that the context in which the local governments in developing
countries operate differs very widely. These countries have
very different histories, and there are extreme differences
in political and economic systems, institutional
1 The factors underlying this presumption will be
explored later.
organizations, cultural heritage, and constitutional and
legal constraints on local government. This great diversity,
which is documented in Chapter 2, makes the development of
generalizable theories and models to analyze the problem
virtually impossible; nevertheless, it is possible to
identify important factors that need to be considered in
defining an appropriate fiscal role for local government in
developing countries.
Although the major focus of this research will be on a
single country, the information and insights gained from this
effort will aid in the development of a methodology and
allow the formation of some generalizations about how to
analyze the fiscal role of local government in developing
countries. The analysis will be conducted primarily from a
public finance point of view, but the exercise is by its
nature an interdisciplinary one, which draws to some extent
on literature in other fields.
Development Economics and Public Finance Background
Although there has been a great deal of research
conducted on public finance and taxation in developing
countries, very little attention has been paid to the fiscal
role and finances of local government. Most of the research
on this topic has been in the form of case studies or
chapters in studies of national tax systems, usually
conducted by national tax system study commissions or major
international development agencies, such as the World Bank.
This scarcity of research has undoubtedly occurred largely
because of the small role that local government has
traditionally played in most developing countries.
Furthermore, traditional development strategies have tended
to focus on central planning, large-scale industrialization,
and spatial centralization to capture economies of scale and
promote economic growth [Lewis (1954); Hirschman (1958);
Brenner (1966); Alonso (1971); Richardson (1973); Todaro
(1981); and, Wheaton (1981)]. To a great extent, these
strategies require that public sector development policies be
designed and administered at a central level and have
generally ignored local government.
Recently, this emphasis on centralization in development
has begun to change dramatically. Many newer development
strategies have focused on decentralizing the public sector,
slowing the growth of large urban areas, and regionalizing
development [Mera (1972); Richardson (1977); Todaro (1981);
Kelley and Williamson (1982); Cheema and Rondinelli (1983);
and, Rondinelli (1984)]. Major international development
agencies, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and many bilateral aid agencies, have stressed policies
of decentralization. Proponents of egalitarian development
have stressed the greater equity inherent in decentralized
development and the growth-stimulating effects of
redistribution [Chenery (1974); Cline (1975); Mellor (1976);
N.L. Hicks (1979); Todaro (1981); and, Gillis, et. al.
(1987)]. A number of analysts have suggested that the
weakness of local institutions in developing countries
severely constrains both economic growth and improvements in
equity [Uphoff and Esman (1974); ILO (1974); and, Mawhood
(1974)].
Although there are many forms of decentralization, it
might be expected that strengthening local government would
be one of the more obvious and important ones in many less-
developed nations. 2 Nevertheless, the recent emphasis on
decentralization in developing countries has not greatly
stimulated the literature on the fiscal role of local
government in the developing world. Only a few attempts to
conceptualize the issues broadly and/or to compare local
finance policies across a group of countries have been made.
Some of this literature, e.g., U. Hicks (1961a, 1961b, 1978),
predates the emphasis on decentralized development, and most
of the rest of it focuses primarily on major urban areas
[Bahl (1979, 1981); Linn (1981); Bahl and Miller (1982);
Davey (1983); Cochrane (1983); Bahl, Holland and Linn
2 In fact, much of the emphasis on decentralization in
developing countries has focused on working through local-
level representatives/offices of central government
ministries/agencies, a process known as deconcentration. In
some cases this is appropriate, but in other cases, it is
more appropriate to decentralize through local authorities,
process known as devolution. The strong emphasis on
deconcentration is, at least in part, nothing more than a
manifestation of the central government fear of
significant decentralization to be discussed later in this
chapter.
(1983); Bahl and Linn (1983); Mawhood (1983); and, Bahl,
Miner and Schroeder (1984)]. This research explicitly
emphasizes the potential for decentralization of the public
sector and improving the role and performance of the local
government sector.
Most of the theoretical public finance work on local
government's economic role has been developed in the context
of industrialized countries [Tiebout (1956); and, Oates
(1972)]. These theories are not directly transferable to the
developing world because the history, development, context,
and practice of local government in developing countries
often differs greatly from the developed countries.
Therefore, the analytical tools used to evaluate the fiscal
role of local government in the developed countries require
some modification for application to a developing country.
This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.
Underutilization of Local Government in Developing Countries
In industrialized nations around the world, local
governments often have an important role to play in the
national political and economic scene. In Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, for
example, local government accounts, on average, for 11
percent of total public sector employment. In a number of
the member countries, the figure runs as high as 20 to 25
percent. By contrast, the governments of developing
countries are highly centralized. The average share of
public sector employment accounted for by local government in
these countries averages 4.5 percent, ranging from 2.5
percent in Africa to 8 percent in Asia [Cochrane (1983),
p.1].
There are a number of reasons why local government has
not played a major role in most developing countries. First,
the type of local government introduced by colonial powers in
developing countries is often very alien and lacks legitimacy
among the native people.3 Even in areas where traditional
native chiefs or councils have long existed, these
institutions have often gained their legitimacy by
traditional succession or custom, e.g., the automatic
appointment of elders to a governing council. The idea of a
council elected on other lines may take time to be fully
accepted, particularly in places where local tradition is
important to the people. In addition, in areas where the
cash economy is a relatively new phenomenon, people are used
to living at a subsistence level and being largely self-
sufficient. They are not accustomed to dependency on modern
administration and services provided by the government, nor
are they accustomed to paying for these services.
Another important reason for the underutilization of
local government in developing countries is that, even in
3 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see
Mawhood (1987).
some areas where local government was introduced early in
colonial times, local institutions were never properly
developed. Colonial authorities may not have felt a need to
involve natives in self-government in a meaningful way until
great pressure was put on them to do so just prior to
independence. Local government institutions in many
countries were designed for the settlers, not the natives.
Many of the settlers have returned to their countries of
origin in the post-independence years, leaving the natives
with an institutional framework that was not designed with
their culture and needs in mind. Even in places where strong
local government was institutionalized for the natives, its
functions were often administrative and regulatory, and they
had little to do with self-determination and economic
development.
As noted earlier, for most of the early years of
development economics, developing countries were advised that
they could be more effective by centralizing control over the
economy. Development policies tended to focus on central
planning, industrialization, and centralization of
development in major cities, despite the fact that a majority
of the population were often engaged in agriculture in rural
areas and nationals of the country lacked the capital to
initiate and sustain large-scale investments. In addition,
important economic functions traditionally cited as primary
government responsibilities in the developing countries, such
as macroeconomic stabilization and international trade
management, must be undertaken by central governments. For
all of these reasons, the principal public sector focus for
economic policy has been on the central government, and local
authorities have been largely neglected.
In many developing countries, there is a lack of
managerial and technical expertise to staff local governments
effectively. Because of this lack of skilled personnel, it
has not been possible to develop local government
institutions and an effective working relationship between
the central and local governments. Because the pool of human
resources is so limited and training and educational
facilities so scarce, the central government may fear losing
some of its essential qualified people to decentralized
levels of government if the latter are strengthened.
Furthermore, the central government financial resources to
develop and aid decentralized institutions are simply not
available in many developing countries.
Perhaps the most important reason why local governments
have been neglected in developing countries is that there
exist many strong central governments that do not wish to
share their power [Rondinelli (1983); and, Cochrane (1983)].
Often in the name of national unity, central governments in
developing countries have weakened local government
institutions set up by the colonial administrations and
refused to grant local governments significant powers. Many
governments in developing countries are somewhat unstable and
insecure, and they feel the need to consolidate control in
order to introduce an element of stability and protect the
interests of their leadership. In many developing countries,
the income distribution is very skewed. It is concentrated
among a powerful modern elite who see it as in their best
interests to keep control in their own hands and therefore to
prevent any meaningful decentralization of power and
redistribution of wealth. In some cases, the ruling elite
are dominated by particular tribal or ethnic groups who are
reluctant to share power with rival groups.
The political tendency towards centralization in many
developing countries manifests itself in a wide variety of
constraints on the development of local government, which the
central government can use as an excuse for not doing more to
strengthen local authorities. Many of these constraints are
constitutional or legal in nature. In some countries, for
example, local authorities can do little without lengthy
review and approval by a central government ministry. In
others, there are severe constitutional or legal limits on
the revenue-raising and service-provision powers of local
authorities. The result of these types of restrictions is
that local governments cannot operate efficiently and
effectively. Other constraints are more explicitly
political. In some countries, a few select local
governments may benefit from central government technical and
political figures in the central government who come from the
regions in which the favored local authorities are located.
Other local authorities may be left to fend for themselves
under more difficult conditions.
Some types of constraints on the functioning of local
authorities are more local in nature. Even in some
developing countries where local governments are properly
empowered, they may not be able to operate effectively
because of local problems. For example, property and
business-based taxes may be greatly underutilized in some
local authorities because the local government is to a great
extent under the control of major landowners and businessmen
who do not see such taxes in their best interests. This can
greatly hold back the development and performance of local
authorities. In addition, local tribal systems might
justifiably undermine the local political process because
their interests and traditional institutions were not
sufficiently taken into account when the local government
system was set up. Particular local authorities might also
be subject to some of the other types of constraints
discussed earlier, such as a lack of resources and trained
personnel, even if the country as a whole is not as seriously
affected.
The Case for Local Government in Developing Countries
Despite the obstacles to effective local government
institutions in developing countries, a strong case can be
made for defining a more substantial role for them. The more
prominent role of local government in developed countries
suggests that local authorities may have an important role to
play in the management of development. In a recent World
Bank publication, Cochrane has gone so far as to state that
an effective public sector in a modern developing country
"depends on the ability of the central government to harness
the resources of lower levels of government" [Cochrane
(1983), p.1].
Local governments are often the institutional overseers
of the population centers in which most industrial and
specialized nonindustrial economic activities are based.
The jurisdictions that they govern may generate the primary
demand for the agricultural production of the surrounding
territory, and they are the communications and transport
centers for their local region. These centers provide the
input-output linkages for rural production and are the
concentration points for marketing activities. Given limited
central government resources, the effectiveness of local
authorities in providing infrastructure and an atmosphere
conducive to economic activity can have an important
influence on the success of the local economy and its
potential for future development [Rondinelli (1982); Little
(1984); and, Belsky and Karaska (1984)].
The role of local authorities in the local economy also
means that they can play an important role in supporting
and/or implementing macroeconomic and national development
policies. Where there is limited central government
presence, local authorities are in a good position to
mobilize support for national development policies by their
actions and by making these policies more widely known at the
local level [Rondinelli (1978 and 1981)]. This is
particularly important in countries that are large and/or in
which it is difficult to travel to remote areas because of
poor access roads and harsh climatic conditions. In such
cases, it may not be practical for the central government to
keep in good contact and work effectively with some areas of
the country. From a purely managerial standpoint, the
administration of development policies in widely scattered
locations throughout an entire country can be extremely
difficult. In short, under certain conditions common in
developing countries, local governments will be able to
mobilize financial, political, and social resources and
manage some aspects of economic development more effectively
and efficiently than the central government. They will also
be better able to disseminate information about and implement
national development policies.
In some developing countries, local authorities may be
able to provide certain kinds of vital services that it is
not practical or possible for the private sector or the
central government to provide. In some cases, for example,
particularly in rural areas, the private sector cannot afford
to provide facilities for local producers to market their
goods. Although it might be possible for the central
government to finance such facilities, often through donor
funds, it may not be practical for the central government to
staff and maintain them due to limited resources. In such
cases, it may be appropriate for local authorities to assume
responsibility.
Local authorities can also have an impact on population
policies and settlement patterns in that their effective
development and management can play a role in helping to
curtail the excessive growth of population and economic
pressure in the primary urban centers [Evans (1986)]. The
process of continuing urbanization in smaller local
authorities creates new wealth through increases in economic
activity, income, and land values, drawing still more people
and employment to these areas.
More intensive development of smaller local areas also
has the potential for longer-term equity gains. A variety of
recent research cited earlier has suggested that
decentralized development has a tendency to lead to a more
equal distribution of income. Other things being equal, such
redistribution has the potential to generate an increase in
income and further economic growth through the increased
multiplier effects that result from higher marginal
propensities to consume among lower-income people.
Another important reason for greater utilization of
local government in developing countries is that there is
little evidence that more centralized service provision in
developing countries is any more efficient than local service
provision. If fact, economists would argue that, for many
services, just the opposite is true. In the absence of
economies of scale, externalities, and uniform demand for a
service over a large area, it is more efficient to assign
service provision to decentralized levels of government.
Decentralization allows for better government adaptation to
dissimilar circumstances and preferences across local areas.
This issue of assignment of public sector functions to local
authorities is a key issue in this thesis and will be dealt
with extensively in Chapter 3.
Perhaps the most important reason for strengthening
local authorities is that they are the institutions that are
closest to the people at a grassroots level. Local
government has great potential to increase the level of local
participation in the development process and, by definition,
to increase the degree of self-government. Williams (1981)
has suggested that successful development strategies require
greater participation of their intended beneficiaries, from
the planning to the evaluation stage. Some analysts have
argued that greater equity in the allocation of government
resources will be realized when representatives of a wide
variety of political, religious, ethnic, and social groups
participate in decision-making [Montgomery (1972); Uphoff and
Esman (1974); and Esman and Montgomery (1982)]. If local
government is given a greater role, it may be more possible
to retain local culture, values, and customs, which are
extremely important to the people in some countries of the
developing world. Finally, when local people have problems
and need help, they often come to local government officials
first. Because local authorities are staffed by people
familiar with local conditions, they have a greater potential
than does the central government to respond effectively to
many local needs.
Despite the above arguments made in favor of stronger
local authorities in many developing countries, it is
important to recognize that decentralization and an enhanced
role for local authorities are not desirable and necessary in
all developing countries. Some countries are geographically
small and/or ethnically and economically homogeneous. In
such cases, a well-organized central government may be
adequate to ascertain the needs and desires of the people
and to formulate and implement effective development
policies.
Even in developing countries where a case can be made
for strong local government, the importance of central
government coordination of development activities must be
acknowledged. Decentralization can go too far and lead to
the development of local authorities who work against the
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best interests of the country as a whole. Local authorities
should be responsive to national needs and be willing to
explain and support national policies in their jurisdictions.
Of course, local authorities have their own development
responsibilities and priorities, but they should not be in
conflict with overall national development objectives, as
articulated through a broad-based and democratic political
process.
Renewed Interest in Local Government in Developing Countries
In recent years, there has been a pronounced interest in
developing or reviving local government in less-developed
countries. This interest has come from the governments of
developing countries, academics, and international
development organizations. Part of the explanation for this
upsurge in interest is a realization of the potentially
productive role for local government described above. It
was, however, significant changes in economic and political
situations that actually triggered concrete action.
Throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s, the world
economy has been confronted with a variety of problems
particularly affecting the developing countries, which have
been less able to deal with them than the developed
countries. At various times during these years, there have
been periods of extreme inflation, collapses in the prices of
important agricultural and natural resource commodities on
which developing countries rely for foreign exchange, serious
droughts in parts of Africa and Latin America, and an
extended period of worldwide recession. During the same
period, many developing countries saw their trade policies,
such as import substitution, fail to a great extent. There
was slower economic growth than there had been a decade
earlier, and in some countries population growth was
exploding at a tremendous rate. The combined effect of these
and other trends was tighter government budgets during a
period of time when demand for government services was
growing rapidly.
Because of their economic problems, many developing
countries began to generate large government budget deficits,
which were financed primarily by external borrowing. Over
time, interest payments began using up higher and higher
percentages of government resources, and the vicious cycle of
borrowing and overspending escalated. It is now very clear
that many central governments in developing countries have
been living far beyond their means for years, and that they
were actually encouraged to do so by the lending policies of
the developed nations. At the same time, the labor force
has been growing rapidly as population grows, while actual
employment opportunities are increasing at a slower rate.
The implication of these developments is that
governments in developing countries cannot continue to expand
at their rapid historical rates and must try to focus on
self-financing and more productive public investments. In
some countries, this situation is likely to necessitate
temporarily placing less emphasis on social services, such as
health and education, and more emphasis on basic
infrastructure services, such as water, roads, and
electricity, which have the potential to stimulate private
sector investment. It also suggests that the central
government may have to reduce its role in managing certain
development policies and rely more on local governments,
which are often underutilized and may have tremendous
untapped revenue potential. In some developing countries,
local authorities are the only decentralized institutions
with adequate administrative capacity and legal or
constitutional powers for raising revenue and providing
public services.
The new focus on a greater fiscal role for local
government has been advanced greatly by major international
development agencies, such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. These institutions have
conducted a variety of research on strengthening local
government and have implemented a number of programs
requiring their participation. Local government has also
received a boost from revised aid guidelines and policies of
a number of major bilateral aid agencies. In the wake of the
economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s, conservative
movements and governments have become more influential and
moved into power in many developed countries. One result has
been that the bilateral aid agencies have tried to redefine
the types of projects that they will support with grants and
loans. There is less emphasis on financing central
government programs because of a bias against central
planning and control, and more emphasis on the market and
decentralized institution-building that supports the growth
of the private sector. Such policies will often be
administered through decentralized agencies of the central
government and local authorities. The additional burdens on
local authorities in many countries have led to calls for
strengthening them.
Reliance on local government may further increase in
coming years as the governments of some developed countries
continue to cut back their own scale of operations. Economic
aid to developing countries is likely to be one of the first
budget lines to receive cuts in conservative political and
difficult economic times, and the developing countries may
have to learn to be less and less dependent on foreign aid.
The worldwide stock market crash of October 1987 and
potential forthcoming repercussions may force additional
major economic policy adjustments that a number of developed
nations have been avoiding for some time, further affecting
the developing countries. Development aid is certain to be
affected by the efforts of the United States to reduce the
federal budget deficit in the wake of the crash. If the U.S.
economy enters a recessionary period and other major
economies follow, a further deterioration in development aid
is likely to result.
Cutbacks may occur not only in aid to the governments of
developing countries, but also in industrialized country
funding for certain types of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and charities. In some areas of the developing world,
these organizations provide a substantial level of important
services at the community level. If these services are
seriously reduced, local governments and indigenous self-
help groups might be called on to keep particular programmes
and services afloat.
Grassroots political factors have also certainly had an
impact on the new emphasis on local government. As people
become more educated and more informed through improved
communications, they often want to have a greater say in the
matters that affect their daily lives. There is greater
awareness of the waste and corruption in many central
government bureaucracies, and people desire to bring the
control of government functions closer to themselves. In a
number of developing countries, there has been a movement
towards greater democracy as military regimes are forced to
relinquish power and institute democratic reforms.4 This
4 Of course, the deteriorating economic conditions in
developing countries discussed above are a primary factor in
the toppling of military regimes, but greater political
awareness and better political organization also have a role
to play.
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sets an example for other countries and emboldens people to
push for still further changes. Political pressure from
below and from the international community forces central
governments in developing countries to continue the process
of reform. In some developing countries, part of this reform
has included efforts to decentralize.
The process of decentralization in developing countries
may be, at least in some cases, encouraged by cultural
factors. Peoples of the developing world have begun to
revive a positive opinion of their own traditional cultures
in recent years. There is, of course, still a great deal of
interest in the western cultures and values brought to
developing countries during the colonial era and evident in
modern mass media. Developing peoples, however, are also
nurturing a new pride in their own heritage, which may in the
past have been something that native people who were exposed
to western culture tried to hide.
In certain traditional cultures, there is a history of
community self-government and an emphasis on collective,
rather than individual, values. Given the resurgence of
cultural awareness, people may be more inclined to want to
participate in decentralized institutions and processes,
which give them a sense of identity and self-determination.
The quality of government and public services may improve
greatly from this cultural rebirth in some developing
countries.
Obiective of the Thesis
There has been a renewed interest in strengthening local
governments in developing nations in recent years, but little
new literature has been generated on defining an appropriate
fiscal role for local governments in these countries. The
primary purpose of this study is to develop some concrete
insights into the problems of designing an effective public
sector in developing countries with an appropriate role for
local authorities. The first objective is to understand
more fully the existing problems in local government
organization and administration for a single case study
country. This requires trying to demonstrate what an
appropriate role for local government might be, and
documenting how and why the system falls short of the
normative target as well as what the consequences of these
deficiencies are.
The second objective is to get a clearer sense of the
types- of problems and constraints that seem to be responsible
for these deficiencies, to determine which of the problems
can be eliminated or alleviated, and to identify the types
of corrective policies that might be employed. Going through
this process for one country will help to clarify the major
issues and problems involved in analyzing decentralization
and local government in the developing world. The process
will lead to a clarification of the analytical framework as
22
well as some useful generalizations about the analysis of
the fiscal role of local government in developing countries.
This chapter has briefly reviewed the historical role of
local authorities in developing countries and suggested some
reasons for their underutilization. It has also documented
the reasons for the renewed interest in local government in
the developing world, as well as some of the problems and
issues in analyzing local government in developing countries.
Chapter 2 will explore the tremendous variation in the
organization and practice of local government in developing
countries. There will be a discussion of general types of
systems, as well as eight brief case studies documenting the
diversity of local government systems in the developing
world. It is important to take this diversity into account
in analyzing the role of local government in the less-
developed countries.
Chapter 3 will outline a basic framework for the central
task of this thesis: analyzing an appropriate fiscal role for
local governments in developing countries. Economic theories
of local government in developed countries will be reviewed,
and their relevance for developing countries assessed.
Chapter 4 will explore in some detail the history,
development, and current structure of local government in the
main case study country, Kenya. This exercise will
demonstrate how political and cultural factors, as well as
historical accident, affect the nature of the local
government system that develops in a given country. These
factors also provide a background to refer to in the
following chapters, in which the current system of local
government in Kenya is evaluated.
Chapters 5 and 6 will use the framework developed in
Chapter 3 and the background information presented in Chapter
4 to analyze and evaluate the current system of local
government in Kenya. This will include a discussion of the
various non-economic factors that have influenced the
development of local government in this country and may
still, to some extent, define the boundaries within which the
system of local government must lie.
On the basis of the evaluation in Chapters 5 and 6,
Chapter 7 will outline a set of recommendations for reforming
the fiscal role of local government in Kenya.
Finally, Chapter 8 will summarize the major findings of
the thesis and discuss the lessons learned from the Kenya
case study regarding the factors and processes that are
important in defining a fiscal role for local government in
developing countries.
CHAPTER 2
DIVERSITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
There has long been pessimism about the possibilities
for developing democratic local government institutions in
the less-developed countries. With few exceptions, observers
and analysts of local government in developing countries felt
that the strong centralization existing in many places would
be difficult or impossible to overcome. Walter Oyugi,
Professor of Government at the University of Nairobi and an
expert on local government in developing countries, has
summed up the situation in this way:
In the underdeveloped countries the grassroots democracy
motive is rarely found. Noble as the ideal of political
development is, it does not at the moment seem to
concern the ruling cadres. Their concern in this sphere
seems to be the attainment of political conformity and
central government hegemony over the local communities
and institutions. Hence it has become a common
observation that governments in most of the
underdeveloped countries are predisposed to controlling
the behavior of their local citizenry and, therefore,
cannot be expected to contradict their prime objectives
by offering village democracy to the people [Oyugi
(1973), p. 56].
During the past ten years or so, there has been some cause for
greater optimism that decentralization will succeed, as discussed
in the previous chapter. How it will proceed and the forms it
will take are likely to vary greatly, largely because developing
countries are such a heterogeneous group.
There is a great diversity in the types of local government
systems that operate in developing countries. As noted in
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Chapter 1, this is important because the tremendous
variations in context make it very difficult to analyze local
government in developing countries with the types of
generalizable theories and models normally used by
economists. There are great differences across countries in
types of political and economic systems, institutional
organizations, and cultural, social, and historical
influences, all of which can have a great effect on how the
system of local government has evolved and operates. These
factors also strongly affect the approach that needs to be
taken when these systems are being analyzed.
The purpose of this chapter is to sketch a brief outline
of some of the different types of local government systems
operating in the developing world and to examine the fiscal
role of local authorities in these systems. First, a general
overview of various types of systems is presented. This is
followed by brief descriptions of the local government system
in a small sample of diverse developing countries. The
latter-exercise is intended to give some concrete examples of
the diversity existing among these systems, which has an
adverse impact on the possibilities of generalizing about
local government in the developing world. An understanding
of the differences among the systems will be useful in the
next chapter, where a framework for analyzing the fiscal role
of local government in developing countries is developed.
Overview of the Range of Functions and Powers of
Local Government in Developing Countries
Systems of government in the developing world are
basically of two types: unitary systems and federal systems.
By far the overwhelming majority of developing countries are
unitary states in which the source of the state's power is
the central government. To the extent that local government
exists, it is a creation of the central government. Federal
states are ones in which the federal (central) government
exists by virtue of a union of decentralized units, which
join together and agree to surrender certain powers to the
central government.1
Unitary governments permit the existence of a wide
variety of decentralization. In some unitary states, there
are no local governments, although there may be decentralized
administrative units of the central government. Under the
field or local administration system, local governments
operate largely as extensions of the state bureaucracy with
few autonomous powers. This is the system that was imposed
by the French in most of their former colonies, e.g., Cote
d'Ivoire, Mali, the People's Republic of Benin (formerly
Dahomey), Tunisia, etc. In extreme cases, the central
government may even appoint the members of local government
councils rather than permitting their election by popular
1 For a good discussion of these systems and the logic
behind them, see Smith (1985).
vote.
In former British colonies in the developing world, a
genuine system of semi-autonomous local government was
normally established. The local authorities are legal
entities, which can sue and be sued as well as enter into
independent contracts. This type of system, which exists,
for example, in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Uganda, often retains a
significant degree of central control, but local authorities
are usually governed by locally elected councils which have
some degree of fiscal autonomy.
In either the local administration or local government
system, there are sometimes several tiers of decentralized
government units, while in a federal system this is always
true. For example, there may be states, provinces, regions,
or districts at an intermediate level, while at the most
decentralized level there would be local authorities, such as
municipalities, towns, and urban centers. Sometimes none of
the decentralized levels of government have much autonomy,
e.g., the Sudan and Thailand. In some cases, e.g., Nigeria,
Papua New Guinea, and Mexico, the intermediate levels are
more powerful than the most decentralized levels, while in
other cases, e.g., Colombia and Venezuela, the intermediate
levels have few responsibilities and powers compared with the
local levels.
There are also various kinds of autonomy displayed in
local government systems. First, there is the issue of
political autonomy. This has to do with whether or not local
government councils are elected by the people or appointed by
the central government, as well as how independent they are
from central government politics and policies. There is also
the issue of fiscal autonomy, which relates to the degree of
independence in revenue-raising and spending decisions. In
some cases, e.g., the Sudan, local governments have little
control over how they raise and spend their revenue. In
other cases, e.g., Papua New Guinea, local authorities may
have significant discretion over spending questions but be
largely or fully dependent on the central government for
revenue. In still other cases, e.g., Indonesia, local
authorities may have access to a wide variety of income
sources but substantially less than full discretion about how
the funds are spent. Finally, there are at least a few
developing countries, e.g., India, where local authorities
have a fair degree of both revenue-raising and spending
autonomy.
The type of government system that exists in a
particular developing country depends on a variety of
factors. Principal among these are the indigenous culture
and customs and the legacy of the colonial power in the
country. Each country has its own history, during the course
of which a system of government evolved to suit the needs of
the country's leadership and/or people.
In many developing countries, the system of local
government is still evolving. In others, lack of stable
political institutions means that the degree of
decentralization is not constant. In many countries, there
seem to be ebbs and flows of enthusiasm for decentralization.
Mawhood (1987, p. 22), a seasoned observer of local
government in developing countries, explains this erratic
cyclical pattern as follows: "Perhaps we can conclude that
successful decentralization occurs when the political weather
is good (that is, the regime is strong and unchallenged) but
the economic weather is bad (it suffers a painful shortage of
resources)." This suggests that, at least in some
developing countries, the process of establishing strong
decentralized institutions has been and will continue to be
slow and difficult.2
The reality is that the vast majority of government
systems in the developing countries tend to be highly
centralized. Although local institutions may account for a
significant percentage of public sector expenditures, they
rarely have a substantial degree of both political and
fiscal autonomy. Allen (1987) argues that true community-
2 There are cycles in levels of decentralization and
the nature of intergovernmental relations in some developed
countries as well. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example,
state and local governments in the United States were
increasing their public expenditure role but decreasing in
their level of revenue self-sufficiency as federal government
grant programs increased. In the Reagan years, there has
been a clear movement to reduce central government support of
state and local government at the same time that taxpayers
are taking a stand against increases in state and local taxes.
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based local government exists only in a handful of countries,
e.g., Tanzania, Cuba, South Korea, and India, usually for
ideological reasons. Even in such cases, however, there is
often a high degree of dependence on the central government.
In spite of the instability and great diversity of local
government systems in developing countries, it is possible to
identify a few general trends in the development of local
government which exist in different parts of the developing
world.3 Local governments in most Asian countries are
bureaucratic instruments of the central government rather
than agents of local participation. In many parts of Asia,
there is a long history of empires and traditional central
rule. Many Asian cultures also emphasize social harmony,
order, and cohesion. There is a strong sense of duty and
obedience in these societies, and it blends very well with
centralization. There are, however, some exceptions and
qualifications to the Asian rule of centralization. Although
the public sector in China is quite centralized, for example,
local governments have significant autonomy over certain
functions. In some of the former British colonies on the
Indian subcontinent, there is a highly developed system of
local government remaining from the colonial era.
In most of Africa, centralization is also the norm,
largely because of the legacy of colonial powers on this
continent. Highly centralized government systems exist in
3 For a more detailed discussion, see Mawhood (1987).
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most of the francophone countries in west, central, and north
Africa, although some of these countries are making attempts
to decentralize. Anglophone countries in east, southern, and
west Africa generally have more autonomous local governments,
but strong central governments still tend to dominate the
public sector. Africa is an interesting case because many of
the African cultures are very well-suited to local
government. Many Africans are accustomed to small-scale
tribal government and highly local decision-making
processes. Possibly because of this, there are strong
village self-help movements in Africa, even in some areas
where modern local government is fairly limited.
Latin America government systems are more decentralized
than their counterparts in Asia and Africa, but there is
still not a great deal of local government autonomy in most
countries. The majority of Latin American countries gained
their independence from colonial powers much earlier than the
countries of Asia and Africa, and this has given them more
time to develop decentralized institutions. In addition,
some of the larger Latin American countries developed
decentralized government in major regional cities far away
from national capitals during colonial times, and the
tradition has continued [Mawhood (1987), p.18]. Even in the
federal systems such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico,
however, much of the institutional development has been at
the state level rather than the local level. Thus, the
states and regions often play a very significant fiscal role,
while the role of the local governments is much more limited.
Comprehensive comparative data on the role of
decentralized government across developing countries is not
currently available, but there are a few dated studies that
provide some useful information. Table 2.1 gives information
on the percentage of 1968 total government spending accounted
for by subnational governments in 44 developing countries.
Although the data are old, they give an indication of the
enormous variation in the size of the decentralized public
sector in developing countries. Furthermore, they basically
confirm the geographic generalizations made above about the
role of decentralized government in different areas of the
developing world. However, two points of caution are in
order. First, having a high percentage of expenditure
accounted for by decentralized government does not
necessarily mean that local governments have a significant
role to play, nor does it mean that the decentralized levels
of government are necessarily autonomous in their revenue-
raising powers and expenditure functions. Second, the data
should be used for very rough comparative and illustrative
purposes only. Some significant changes have certainly
occurred in some of these countries since 1968. For
example, the importance of the Kenyan decentralized
government sector has declined dramatically since 1968
because some major service responsibilities and revenue
TABLE 2.1
SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT PERCENTAGE SHARE IN TOTAL GOVERNMENT
CURRENT EXPENDITURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1968
Countries with Large
Subnational Share
Brazil
Colombia
Chile (1967)
India
Mexico
Pakistan
Uruguay
Ecuador
Venezuela
South Africa
Cameroon
El Salvador
Costa Rica
Bolivia
Median
Mean
65.8
54.2
52.7
52.3
47.5
44.5
44.4
41.4
41.2
40.1
40.0
39.2
37.5
37.2
42.9
45.6
Countries with Small
Subnational Share
Malaysia
Rhodesia*
Panama
Tunisia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Fiji
Thailand
Jamaica
Mauritius
Chad
Peru
Zambia
Swaziland
Lesotho
Ceylon**
Median
Mean
9.3
8.9
8.8
8.2
7.8
6.3
6.2
5.7
5.6
5.5
5.3
3.8
1.8
1.3
1.2
0.1
5.7
5.4
Countries with Medium
Subnational Share
Korea
Nicaragua
Nigeria (1969)
Malagasy
Ireland
Portugal
Botswana
Phillipines
Honduras
Kenya
Trinidad
Algeria
Guatemala
Turkey
Median
Mean
28.9
27.7
27.4
25.8
21.5
21.5
20.5
20.4
20.1
18.9
18.3
14.7
13.7
10.9
20.5
20.7
SOURCE: Woo Sik Kee, "Fiscal
Decentralization and Economic
Development" (Washington, DC:
The World Bank, 1976), mimeo
as cited in R. Bahl, Urban
Government Financial Structure
and Management in Developing
Countries, (Syracuse, NY:
Metropolitan Studies Program,
Syracuse University, December
1982), p. 30.
*Zimbabwe
**Sri Lanka
sources were transferred to the central government in 1970.
Table 2.2 presents information on the percentage of
local government expenditure financed from central government
transfers in selected cities in a sample of developing
countries. Again the data are old, mostly from the early and
mid-seventies, and for this reason they should be interpreted
with caution. However, they do illustrate the large
variations across developing countries in the degree of local
authority dependence on central government. Furthermore, the
data show that there are extreme variations within particular
developing countries in the degree to which central
governments fund local government services in different local
authorities.
Variations in Local Government in Developing Countries:
Selected Brief Case Studies
In order to illustrate the degree of diversity in local
government systems in developing countries, it is useful to
give some concrete examples of different types of systems.
This section presents very brief case studies of local
government systems in eight developing countries, including:
Brazil, Nigeria, Bangladesh, the Sudan, Papua New Guinea,
Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Peru. These countries were selected
so as to represent the spectrum of government organization,
from a federal system to a highly centralized unitary state.
They also illustrate a spectrum of responsibilities, from a
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TABLE 2.2
PERCENTAGE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE FINANCED FROM
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS (GRANTS AND SHARED TAXES) IN
SELECTED CITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
City Year Percent Central Transfers
Tunis (Tunisia) 1972 0.7
Bombay (India) 1970/71 1.0
Rio de Janiera (Brazil)* 1967 1.7
Francistown (Botswana) 1972 1.9
Kitwe (Zambia) 1975 2.2
Karachi (Pakistan) 1974/75 2.8
Cali (Colombia) 1974 2.8
Amedabab (India) 1970/71 4.2
Lusaka (Zambia) 1972 6.0
Mexico City (Mexico) 1968 8.9
La Paz (Bolivia) 1975 9.0
Valencia (Venezuela) 1968 9.2
Lumbumbashi (Zaire) 1972 9.5
Cartagena (Colombia) 1972 12.8
Bogota (Colombia) 1972 14.0
Seoul (Korea) 1971 15.8
Calcutta (India) 1974/75 19.5
Jakarta (Indonesia) 1972/73 21.1
Madras (India) 1975/76 25.1
Mbuji-Mayi (Zaire) 1971 29.8
Manila (Phillipines)** 1970 30.0
Bukaru (Zaire) 1971 30.1
Tehran (Iran) 1974 45.2
Kingston (Jamaica) 1971/72 67.2
Kinshasa (Zaire) 1971 73.1
Median 9.5
Mean 17.7
*Due to the exclusion of autonomous agencies which raise
self-financing service revenues, the importance of central
transfers is probably overstated.
**Total revenues are used as the base rather than total
expenditures.
SOURCE: Johannes Linn, "Urban Finances in Developing
Countries," in Urban Government Finance: Emerging Trends,
edited by Roy Bahl in Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Vol. 20
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 258-259.
fairly high degree of financial self-sufficiency and
decision-making autonomy to a low degree of both.
It is important to note that there is not a great deal
of information available about local governments in
developing countries, and much of what can be found is not
very current. The brief cases presented here are extracted
from fairly recent reports, articles, and/or interviews. The
level of detail differs across cases because the quantity and
quality of information available from the sources consulted
for the case material varies greatly.
Brazil: A Strong Case of Federalism4
Brazil has one of the few federal systems in the
developing world and one of the most developed systems of
decentralized government. Since the last century, the
Brazilian system of government has changed a number of times,
alternating between various forms of federalism and unitary
government. The current federal system is well suited for
Brazil, which is one of the largest developing countries in
the world. The country is divided into 23 states and about
4,000 local authorities (municipios).
All levels of government in Brazil have significant
service responsibilities and revenue-raising powers. In
1978, the federal (central) government accounted for 72.6
4 The information on Brazil is from Mahar and Dillinger
(1983).
percent of public sector current expenditures, 46.1 percent
of public sector capital outlays, and 67.0 percent of total
public sector spending. State governments made 24.6 percent
of public expenditure current expenditures, 43.7 percent of
public sector capital outlays, and 28.7 percent of total
public sector spending. Local authorities, despite their
number, had a much smaller role to play. In the same year,
they accounted for only 2.8 percent of public sector current
expenditures, 10.2 percent of public sector capital outlays,
and 4.4 percent of total public sector spending. Thus,
decentralized government in Brazil has a large fiscal role to
play, but primarily at the state, rather than the local,
level.
The service responsibilities of different levels of
government are not very clearly specified, with the exception
of obvious central government functions, such as defense.
The Constitution allows the states to engage in any
activities not specifically prohibited in its provisions.
The local authorities are merely assigned responsibility for
"local public services", without any definition of exactly
what these are. These ambiguities have led to joint
provision of many services across all levels of government.
The states and local governments combined accounted in 1975
for a significant percentage of public expenditures (after
transfers) in the following categories: housing and urban
services, 99 percent; education, 74 percent overall, 98
percent primary; and, health and sanitation, 47 percent.
There is a great heterogeneity among Brazilian states
and local authorities, but they, by and large, have access to
good sources of revenue. The main source of state revenue is
a modified value-added tax, which accounted for 59.2 percent
of total state revenue in 1978. Local authorities rely
heavily on a municipal service tax and property taxation,
which together yielded about 33 percent of local income in
the same year.
States are to a great extent self-sufficient, receiving
only 19.6 percent of their revenue from federal government
transfers. Local authorities were much more dependent on the
federal government, with 39.7 percent of their total income
coming from central sources. Only a small percentage of
federal transfers to state and local governments are
programme grants from general funds. Brazil has a revenue-
sharing scheme in which percentages of central government
taxes, including the income tax, the manufacturers' sales
tax, the fuel tax, the vehicle registration tax, and the
electricity tax, go to both state and local governments, and
these tax shares represent the bulk of the transfers.
Both state and local governments clearly have some
significant fiscal roles and powers in Brazil. However,
there are still a number of areas in which the central
government has a great deal of control over decentralized
governments. For example, the freedom of the states to levy
the value-added tax, by far their most important source of
revenue, is controlled by the federal government. The latter
has the authority to determine both the tax base and the tax
rates. The federal government has similar powers over the
municipal service tax, but not over the municipal property
tax.
Nigeria: Strong States in a Quasi-Federal System5
Like most former British colonies, Nigeria has a long
history of local government. It is unusual, however, in that
it also has a very powerful system of state government. The
Nigerian Constitution recognizes federal, state, and local
governments. It is not a true federal system because the
states are a creation of the central government, but it does
operate like a federal system in that the states have
substantial autonomous powers with which the central
government cannot interfere.
Local governments have not been strong historically in
Nigeria. It is interesting that the local government reform
movement arose during an era of military control. In 1976,
the military government issued a set of guidelines designed
to strengthen local government. The explanation given for
this move was that there was a need to institute
participatory democracy as a prelude to the impending return
5 The information on Nigeria comes from: Gboyega
(1983); Cochrane (1983); Rondinelli, et. al. (1983); and,
Nooi (1987).
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to civilian rule.
In the 1976 guidelines, Nigeria devolved a wide range of
functions to the local governments. These included:
maintenance of law and order; construction and maintenance of
secondary public roads and bridges; formulation and
implementation of rural development schemes; agricultural
development; and, provision of local services, such as
health, housing, and water. The Nigerian local governments
have access to a variety of revenue sources, including a
community tax, property rates, license fees, and service
charges.
Local government councils are supposed to have a fair
degree of local representation. Some local council members
are elected directly, but some are appointed by the state
governors. The states have a great degree of control over
the local councils. Local functions and revenue sources are
heavily regulated by the state governments. Local
governments are also heavily dependent on the state and
federal governments for revenue. The higher levels of
government are required to make statutory grants to local
authorities. The federal government must provide 5 percent
of its retained revenue through the states, while state
governments must provide 10 percent of their own-source
revenues to the local authorities in their jurisdictions.
The strong system of local government proposed by the
mid-1970s military government has never materialized in
Nigeria. After the country temporarily returned to civilian
rule in 1979, elections were held at the federal and state
level, but economic and political factors did not favor
strengthening local government. On the economic side,
drastic declines in oil revenue meant that the resources to
implement the decentralization programme were not there. On
the political side, the states were very successful in
blocking the implementation of the decentralization process.
The state governments, by and large, did not share in the
central government's enthusiasm for strengthening local
authorities. State governors began appointing their strong
supporters to local government councils and keeping tight
control over local authority actions. There was little that
the central government could do to force local authority
reform because the states have the ultimate powers over local
government in Nigeria. State governors may order the
dissolution of any local government council in their
jurisdictions at any time.
Today, many of the more than 300 local authorities in
Nigeria basically operate as appendages of the state
governments and without the full state and federal aid
revenue that is due to them. In 1983, only 5 out of 19 state
governments paid their full 10 percent grant to the local
authorities. Furthermore, 14 of 19 state governments
deducted substantial proportions of the federal government
grants due to local authorities and unilaterally diverted
them to state services. This is particularly significant
because local governments raise less than 20 percent of their
revenue from local taxes and charges and must depend heavily
on state and federal governments. The local authorities have
little autonomy, and, in the final analysis, they can do
little that is not in line with the wishes of the state
governments. Thus, Nigeria is a case where the state
governments wield unusual power, and attempts to implement a
significant fiscal role for local government have failed.
Bangladesh: Strong Decentralization in a Unitary State6
Bangladesh is an interesting case because it is a
unitary central government with a highly developed system of
local government. There is a long history of local
government on the Indian subcontinent, which dates back to
before the turn of the century under British rule.
Bangladesh has carried on the tradition of local government,
making various refinements in the direction of
decentralization over the years. Although recent research
has indicated that rural local governments do not have a
sufficient degree of fiscal autonomy to discharge all of
their potential responsibilities properly, Bangladesh has a
degree of local participation in decision-making that is
enjoyed by few developing countries with unitary governments.
6 The information on Bangladesh comes from Schroeder
and Maniruzzman (1984).
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There are four types of local government in Bangladesh.
The zilla parishad is geographically identical to the
district, which is the key administrative division of the
central government. The upazila parishad corresponds to the
thana, which is a subdivision of the central government
district. These two types of local government have strong
links to the central government and its ministries. Central
government officials are dominant members of the zilla
parishad councils, although there are plans to introduce a
greater degree of elected representation. The upazila
parishad council has more direct local representation,
although it has no employees of its own and relies on central
government staff to carry out the council's functions.
Union parishads are the third type of local government
in Bangladesh. These local authorities cover rural
subdivisions of the upazila parishads. These are
politically autonomous from the central government in the
sense that nearly all of the members of their councils are
directly elected in the local jurisdiction. This is also
largely true of the paurashavas, which are the fourth type of
local authority. These are the form of local government in
the urban areas of Bangladesh.
The zilla, upazila, and union parishads are somewhat
integrated local governments, which are responsible for a
hierarchy of services in the rural areas. Although there are
many possible responsibilities for the zilla parishads, their
prime responsibility in practice is for public works,
particularly roads for the district area. They also have
local responsibility for a national works programme, and make
some expenditures on education, agriculture, public health,
and social welfare and culture. The levels of local
government below the zilla parishad, despite a more
democratic political organization, do not have the financial
resources to play a major role in service provision. The
upazila parishads cover smaller areas within the zilla
parishads and help with many of the zilla parishad
responsibilities in their jurisdictions. Union parishads are
supposed to be assigned responsibility for 40 different
functions. Due to serious financial constraints, however,
they often do little more than settle local disputes, try to
document local agricultural and irrigation needs, and
provide some road maintenance services.
Zilla parishads get most of their revenue from taxes,
particularly a tax on immovable property. They also get some
earned income from enterprises, and they depend on the
central government for about 35 percent of their revenue.
Upazila parishads get their revenue from markets, fishponds,
and local businesses. They also get fees for various
licenses, but are overwhelmingly dependent on central
government grants. Union parishads get their income from
taxes on property in urban centers and various types of small
fees. The also get around 40 percent of their revenue from
central government grants.
The paurashavas in the urban areas are completely
independent of the zilla-upazila-union parashad system of
local government in the rural areas. They are responsible
for a wide range of traditional urban services, including
health, sanitation and sewerage, conservancy, markets and
slaughterhouses, education, etc. The two main sources of
revenue are the urban property tax and the octroi, which is
essentially a tax on goods brought into the municipality.
These two taxes accounted for about 65 percent of paurashava
income in 1981, with most of the rest coming from
miscellaneous taxes, tolls, and service fees. The
paurashavas are fairly independent financially, with only
about 10 percent of total income coming from the central
government in 1981.
Thus, Bangladesh has a substantial and largely
independent system of self-government in its urban areas.
The local government system in the rural areas is less
independent, particularly financially. Even with central
government grants, the rural local governments cannot
adequately provide the services for which they are
responsible. There is, however, a degree of representation
and participation in local government which is fairly rare in
the developing countries with unitary central governments.
Despite a lack of financial resources for local authorities,
the local government system in Bangladesh might serve as a
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model for other developing countries, although it might need
to be simplified for many other places.
The Sudan: Strong Central Control in a
Multitiered Unitary State7
The development of modern Sudan in the colonial and
post-independence eras has seen the rise and fall of a
variety of local government systems. As the largest country
in Africa in terms of area, the difficult issue of
decentralized administration has long been a major problem
for government. The situation has been complicated by the
division of the country into an Islamic north and a southern
area dominated by Christians and followers of traditional
African religions. The country was able to remain united
under colonial rule, but the power struggle between the north
and the south has caused turmoil since independence and is
the cause of the current Sudanese People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) civil war against the Islamic government. This case
is interesting because it clearly points to the problems that
can evolve when a colonial power imposes a system of unitary
government over a geographic area that has no basis for
unity.
7 The information for the Sudan comes from: Presidency
of the Republic of the Sudan (1980); Norris (1983); Nooi
(1987); and, Marouf (1987). The author also interviewed
Fouad Eid Ali, Undersecretary, and Mohamed Ahmed Osman
Marouf, Director of Training, Ministry of Local Government,
Khartoum. The interviews were conducted in July 1987 at the
International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) Conference on
Local Government in Africa held in Mombasa, Kenya, in July, 1987.
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Local government reform became important in the early
1970s. During the course of that decade, the number of
local authorities increased from 86 to 5,600. The powers of
central government ministries in the provinces were
curtailed and the Ministry of Local Government dissolved.
Control of the local authorities was handed over to the
provincial commissioners. Unfortunately, most of the
provincial commissioners kept the power at their level and
did not extend decentralization to the lower tiers.
Attempts at reform again occurred in 1980 and 1981 with
the passage of the Regional Government Act and the Local
Government Act. The provinces became regions under the
leadership of governors, who are regional ministers of the
central government, and regional governments became known as
people's regional councils. Regional government was given
the power to license elected local government councils, which
were corporate bodies with independent budgets and autonomous
powers. A Ministry of Local Government was re-established to
support the new decentralization initiatives.
After the uprising of April, 1985, the people's regional
councils and local government councils were dissolved. They
were replaced by appointed regional and local administrative
committees, which are supposed to perform the same duties and
functions as the regional and local governments they
replaced. The central government is currently studying the
issue of what to do about local government in the future.
Decentralized levels of government are responsible for a
wide variety of services in the Sudan. Regional governments
have primary responsibility for health and secondary
education, while local governments provide water, sanitation,
works, primary education, and other basic services. Local
governments do have the power to collect certain fees and
taxes, the most important of which are the immovable property
and personal property taxes, but the revenue is considered to
be the property of the central government. Local governments
are highly dependent on the central government--80 percent
of their income comes from central government grants. Local
governments are not allowed to borrow from any source.
Despite a number of attempts to decentralize, Sudan
remains a country with a highly centralized public sector.
Little remains of the decentralization efforts except the
shell of decentralized institutions. Before central
government administrative committees took over the
responsibilities of regional and local governments, there was
a fair degree of local autonomy and participation through the
election of semi-independent councils, but there was also a
high degree of financial dependence on the central
government. During the current civil war, there has been a
clear reversion towards centralization.
Papua New Guinea: Extreme Fiscal Dependence of
Strong Local Governments in a Unitary State8
Papua New Guinea was highly centralized and had a very
weak system of local government until the late 1970s. In
1977, the central government replaced the district
administration system with a provincial system, which formed
the basis for local government. The provinces were to be run
by powerful elected provincial assemblies and executive
councils. Provincial governments were given full legislative
and managerial responsibilities for a wide range of local
functions, including public works, hospitals, and education.
In addition, they were assigned some responsibility for joint
central-local functions, and they were given access to a
number of local taxes, the major one being the sales tax.
The central government also provides substantial transfers,
including: a significant administrative functions grant; 1.25
percent of the value of export goods produced in the
provinces; and, all revenues from license fees
and royalties collected by the central government in the
province.
The 19 provincial governments in Papua New Guinea are
overwhelmingly dependent on the central government for their
income. In 1978, provincial own-source revenues accounted
for an average of only 6 percent of total provincial revenue.
8 The information on Papua New Guinea comes from:
Conyers and Westcott (1979) Cochrane (1983); and, Rondinelli
(1983).
By 1981, the situation had improved very slightly: 8.5
percent of provincial revenues were generated by provincial
taxes. During the 1978-81 period, unconditional grants from
the central government to the provincial councils increased
by 65 percent, while other types of central government
transfers to the provinces increased by 45 percent. In
general, central government transfers to provincial
governments account for 20 to 25 percent of total central
government expenditures in a given year.
Thus, Papua New Guinea has a highly developed system of
provincial self-government with a significant degree of
autonomy. Fiscally, however, the provincial councils are
dependent on the central government for the vast majority of
their income. Some analysts might be highly critical of this
arrangement, but it is possible to argue that the system
works very well and is appropriate for a small country, such
as Papua New Guinea.
Zimbabwe: Developing Decentralized Government
in a Unitary State9
Zimbabwe is a new country which is still in the process
9 The information on Zimbabwe came from a presentation
at the International Union of Local Authorities Conference on
Local Government in Africa held in Mombasa, Kenya in July,
1987. The presentation was given by B. Mtandwa, Mayor of
Kwekwe and Deputy President of the Urban Councils
Association of Zimbabwe. Interviews were also conducted with
the speaker and several other members of the Zimbabwe
delegation, including J.S. Moyo, Ministry of Local
Government, Harare.
of developing its system of government. The former white
minority-ruled Rhodesia has only been known as Zimbabwe since
1980. The former government of Ian Smith had retained the
colonial system of local government. Under this system,
there were 242 African councils. The armed struggle, which
eventually led to the rise of a black majority government
under Robert Mugabe, basically destroyed the African council
system, which the Africans considered to be a puppet
extension of the racist regime.
Since that time, the government of Zimbabwe has been
trying to implement a relatively strong and autonomous system
of local government. There are currently 126 local
authorities in Zimbabwe of three different types: urban
councils, district councils, and rural councils. These do
not overlap jurisdictionally and are all empowered to provide
the same types of services.
There is a good degree of participation in local
government in Zimbabwe. For every 500 people there is a
village development committee. Ten of these committees form
a ward within the local authority in which they are situated,
and each ward is supposed to elect a councillor to the local
council.
Local authorities in Zimbabwe are responsible for a wide
variety of public services. These include: fire, police,
ambulance services, planning, health inspection, roads,
health, education, social welfare, water, sewerage, waste
management, and refuse collection. Of course, not all of
these services are provided by all local authorities, but
most of these services are provided in the urban councils.
The local authorities in Zimbabwe have access to a wide
variety of revenue sources, including property rents and
rates, vehicle and shop licenses, housing rents, service
charges, education fees, and health fees (for those who earn
more than a certain income). Local authorities may also earn
income from various public enterprises, including liquor
trading, ranching, crop farming, and the building of factory
and commercial shells for investors. Councils are free to
seek loans from both the central government and on the open
market.
There is some degree of financial and functional
independence among Zimbabwean local authorities, particularly
in the urban.areas. District councils rely on the central
government for about 50 percent of their revenue, while rural
councils get 30 to 40 percent of their income from central
government grants. Urban councils are much more self-
sufficient, relying on the central government for only 5 to
20 percent of their revenue. The Ministry of Local
Government and Urban and Regional Development has regulatory
power over the local authorities, but many of its policies
are designed to increase the capacity and self-sufficiency of
local governments.
Thus, Zimbabwe is a case of a new system which is trying
from the beginning to carve out a substantial fiscal role for
local government. The local authorities in this country are
empowered with significant service provision responsibilities
and a variety of revenue sources, and they seem to be
developing with remarkable speed.
Botswana: Reducing Local Government Fiscal Autonomy
in a Unitary State10
Unlike Zimbabwe and other developing countries that are
trying to strengthen local government, Botswana seems to be
moving in the opposite direction. Botswana, in contrast to
most former British colonies, never had a modern western
system of local government imposed on it during the colonial
years. It was not until independence was attained in 1966
that a system of local government was instituted. A council
was set up in each district, the decentralized administrative
division of the central government. Several town councils
were also established in urban areas.
Local authorities in Botswana are technically
responsible for a wide variety of public services, including
primary education, basic health services and facilities,
rural road maintenance, and village water supplies. They
also have access to a variety of local taxes, the most
10 The information on Botswana came from Reilly (1983)
and Wallis (1987). Interviews were also conducted of local
government officials from Botswana attending the
International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) Conference on
Local Government in Africa held in Mombasa, Kenya in July, 1987.
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productive of which is the property tax. The central
government has a system of deficit grants to local
authorities that automatically make up any revenue shortfall
in local authority budgets.
The system of participation through local government in
Botswana is often considered to be one of the best in Africa.
However, the degree of fiscal autonomy is relatively small
and seems to be in the process of being cut back further by
the central government. The local authorities are under
strict control by the Ministry of Local Government and Lands,
which must approve most local authority revenue-raising and
spending activities. As of 1988, the central government is
taking over all local authority taxes. Thus, local
authorities in Botswana will be entirely dependent on central
government for their income.
Despite being considered a model for political
decentralization in Africa, Botswana is one of the few
developing countries that seems to be explicitly and openly
undermining the fiscal powers of local authorities at a time
when many developing countries are at least talking about
decentralization.
Peru: Extreme Centralization in a Unitary Statell
The public sector in Peru is among the more highly
centralized of the world's developing countries, with the
11 The information for Peru comes from Greytak (1982).
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central government collecting most of the public sector
revenues and also doing most of the spending. In 1979,
central government expenditures accounted for over 96 percent
of total public sector spending.
Most public services in Peru are planned and provided by
ministries and public enterprises under the central
government. This is true for water, sewerage and sanitation,
roads, public health, electricity, and other major services,
both in the rural and urban areas. Although local
authorities share some of these responsibilities in name, in
practice they have neither the resources nor the staff to
have a significant independent impact on service provision.
Peru is divided into three levels of local government.
The country is divided into 24 departments, which are, in
turn, subdivided into 113 provinces. The provinces are
further subdivided into 930 districts. The provinces and
districts are most important in terms of service provision.
All types of local government in Peru are primarily rural in
nature, although they do provide services in the urban areas.
Capital cities in the provinces, for example, fall under the
jurisdiction of the provincial local government.
Peruvian local governments, in fact, have clear legal
authority to provide services and raise revenue. In addition
to having a role to play in the provision of the services
named above, local authorities are allowed to raise revenue
from user charges, the sale of goods and services, and
various taxes, the most important of which is the tax on
immovable property.
At one time, the local governments in Peru played a more
important role than they do today. During the 1970s, the
growth of the local government sector lagged behind the
overall growth of the public sector, leading to a decline in
the overall importance of local government. In 1979, local
government accounted for only 3.7 percent of total
government expenditure and was responsible for substantially
less than one percent of total capital spending by the
government and public enterprises. In the same year, the
largest single source of local government revenue was
transfers from the central government. These accounted for
34 percent of total local government income.
Thus, Peru is a country in which the local government
plays a relatively minor fiscal role in the public sector
system. It is particularly noteworthy for its lack of
independent local authorities in its urban areas. The small
role of decentralized government in Peru is not unusual in
developing countries, particularly among those in Africa and
parts of Asia. It is, however, one of the most highly
centralized states in Latin America. Efforts are underway to
attempt to increase autonomy at the local level in Peru, but
it is not clear how successful they will be.
Summary of Cases
The cases discussed in this chapter are presented in
summary form in Table 2.3. This information clearly
demonstrates the diversity of local government systems in
developing countries along several important dimensions. The
countries range from Brazil, a federal system whose state and
local governments have moderate to high revenue self-
sufficiency and decision-making autonomy, to Sudan, a unitary
system whose regional and local governments have little
revenue self-sufficiency and decision-making autonomy.
Between these two extremes, there are a variety of
different cases that highlight particular aspects of local
government systems in developing countries: Nigeria, with
strong state, but weak local, government; Papua New Guinea,
with regional governments that are highly dependent on the
central government for revenue, but largely independent in
making expenditure decisions; Peru, where local governments
have moderate revenue self-sufficiency but little decision-
making autonomy; Bangladesh, with strong urban but weaker
rural local governments; Zimbabwe, where a new system of
local government with an increasing degree of fiscal and
political autonomy is being instituted; and, Botswana, where
decision-making autonomy is high but revenue self-sufficiency
is declining.
TABLE 2.3
DIVERSITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS:
SUMMARY INFORMATION FOR EIGHT DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Country Type Decentralized Revenue Decision
Name of Government Self- Making
System Types1 Sufficiency2 Autonomy3
BRAZIL
NIGERIA
BANGLADESH
SUDAN
PAPUA NEW
GUINEA
ZIMBABWE
BOTSWANA
PERU
Federal
Federal
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
Unitary
State
Local
State
Local
Rural
Urban
High
Moderate
Moderate
Low
Moderate
High
Regional
Local
Regional
Rural
Urban
Local
Local
Low
Low
Low
Moderate
Moderate
High
Low
Low
Moderate
Low
Low
High
Moderate
High
Low
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
High
Low
1 Some countries have more types of local governments than
those indicated, but detailed information was not available about
the different types.
2 The rating of some countries on revenue self-sufficiency
is sometimes based on general impressions rather than data. These
ratings are for rough comparative purposes only.
3 The rating of local authorities on decision-making
autonomy is based on impressionistic and incomplete information.
These ratings are intended for rough comparative purposes only.
Summary of Issues Regarding Local Government Diversity
In contrast to the situation 10 years ago, there does
seem to be a trend in many developing countries towards
strengthening local authorities, even in some areas where
centralization has long been the rule. As one observer of
the situation put it: "In practice this means local
governments are being given a larger share of total public
income; central controls over local governments are being
eased; representative local governments are being re-
established; municipal credit and technical assistance
programmes and local government associations are being
created; and popular participation in planning is
emerging.,,12
Although this may be true in many countries, it is clear
that policies for strengthening local authorities are taking
very different forms in different developing countries. This
is true not only because government systems differ widely,
but also because the cultural and political climates are so
diverse. Even countries with similar political systems have
very different ways of organizing and operating their local
governments. It is also clear from the cases discussed above
that not all countries are likely to strengthen local
authorities in a meaningful way, and a few are actually
moving in the direction of greater centralization despite the
12 This quote is taken from an editorial in Planning
and Administration, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Autumn 1985).
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rhetoric of reform.
It is very difficult to summarize the different ways in
which local government is organized in developing countries
because of the great variety of roles that local authorities
are called on to play. It is reasonable to say, however,
that there are a set of basic dimensions along which local
authorities differ. First, government systems differ in the
number of decentralized levels of government that exist and
the constitutionally and legislatively mandated
administrative relationships they have among each other.
Second, local authorities differ in their degree of political
decentralization and grassroots legitimacy. Some local
authorities have significant political power and are
popularly elected, while others are appointed councils that
follow the directives of a more centralized level of
government. Third, local authorities differ in the degree
to which they have autonomy in revenue-raising and
expenditure decision-making. Some have significant autonomy
in both, others in one area, and still others have little
autonomy of any sort. Fourth, local authority systems differ
in the average degree of fiscal capacity relative to service
responsibilities. Local authorities in some developing
countries can more or less finance their designated services,
while others do not have the ability to raise sufficient
revenue to do so. In some cases, the central government
steps in with financial assistance, while in others the
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revenue shortfalls remain. Finally, governments in
developing countries vary in their attitudes about
centralization. Many local government systems are being
strengthened, but in some developing countries the degree of
centralization is actually increasing, sometimes in violation
of how the constitution and relevant legislation say the
decentralized government sector is supposed to be organized.
This chapter has documented the diversity of local
government systems and fiscal roles in developing countries.
This establishes a broad context for defining a framework to
analyze the fiscal role of local government in developing
countries, which is the central focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
FISCAL ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
The diversity of local government systems and
operations in the developing world is tremendous, as was
discussed and documented in Chapter 2. This extreme
diversity introduces serious complications into an analysis
of the fiscal role of local government in these areas. In
spite of these complications, however, the public finance
literature has certain insights to offer on the fiscal role
of local government in developing countries. In this
chapter, this literature will be briefly reviewed and its
relevance for developing countries evaluated as a prelude to
outlining a basic framework for analyzing and evaluating the
fiscal role of local government in the developing world.
Public Finance Background
Before the issue of defining a fiscal role for local
government can be analyzed, it is first necessary to
identify the economic role that government as a whole has to
play. The early welfare economists demonstrated that, under
the usual assumptions of perfect competition, a market
economy generates a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources
without any government intervention. The private-goods
welfare economics model was extended to the case in which
there is market failure and public goods are provided by the
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government. In two classic articles, Samuelson (1954 and
1955) showed that, under certain strict assumptions, a
properly functioning market economy will generate a Pareto-
optimal allocation of resources between public and private
goods. 1 He also demonstrated, however, that there was a
frontier of Pareto-optimal solutions, and that it was
necessary to define a welfare function that embodies societal
preferences in order to select the Pareto-optimal mix of
private and public goods that maximizes social welfare. This
suggested the need for a political decision-making process
capable of defining a distribution of resources deemed "fair"
or "desirable" by society, even in a case where the strict
assumptions of the model hold.
The variety of market imperfections or failures that
exist in any modern economy justify some economic role for
government on allocation grounds. Public interference in the
economy in order to allocate resources more efficiently is
1 Samuelson was building on earlier writings in welfare
economics that defined the efficiency conditions for pareto-
optimality in a world with only private goods. He
demonstrated that the efficiency conditions for the public
and private goods case differ from those in the private goods
only case. The efficient solution for private goods exists
when the marginal rates of substitution in consumption are
equal for all consumers and equal to the marginal rate of
transformation in production. Where public and private goods
are involved, the fact that public goods are non-rival in
consumption must be taken into account. All consumers are
provided with an equal amount of the public good, so that the
marginal rates of substitution of public for private goods
may differ. Because consumers share in the consumption of
the public good, the marginal rate of transformation in
production must equal the sum of the marginal rates of
substitution in consumption for all consumers.
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sanctioned by economists for three principal reasons. First,
in cases where there are natural monopolies (or oligopolies),
resources may be more efficiently allocated if the government
regulates or operates these enterprises. Second, when
production or consumption of a good or service generates
external costs or benefits that accrue to other producers or
consumers, the market-pricing mechanism fails, and resources
will be over- or under-allocated in these markets. In such
cases, the government can regulate or provide incentives for
the private sector to internalize costs and benefits.
Finally, there is the case of public goods, which the private
market fails to provide or provides suboptimally because of
their nonrival and non-excludable nature. Pure public goods
are extremely rare--most goods provided by governments are
impure, i.e., are to some extent rival and excludable. There
are also cases of merit goods, which generate such important
external benefits that the government decides to provide them
because they would otherwise be provided at suboptimal levels
by the market.2
Providing optimal levels of public goods is complicated
by the "free rider" problem: people have no incentive to
reveal their true preferences for public goods because they
will still enjoy them if other people are willing to pay.
2 The market may also fail when information is
expensive and/or imperfect. When individuals do not have the
information required to make well-informed decisions in the
marketplace, inefficient patterns of resource allocation are
likely to emerge.
This results in the need for use of governmental powers of
coercion to extract taxes to finance public goods. The
selection of an optimal combination of public goods and
taxes, like the identification of an optimal distribution of
income, is basically left to the political process.3 Public
choice theory has demonstrated that, under special
conditions, the outcome of a majority voting process reflects
the preferences of the median voter and results in a stable
solution to the problem of making collective decisions. A
number of theorists have attempted to deal with other aspects
of the complicated problem of public choice, including
intensity of preferences, logrolling, representative
democracy, and bureaucratic decision-making.
The final justification for government interference in
the economy is that market-economies are not inherently self-
regulating and require government intervention for
stabilization purposes.4  After the stock market crash of
1929 and the Great Depression which followed it, a
stabilization role for government was somewhat reluctantly
acknowledged by mainstream economists. Roosevelt's New Deal
programs ushered in a new era of government intervention in
the economy. "Keynesian Economics," however, was not fully
3 An excellent review of public choice theory is found
in Mueller (1976).
4 The allocation, distribution and stabilization roles
for the public sector were first elaborated as a group of
functions by Musgrave (1959) in his seminal public finance
text.
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and explicitly incorporated into mainstream economics until
the Kennedy years, when discretionary fiscal policy formally
emerged as official government policy. 5 The Keynesians
justified the need for the government to use monetary, tax,
and spending policy to help moderate the effects of regular
cyclical upturns and downturns in a market economy.
Government may use these policy instruments to move against
the direction of the cycle by injecting purchasing power into
the economy during recessionary downturns and withdrawing
purchasing power from the economy during inflationary
upswings. As the international economy became more
interrelated, stabilization needs also dictated a more active
government role in the management of exchange rates and the
international balance-of-payments. During the past decade
there have been popularized critics of Keynesian economics
and a great deal of anti-Keynesian rhetoric by conservative
politicians. Nevertheless, few modern macroeconomists would
deny that the public sector must serve as an agent of
macroeconomic stabilization.
In summary, mainstream economics assigns three major
functions to the public sector. Government intervention is
justified to provide a more efficient allocation of resources
5 Not all followers of Keynes would accept as adequate
the stabilization role for government defined by the
mainstream macroeconomists. The post-Keynesians would argue
that mainstream economists have not fully acknowledged the
instability, that, according to Keynes, is inherent in a
capitalist economy, nor the political economy basis for this
instability.
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when there are market failures. It is also acceptable for
government to implement policies to affect the distribution
of income, according to some politically defined notion of
what constitutes a fair income distribution. Finally,
government is expected to pursue various types of
countercyclical policies in order to stabilize macroeconomic
fluctuations.
Theories of the Fiscal Role of Local Government
The theories briefly outlined above were applied by
public finance economists to the issue of decentralized
government. An appropriate role for local government in
developed countries has traditionally been defined by
economists using a basic theory of fiscal decentralization
known as fiscal federalism.6 Drawing on the standard model
of public sector responsibility for stabilization,
distribution, and allocation, the decentralization model
provides economic guidelines for dividing these functions
among different levels of government. In addition, the model
presents guidelines for designing an optimal local revenue
system.
Stabilization
Primary responsibility for stabilization is generally
6 The theory of fiscal federalism is set forth in
detail in Oates (1972).
assigned to the central government because stabilization
activities are considered to be essentially macroeconomic.
Monetary policy must be managed at the national level because
of the problems that would result if subnational
jurisdictions had their own money supply and/or control over
monetary policy. In addition, local economies are likely to
be highly open, suggesting that leakages from a marginal
dollar of private spending are likely to be substantial.
Thus, the expenditure multiplier (the reciprocal of the sum
of the marginal propensity to save and the marginal
propensity to import out of income) would be small, and the
expansionary effects of local fiscal policy, such as a local
tax cut, would be dissipated into other areas. Finally, the
use of Keynesian deficit finance policies would not be
desirable at the local level. Such debt is often held by
individuals external to the local jurisdiction, and the
repayment of such debt will involve the transfer of real
income to individuals outside the local area. 7
The standard arguments for assigning the stabilization
function to the central government have recently been
challenged. Gramlich (1987) has argued that, at least in the
case of the United States, new macroeconomic developments and
large federal deficits in recent years have greatly
7 of course, it must be acknowledged that central
government debt can also be held externally to a significant
extent. In the case of some developing and developed
countries, the problems that this can generate have been
fairly evident in recent years.
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constrained the ability of the federal government to pursue
countercyclical policy. He also demonstrates that state
governments have successfully played a greater role in
pursuing countercyclical policies than they did in the past.
Although some of these findings, particularly those relating
to changes in macroeconomic conditions, may be generalizable
to other countries, the ability of decentralized government
stabilization policy to have the desired effects will depend
on a variety of factors in any given country, including the
importance of decentralized governments in the national
economy.
Distribution
The fiscal federalism model places responsibility for
distribution in large part with the central government
primarily because of the problems that would be expected to
result from factor mobility if local redistribution programs
were undertaken. Local redistribution programs could induce
wealthy residents and businesses to move out of a
jurisdiction practicing redistribution, while poor
individuals eligible for benefits would move in, thereby
undermining the redistributive base. This would particularly
be a problem for small jurisdictions and especially where
local redistribution programs were not widespread and fairly
similar across jurisdictions.
Other analysts, such as Pauly (1973) and Tresch (1981),
70
have suggested that income redistribution may raise the
utility of higher income people and that taxpayers should
and will try to raise the incomes of the poor primarily in
their own area. Gramlich (1987) has argued that in recent
years, state governments in the United States have been
playing a greater and successful role in implementing
redistribution policies. The question of central versus
local primacy in redistribution policies is difficult to
resolve empirically, but the mobility issue continues to be
an important concern, as does the existence of
interjurisdictional income disparities in a given country.
These disparities suggest that, if redistribution
responsibility is decentralized, some wealthier areas will be
better able to effect meaningful income redistribution than
their poorer counterparts. Some decentralized redistribution
probably occurs in many countries because local governments
may provide services that benefit the poor, who may pay few
or no taxes.
Allocation
The role of decentralized levels of government in the
allocation function is very substantial. The basic idea
behind this assertion is that there is not likely to be
uniform demand for many public goods and services across
large geographic areas. If this is the case, there would be
a misallocation of resources if uniform levels of services
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were to be provided across large jurisdictions. Welfare
gains could be enhanced through decentralization because
residents in the decentralized jurisdictions could choose the
mix of public goods and taxes that best conforms with their
preferences. In the absence of a market and competitive
pricing, community-wide demand would obviously be made
through the collective decision-making process, i.e.,
voting. In this framework, a fragmented pattern of
jurisdictions is preferable to a system of large, all-
purpose authorities. This is true not only because of the
preference differentiation issue, but also because in smaller
jurisdictions, expenditure decisions are tied more closely to
real resource costs. In addition, when there are a large
number of decentralized governments providing services, there
is likely to be greater experimentation and innovation in the
provision of local public goods, potentially leading to
improvements in overall resource productivity.
Extensions of the logic of preference variations
suggest that in a system where there are opportunities for
mobility, people will move to an area where a local
government provides their preferred mix of public services.
This produces a market-like solution to the local service
provision problem. An equilibrium occurs when people
distribute themselves across differing communities in such a
way that there is no incentive for anyone to move, i.e.,
everyone is satisfied with the services being provided in the
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jurisdiction in which they reside.8 This "voting-with-the-
feet" theory is based on a variety of strict and unrealistic
assumptions, e.g., no externalities, perfect mobility,
perfect information about public goods and services in a very
large number of heterogeneous communities, zero government
fixed costs, and constant costs of production. Nevertheless,
it is useful conceptually, and the results of the relaxing
the strict assumptions can be analyzed.9
There are important exceptions to the general rule of
decentralizing to maximize efficiency in service provision.
Some services, such as utilities and transportation systems,
exhibit economies of scale, and, in such cases, it is more
efficient to provide these services at a more centralized
level or through a cooperative agreement of local
authorities. 10 In addition, there are cases, such as water
supply, in which the provision of particular services
generates interjurisdictional externalities. In such cases,
8 This theory was set forth by Tiebout (1956) during
the early development of public finance theory and prior to
the articulation of the fiscal federalism theory. However,
it actually fits in well under the discussion of efficiency
in the allocation of resources and so is placed under the
umbrella of fiscal federalism.
9 There has been a variety of theoretical writing and
empirical research on the fiscal federalism and Tiebout local
government theories. Much of this work is summarized,
discussed, critiqued, and analyzed in King (1984).
10 It is technically efficient to assign service
provision to a larger jurisdiction only if the cost savings
from joint consumption outweigh the potential welfare loss
involved in providing the good or service over a wider
jurisdiction where preferences may be less homogeneous.
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resource allocation is more efficient when the service is
provided more centrally, cooperatively, or with central
coordination. The ideal service provision area is one that
just leads to an internalization of externalities.
optimal service provision area is a very complicated
issue, because it may vary greatly for different public goods
and may in few or no cases correspond exactly to the
boundaries of existing political jurisdictions. The welfare
gains from establishing levels of government or independent
authorities with efficient boundaries for providing a
particular public good or goods must be weighed against the
costs involved in having a larger number of jurisdictions.
It may often be more practical and efficient to use
intergovernmental grants to subsidize goods that exhibit
positive externalities or to establish cooperative
arrangements among existing government units in order to
internalize externalities and/or capture economies of scale.
Oates (1972, p. 19) defines the central theoretical
problem of fiscal federalism as: "the determination of the
optimal structure of the public sector in terms of the
assignment of decision-making responsibility for specific
functions to the proper geographic subsets of society."
This clearly implies that economic or fiscal federalism is
different from political federalism, and that it may
necessitate cooperative agreements among decentralized
political jurisdictions, creation by the central government
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of regional or special authorities for provision of specific
services, or provision, subsidy, or regulation of a
particular service by a more centralized level of government.
Because the efficient service area may not correspond to
existing political jurisdictions and is theoretically
independent of political considerations, the assignment of
responsibility guidelines based on the theory of fiscal
federalism can be applied even in countries where a federal
political system does not exist.
Revenue-Raising System
Drawing on mainstream public finance theory, the fiscal
federalism model sets forth guidelines for designing an
optimal tax system to finance decentralized government
functions. The guidelines explicitly incorporate spatial
dimensions of a local tax system into the analysis.
According to Oates (1972), there are four basic guidelines
to be followed:
1. Local government taxes should be neutral, i.e.,
avoid excess burden. Local governments should select a set
of taxes that extract the resources required to met their
responsibilities but which have as few undesirable side
effects on the operation of the economic system as possible.
A tax is neutral when it does not alter the terms on which
consumers or producers choose among alternative economic
activities and possible locations for them. Such a tax
reduces private disposable income and leads to an alteration
in expenditure patterns, requiring an adjustment in
equilibrium prices and quantities in the system. It does
not, however, alter relative prices and affect the basis on
which economic decisions are made.
2) The benefits and costs of local taxes should be
clear to each individual in the local authority iurisdiction.
To the extent that local people understand how the tax
revenue they pay is going to be used, they can make informed
decisions, thereby increasing efficiency. This suggests the
desirability of adherence to the benefit principle, which
states that an individual should bear the costs of the
benefits enjoyed from a particular good or service.
3) The pattern of incidence of local taxes should be as
ecuitable as possible. 1 1 There are two basic types of
equity, horizontal and vertical. Horizontal equity requires
that people in similar circumstances be treated similarly by
a particular tax. Vertical equity requires that people in
different circumstances be treated differently. The latter
is the basis for ability-to-pay taxation, whereby
redistribution is effected because people of higher income or
wealth pay proportionally more than people in less fortunate
11 The overall incidence of the tax and expenditure
system is a better measure of equity than the incidence of
the tax system alone. If, for example, a tax system is
proportional, but expenditures highly favor lower income
earners, the overall incidence of the system may be desirable
even in the absence of a progressive tax system.
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circumstances. The mobility problems that ability-to-pay
taxes can cause across local jurisdictions have already been
discussed.
It is important to note that a tradeoff exists between
adherence to the benefit principle and the use of ability-to-
pay taxation. The redistribution inherent in the latter
violates the former, but this is often considered desirable
in cases where a more equal distribution of income and basic
public services is a national goal.
4) Administration and compliance costs should be
minimized. Some taxes, such as a complex progressive income
tax, are difficult and relatively expensive for government to
administer and constituents to comply with. Taxes of this
nature should be avoided by local government where possible
because of limited local resources and administrative
capacity and to minimize perverse incentives for those who
pay taxes. Alternatively, local authorities can take
advantage of the economies of scale in established central or
regional government collection mechanisms to collect certain
local taxes for which there are particularly significant
economies of scale in collection.
In addition to these basic guidelines, several other
factors and issues should be taken into consideration:
1) The spatial dimension of decentralized public
functions requires that issues related to local government
competition and interdependence be explicitly taken into
consideration. One of these issues, mobility, has already
been touched upon in connection with ability-to-pay taxes and
redistribution. The problem of mobility, however, is much
broader. If particular taxes in one jurisdiction are higher
than similar taxes in neighboring jurisdictions, affected
taxpayers would be rational to move to the lower tax
jurisdiction, all other things being equal. This results in
a violation of the principle of neutrality and a loss in
efficiency, because local taxes are affecting the basis on
which individuals and firms make decisions about where to
locate their economic activities.
Another spatial issue related to taxation is the degree
to which a local government can export its taxes to residents
of other jurisdictions. If, for example, nonresidents buy
goods subject to a production or sales tax in a particular
local authority, part of the burden of local taxes is shifted
to other jurisdictions. Tax exporting is desirable from the
point of view of the taxing jurisdiction, although it may
create an incentive for some jurisdictions to push their
output of public goods beyond the optimal level.
2) National goals regarding public service provision
and ecruity may require central government intervention. To
the extent that there are fiscal disparities across local
governments in a particular country, there will be
differences in the ability of some jurisdictions to provide
public services. The national political process may decide
78
that local authorities should have more equal financial
capacities than they do and/or that particular local services
should be provided at a minimum level across all local
authorities. In order to attain these goals, the central
government can use block grants, which are unrestricted lump-
sums, or categorical grants, which are restricted for
particular priority uses. Intergovernmental grants can also
be used to subsidize the provision of goods that involve
positive externalities.
3) It is possible and may be desirable to separate
responsibility for revenue-raising and expenditure functions
between levels of government. In cases where there are
unacceptable fiscal disparities across local authorities
and/or highly inadequate revenue collection mechanisms at the
local level, the central government can take primary
responsibility for raising particular types of revenue and
transfering it to the local governments. This can be
consistent with the fiscal federalism model's emphasis on
decentralizing the allocation function if sufficient local
government autonomy over expenditure decisions is maintained.
4) The desired criteria to use for assigning revenue
sources to local authorities will generally differ from the
point of view of central and local governments [Bahl and Linn
(1983), p. 183]. From the central government point of view,
the most important criteria are likely to be: (a) limit local
competition for important national tax bases; (b) limit local
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use of taxes whose burden is exportable to residents of other
jurisdictions; (c) provide local authorities with
sufficiently buoyant revenues in order to limit demands on
central government resources; (d) avoid local reliance on
regressive taxes as much as possible; (e) encourage the use
of taxes that can be easily administered at the local level;
and, (f) encourage the use of taxes that closely reflect the
costs of infrastructure and congestion.
Local governments are likely to agree more or less with
criteria (c) through (f), and will be particularly concerned
with having taxes that are buoyant and easily administered.
However, local authorities are likely to have exactly the
opposite priorities from those reflected in criteria (a) and
(b). They would almost certainly like to get a share of
productive national tax bases, and it is in their interests,
as noted earlier, to rely on taxes whose burden can be
exported to other jurisdictions.
Relevance of the Fiscal Federalism Theory
to Developing Countries
Although few developing countries are federal systems,
the fiscal federalism model provides some useful insights
into evaluating the role of local authorities in the
developing world. Some of the basic assumptions of the
model, however, do not always apply in underdeveloped
countries, and the context in which the-model must be applied
may vary tremendously from the more-developed nations. The
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appropriateness of the model for application to developing
countries, with an emphasis on allocation, is discussed in
the following sections.
Stabilization
It is appropriate to assign to the central government
responsibility for stabilization in developing countries for
essentially the same reasons as in developed countries, but
the case may be even stronger for the former. Macroeconomic
fluctuations are often very severe in developing countries.
Agricultural economies located in areas subject to severe and
unpredictable variations in climate and which are heavily
dependent on other countries for manufactured goods and
credit are in a highly vulnerable position. Stabilization
policies must be carefully planned and coordinated by well-
trained and experienced people. In addition, local
governments in developing countries often have only a very
small role in the economy and the public sector, sometimes
accounting for as little as a few percent of total government
spending. The impact of their fiscal policies is therefore
extremely limited. Finally, casual observation suggests that
some types of local authorities in developing nations are
highly sensitive to both cyclical and unpredictable economic
fluctuations. They all but close down in some areas because
of the extreme dependence of rural local authorities on taxes
related to the level of economic activity (e.g., agricultural
taxes, business license taxes, market fees) and their minor
reliance on wealth-based taxes (land rates) and fee-for-
service activities (water and sewerage charges).
Distribution
The distribution function is also best handled by the
central government in developing countries, but not
necessarily for the same reasons as in developed nations.
Domestic mobility of the rich is likely to be less of an
issue in developing countries. There are often only a few
major cities that provide a reasonably high level of public
services and wealth-responsive amenities for which scale
factors are important. Thus, people do not have a great deal
of choice about where to live if they wish to enjoy the
standard of living of an urban center. It is true that there
has been a dramatic growth of urban areas in some developing
countries as poor rural peasants unable to make an acceptable
living from rural subsistence agriculture flock to large
urban settlements in search of employment. In some
countries, however, tradition and cultural factors may be an
important barrier to permanent relocation, a point that will
be discussed more fully in the next section.
Despite the possibility of fewer problems with mobility
in some less-developed countries, there is no case to be made
for assigning substantial responsibility for distribution to
local authorities. In many areas, the resources of local
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authorities are very limited and there are few possibilities
for serious redistribution. The role of local authorities is
also very limited in many developing countries, and they do
not have the capacity to administer major redistributional
programs. Finally, there are serious political constraints
that may block attempts to redistribute wealth at a local
level. In some places, prominent wealthy residents have a
great deal of control over local authorities and would be
unlikely to permit substantial and explicit local
redistribution policies, although some local services may be
redistributional in the sense that they benefit poorer
residents.
Although a major redistributive role for local
government is not likely, it is nonetheless possible in some
developing countries for local authorities to be somewhat
progressive in the way they finance local services. Taxes
may be levied in such a way as to fall on those who have
greater ability to pay them. In some countries, for example,
most local taxes are raised from local businessmen in the
form of land rates, trading license fees, and charges for
water and sanitation services in urban centers. This revenue
may be used to help provide basic services for the general
population, including the urban poor and rural peasants, who
may pay few or no taxes to the local authority. If such a
system were the standard practice in local governments
throughout the country, there would be little opportunity to
avoid the taxes by moving to another location. Thus, some
redistribution can take place at the local level without
necessarily inducing undesirable efficiency effects.
Allocation
The issues surrounding assignment of responsibility for
the allocation function in developing countries are extremely
complex. The assumptions underlying the fiscal federalism
theory may be violated by certain factors that are uniquely
or particularly important in developing countries, and the
interpretation of how the theory applies in particular cases
may be greatly affected. A variety of factors--economic,
environmental, cultural, and institutional--are often
relevant. Although these considerations are highly
interrelated and cannot always be classified neatly into such
distinct classes, an examination of each category is useful
to illustrate the major issues involved.
Economic Considerations
The general logic of the fiscal federalism
decentralization model would suggest that there should be
more local government if there is reason to believe that
local preferences differ across space. A wide variety of
tastes and preferences exist in wealthy industrialized
nations, but there may be much less heterogeneity of
preferences in the developing world because a majority of the
population is very poor. This poverty cuts across urban and
rural areas, occupations, tribes, and other dimensions that
might be expected to influence preferences. The notion of
willingness-to-pay may even be irrelevant for large segments
of the population in developing countries. Many people in
developing areas do not have the money to create effective
demand for public services, and certain socioeconomic groups
may not be subject to any significant taxation even if they
benefit from public services. In many areas, the chief
"preference" is likely to be for the provision of some
minimum level of basic services. Particularly in very poor
countries, this package of basic services may vary very
little across local authorities except insofar as they differ
along a few basic dimensions that affect the composition of
the required service package, i.e., urban, rural agriculture-
oriented, and rural livestock-oriented. The extent to which
the level of services varies across local authorities with
the same economic base may be largely a function of
population or other size variables that affect demand. This
greater homogeneity of preferences might suggest that there
should be more central or regional government involvement
over wider geographic areas. Although this is clearly true
in some cases, it may be offset by other factors to be
discussed later.
Bahl and Linn (1983) have argued that
interjurisdictional externalities in metropolitan areas may
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be less important in developing countries than they are in
the United States. This is true because those functions that
tend to have the greatest spillover effects, such as
education and health, tend to be the responsibility of the
central government in developing countries. Even in cases
where they are a local responsibility, the limited mobility
of rural people in developing countries may result in less
access to urban facilities for much of the population than is
the case in developed countries. Finally, there is generally
not as much jurisdictional fragmentation in the metropolitan
areas of developing countries as there is in the developed
ones, thus reducing the possibilities for problems with
interjurisdictional externalities.
Environmental Considerations
Public services serve as inputs to the production
process, and production needs may differ dramatically across
local authorities due to a diversity of opportunities and
constraints that result from natural and planned
environmental factors. At the most aggregate level,
preferences and needs differ markedly between rural and urban
areas and between different types of rural areas in the
typical developing country. Urban areas require traditional
urban services such as roads, water, and sanitation. Rural
areas primarily require services that support production and
marketing of rural economic activities, which may be largely
livestock-related in some areas and largely agriculture-
related in others. Thus, differences in preferences and
needs are strongly related to variations in the composition
of economic activity that arise, to a great extent, from
agro-ecological conditions.
Environmental factors may dominate the determination of
the types of industry and other economic activities that
operate in particular urban areas as well as the nature and
level of public services required to support these
activities. One urban area may engage in activities that
require street lights, a high level of electricity,
particular types of sanitation services, etc., while another
may not. Similarly, environmental factors determine the
types of crops and livestock that can be raised in a
particular rural area and the nature, quality, and quantity
of public services required to support these activities. To
the extent that great differences in environmental factors
have a major impact on the type and level of economic
activities conducted in different local authorities,
preferences for public services will vary across space and
the case for local government is strengthened. Such
differences may be very prominent in some developing
countries because of extreme differences in agro-ecological
conditions in tropical regions.
Another complicating factor in the analysis is the
heterogeneity of the population within particular local
authorities in some developing countries, which is due both
to natural environmental factors and boundary decisions made
by the central government.12 Urban local authorities may
have 100 percent of their population living in truly
urbanized areas, or a significant portion may live in rural
areas within the urban authorities' boundaries. In
developing countries, towns sometimes serve mainly as trading
centers, with few residents living in the town center. This
can greatly affect the types of services required and the
area over which they should be provided. Similarly, some
rural local authorities may have most of their populations
living in rural areas, while others may have significant
concentrations of people in urban trading centers located
within their jurisdictions. The type and extent of services
required in local authorities may thus be extremely diverse,
leading to heterogeneous preferences for public services
within a particular local authority.
In many of the developing countries, particularly the
larger and less-developed ones, settlements requiring local
public services are located far apart and/or are connected by
poor roads and inadequate transportation services. This
12 Natural environmental factors may be less important
than boundary considerations, but there are clear cases where
they will be important. In a rural local authority, for
example, the existence of a good water supply at a particular
site may lead to a concentration of population around this
site and the development of an urban center with a need for
urban services. In the absence of such a site, the
population of a rural local authority may have to be more
dispersed or nomadic in order to satisfy their water needs.
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geographic inaccessibility makes regular central or regional
government intervention and monitoring very difficult and
expensive in remote regions even under the best of
circumstances. Thus, in some countries, centralization or
regionalization of service provision would not be very
effective, even if preferences are relatively homogeneous.
This strengthens the case for service provision by local
authorities.
Cultural Considerations
The allocation aspect of the fiscal federalism model is
based on the neoclassical notion of individual preferences.
In many traditional societies in the third world, this is a
culturally alien concept. Family and extended family
obligations are often much more formal and demanding than
those in the developed world. In addition, there are other
important levels of social allegiance involving clan and
tribal obligations; furthermore, there may be extreme
restrictions imposed on individual choice because of caste,
ethnic, or religious affiliations, and in some countries,
gender is a major issue. All of these factors must be taken
into consideration, and may be much more important than
individual preferences in the decision-making process. If
such social allegiances and restrictions predominate for most
or all major cultural groups in a particular country, the
individual preference basis of the fiscal federalism model is
undermined and preferences may be more homogeneous over
larger areas.
The traditional model of local government assumes a
high degree of mobility in order that citizens can move to an
area that provides their preferred mix of public goods and
services. The mobility assumption is crucial to the model,
whether individual or social group preferences are the basis
for making decisions. In some developing countries, mobility
may be greatly restricted among the majority of the
population, primarily for cultural reasons. 13 Many
indigenous people are unwilling to leave the area of their
birth permanently. People who move do so largely in search
of employment with little or no consideration given to taxes
and public sector amenities, and many who move to urban areas
maintain only temporary residence there. They leave their
families in the home area and visit them as often as
possible, fully intending to return to their homes to settle
down after acquiring sufficient money. People may be more
willing to move within the home area, but permanent
relocation to other districts may be strongly resisted by
people in some countries.1 4 This factor, combined with the
13 Some of the rural-urban migration literature on
developing countries hypothesizes that migration from rural
to urban areas is a rural household decision to allocate
family labor between the rural and urban economies. For
example, see Huntington (1977).
14 There is some evidence to indicate that migrants to
urban areas in developing countries intend to return to their
rural area of origin. Oucho (1986), for example, conducted a
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basic needs versus varied preferences issue discussed
earlier, suggest that "voting-with-the-feet" models are much
less relevant in developing countries. In addition, to the
extent that temporary migrants to urban areas remit much of
their earnings to their home areas and live in very basic
and/or temporary settlements, they may have only a minimal
demand for urban public services in the places where they
work.
Cultural factors may also sometimes complicate the
issue of intra-jurisdictional diversity. Some major towns
and trading centers in developing countries have grown up
along tribal or ethnic territorial boundaries. Two different
ethnic groups may coexist in the area around the trading
center within the same political jurisdiction. Even though
both groups may live on land with roughly the same potential,
the two groups pursue very different livelihoods and live in
different types of settlements largely because of tribal
culture and tradition. For example, one group may be
pastoralists who live semi-nomadically, while the other group
may be farmers who live and work on fixed parcels of land.
Thus, although the two groups live in the same agro-
ecological zone and the same local authority, they have very
study of rural-urban migration in Kisumu, Kenya. In
interviewing migrants, he found that only 13.7 percent
planned to stay in Kisumu permanently, while 15.8 percent
expressed their intention to leave when they retired and
another 50.2 percent planned to leave at some time in the
future.
different public service needs because of their occupations
and living arrangements.
Institutional, Legal, and Political Considerations
The allocation role of the public sector is often more
extensive than it is in developed countries. Private sector
institutions tend to be less self-sufficient and less
organized in the developing world, and the government needs
to undertake some essential functions in support of basic
economic activities because other institutions do not provide
them. There are often nationalized or parastatal industries
and marketing institutions at the central government level,
while some extended functions in less-developed countries are
more local in nature. Some of these might include the
provision of marketing facilities and support services, such
as veterinary care and agricultural extension work. Thus,
local government must often provide services that are not
particularly "public" in nature.
The fiscal federalism theory stems from a sense of
integrated local government in a developed government system.
In some developing countries, local governments are token
institutions. They exist outside of a central government
administrative system that may have its own decentralized
institutions. These often exist alongside of local
authorities in the regions but may be much more powerful.
The fiscal federalism model further assumes implicitly that
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local governments have sufficient constitutional and/or legal
powers to enable them to discharge their appointed
responsibilities, which may not be the case in some
developing countries.
Local authorities in developing countries must operate
under difficult conditions because of deficiencies in basic
local institutions, which support the local revenue base and
generate further development, and national institutions,
which are poorly developed and may be overwhelmingly
influenced by political considerations. In a developed
country such as the United States, private property and
homeownership are widespread, and some type of large-scale
industry exists in much of the country, including what are
considered "rural" areas. In developing countries, these
factors, which are mainstays of the local revenue base in
industrialized countries, may be much less important or
inapplicable.
Although there are significant variations in levels of
income and expenditure across local governments in the United
States, it is fair to say that they provide a relatively
standard set of services and have a relatively standard set
of revenue sources available to them. This may not be true
in a less-developed country; furthermore, the differences
across local governments in the United States are largely
self-assigned on the basis of local preferences or the result
of some explainable factor, such as local wealth. In
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developing countries, these differences may be arbitrarily
imposed on a local government by the central government
bureaucracy, which may also impose a variety of other
constraints and conditions on local authority operations.
It is not unusual, for example, for there to be little
correspondence between required services and permitted income
sources, a situation that may lead to local authority
financial crisis.
Limited resources are a significant intergovernmental
constraint in less-developed countries. Even though
sufficient resources to meet service obligations may not be
available locally in all parts of developed countries, there
are models that detail various methods of transferring
income to the local governments, as well as revenue-sharing
and other grant programmes that do so. In developing
countries, redistributive intergovernmental grant programs
may not exist because of limited central government
resources or central government negligence towards local
authorities. In cases where intergovernmental transfer
programs do exist, they may be underfunded and the funds
distributed according to arbitrary criteria or largely on
political grounds.
Insufficient human capital is another major constraint
on local authorities in the developing world that affects
their ability to function as effectively as their
counterparts in developed countries. A lack of human
resources and training lead to poor administrative and
managerial capacity, further impeding the service performance
of local authorities.
Given the limited resources available in developing
countries and the limited capacity of local authorities, it
may be desirable to have more central government monitoring
and support of local authority activities than would be the
case in developed countries. Central government guidance
and assistance help to ensure that basic national priorities
are not being infringed on by local activities and that
scarce resources are not being wasted. There is, however, a
delicate balance to be maintained between ensuring that
national priorities are being met and protecting as great a
degree of local autonomy as possible. This is particularly
important given the fragile state of political institutions
in many developing countries and the possibility that
existing regimes will try to institutionalize their power
rather than develop democratic mechanisms.
The political culture in developing countries may be
the most significant determinant of how much decentralization
actually occurs. The central issue may be how much power the
current ruling group is willing to risk sharing with other
groups, which may be seen as serious rivals and a threat to
the current regime. These other groups may have
tribal/ethnic affiliations that differ from the group in
power, and may have significant geographical concentrations
95
of strength which could be used to undermine the current
government's power base if significant decentralization were
allowed to occur. Failure to allow some degree of local
self-government, however, may eventually create serious
problems for the ruling group.
Revenue System
The basic guidelines for a local revenue system
outlined in the fiscal federalism model are very much
applicable to developing countries. First, it is desirable
to keep the local tax system as neutral as possible. Second,
the benefit principle should be followed in the interests of
efficiency in resource use, although equity concerns also
have an important role to play. Finally, spatial and
intergovernmental issues must be taken into consideration.
Despite the relevance of the basic revenue guidelines
to developing countries, it is important to recognize that
the context in which they are applied will often differ
substantially from the developed nations. Revenue options
may be more limited due to more extreme environmental,
cultural, institutional, and political constraints, and
local authorities may be more reliant on central government
for collection assistance and/or grants than they are in the
developed world. Furthermore, higher levels of government in
developing countries control local government revenue systems
in many ways, including setting tax rates, stipulating tax
exemptions, and directly influencing the size of tax bases.
These various problems and constraints can have a serious
impact on the structure and operation of local revenue
systems. In a study of local government systems in a sample
of developing countries, Bahl and Linn (1983) found that few
countries exhibit an efficient assignment of local
government revenue authority.
Summary of Issues
The above considerations suggest that some aspects of
the traditional fiscal decentralization theory are not
applicable to developing countries. Although many of the
basic principles universally apply, some of the critical
assumptions of the model, both explicit and implicit, are
significantly violated, and various local conditions affect
the way the model should be interpreted. The main areas of
concern are as follows:
1. The role of the public sector is often more
extensive in developing countries than in the developed
countries because private sector institutions are not as
well-established. This means that there may often be an
expanded role for local authorities.
2. Needs for public services as a production input may
differ widely across local authorities because of highly
significant spatial differences in economic opportunities and
constraints in some developing countries. To the extent that
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this heterogeneity of preferences exists, a greater role for
local authorities is justified.
3. There are also factors that suggest that preferences
in developing countries could be less heterogeneous across
local authorities than in the developed countries. Poverty
would appear to be a particularly significant constraint on
the development of widely varying preferences for public
services. Preferences, to the extent the term can be
applied, may be largely for a minimum level of basic services
rather than for different levels of a wide variety of
services. The few major distinctions in preferences may
largely be explained on the basis of rural versus urban
location and the broad types of economic activity that
thrive in different areas. Although these distinctions
affect the mix of required services, preferences regarding
service level may not differ much across areas with similar
economic bases except with respect to required scale.
4. The fiscal federalism theory assumes a high degree
of mobility in order that citizens are able to move to an
area that provides their preferred mix of local public goods
and services. For both cultural and economic reasons,
mobility in less-developed countries may be restricted and
permanent relocation away from the area of origin may be much
more limited than in the developed countries. Also, to the
extent that cultural allegiances based on social and ethnic
affiliations are more important than individual decisions,
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the heterogeneity of preferences across space may be reduced.
5. Even if preferences are more homogeneous across
local authorities in developing countries, more highly
centralized provision of public services is not necessarily
in order. The distance between local authorities and poor
systems of roads and transport often generates a degree of
geographic inaccessibility that makes regional or central
government provision of services difficult. It is also
important to ensure that local residents have a degree of
local self-government, especially in countries where there is
strong tribal affiliation in local areas and particular
tribes dominate the national political scene.
6. Unlike in developed countries, local authorities in
some developing countries do not always provide a relatively
standard set of services nor do they have access to a
relatively standard set of revenue sources. As noted
earlier, some of these differences in the composition and
level of local government revenues and expenditures are due
to variations in economic base. Many, however, are imposed
by arbitrary and inconsistent central government policies
rather than self-selected on the basis of local preferences.
Such policies may constrain local authorities in other ways
as well.
7. Local authorities in developing countries may have
varying combinations of urban and rural residents within
their jurisdictions. In some cases, therefore, there are
highly heterogeneous preferences for public services within
local authorities, a situation that greatly complicates the
provision of local public services.
8. Local authorities in some developing countries are
not part of an integrated system of decentralized government
and are not properly empowered to provide the services for
which they are responsible. Attempts to correct these
deficiencies may be frustrated by substantial political,
legal, and institutional constraints. In some cases, ruling
national political forces may be so powerful and unwilling to
share power with rival or minority groups that all attempts
to decentralize to any significant degree will be effectively
blocked.
9. Local authorities in developing countries are more
likely to be plagued by human resource constraints than their
counterparts in the developing world. Deficiencies in
managerial and technical capacity undermine the ability of
local authorities to satisfy the preferences of their
constituents. This factor, combined with the need to ensure
that the use of scarce resources supports national
development priorities, suggests that there may be a need in
some developing countries for the central government to play
a greater role in monitoring and supporting the activities
of local governments. This need, however, can easily be
abused by national rulers wishing to consolidate their
control.
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Relevance of Basic Principles
It is clear from the discussion above that there are
certain problems with attempting to apply directly to the
developing countries the economic models of local government
formulated in the context of the developed world. However,
many of the basic principles of these models, as qualified by
the special or more serious problems and circumstances of the
developing countries, can be used to analyze and evaluate the
fiscal role of local government in the developing countries.
The following basic principles and issues should be taken
into consideration when evaluating the fiscal structure of
local government and its relationship to other levels of
government in developing countries:
1. The considerations outlined earlier suggest that
there are the diversity of environmental conditions in
developing countries may make spatial preferences for public
goods and services more heterogeneous than in developed
countries. At the same time, certain economic and cultural
factors may make preferences more homogeneous. These factors
must be carefully weighed in determining the appropriate
degree of decentralization for the provision of public goods
and services.
2. In order to minimize costs and provide services
efficiently, it is preferable to assign many public service
functions to decentralized levels of government in developing
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countries even if preferences are not highly heterogeneous.
This is true for a variety of reasons. First, in some
developing countries, local authorities are often
geographically dispersed and/or not easily accessible. This
makes having large jurisdictions more expensive and
difficult. Second, services that can be readily provided on
a small-scale basis might be more easily managed at a
decentralized level and better tailored to the local
population. Third, it is desirable to give some sort of
control and management power to local people or their elected
representatives, especially if they are geographically
distant from the people who would otherwise govern them
and/or if they belong to an ethnic minority. This may help
in building national unity while providing incentives for
participation and for the development of managerial and
technical skills.
3. Externalities and economies of scale must be taken
into consideration in evaluating the assignment of service
provision responsibility in developing countries. This is
true even in cases where very different types of local
government are involved. For example, water is a service
that is often provided in both rural and urban areas of
developing countries. There may be economies of scale
involved in providing this service over a larger area. These
could be exploited, for example, by having a regional water
authority or a cooperative agreement between a rural local
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authority and nearby urban local authorities.
4. Cultural and political constraints need to be
weighed when considering the allocation of public functions
and the size of decentralized jurisdictions. For example, if
there is no real difference on other grounds for service
provision over a smaller area or a larger one, then
ethnic/tribal considerations may suggest that there would be
greater cooperation and harmony as well as lower decision-
making costs if the jurisdiction were larger or smaller,
depending on the particular pattern of tribal settlement. In
many cases, political considerations may be the most
important factor in determining the degree of
decentralization.
5. Legal and constitutional constraints must be taken
into consideration in evaluating the assignment of service
functions and tax sources to local authorities. Powers
cannot be given to local jurisdictions if they are not
allowed to have them under the provisions of the constitution
and relevant legislation. If there is an economic rationale
for making an assignment that is prohibited, attempts can be
made to amend the constitution or legislation. This has been
done in a number of developing countries.
6. Resource and managerial/administrative constraints,
which are likely to be much more severe and pervasive in
developing countries than they are in developed ones, should
be taken into account when evaluating the assignment of
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functions and revenue sources to levels of government, but
they are not by any means the final consideration. Assigning
service functions on economic grounds to levels of government
that are ill-equipped to handle them makes no sense in the
short-run. Redistributive grant schemes and training
programs can be designed to help overcome or alleviate
deficiencies in these areas over time.
7. The national or local nature of a public service
should be evaluated when considering the assignment of
service provision responsibility. If a good is directed at
purely local priorities, it should be provided at a local
level. If it is a service related to national development
goals, a case can be made for higher level provision or
subsidization, even if the service could be provided locally.
This is particularly true when poor local capacity and scarce
resources are a major constraint. Furthermore, scarce
resources may dictate the need for a national strategy of
non-uniform development which concentrates available
resources in areas where the benefits generated for the
national economy are expected to be greatest.
Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating the Fiscal Role of
Local Government in Developing Countries
A framework for analysis and evaluation of a local
government fiscal system in a developing country must take
into account the general factors and principles discussed
above. Major components of a local government system and
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various issues and factors related to their operation and
performance have to be considered both separately and in
relation to each other. Some of these are outside of the
realm of economics, but can have an important impact on the
way the system works or fails to work.15
There are several levels of concern that need to be
examined in analyzing the fiscal role of local government in
developing countries. These have already been discussed in
the previous section and are presented schematically in
Figure 3.1, which will serve as a basis for discussion
throughout the remainder of this thesis. First, there are a
set of public finance obiectives regarding service provision,
revenue generation, and revenue-expenditure linkages. These
relate to the ideal or optimal arrangements for providing
public goods and services in a given country. Second, there
are a set of issues regarding institutional organization and
capacity, which affect the ability of the public sector as a
whole to provide public services efficiently and equitably.
Finally, there are a set of primary contextual areas and
constraints--political, economic, constitutional, and legal--
that affect both the institutional organization and capacity
framework and the public finance objectives.
Because of their high degree of interrelation, these
distinctions--public finance objectives, institutional
15 Many of these factors to be discussed receive
various degrees of consideration in Davey (1983); Bahl and
Linn (1983); and Bahl, Miner, and Schroeder (1984).
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FIGURE 3.1
ANALYZING THE FISCAL ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
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organization/capacity, and context/constraints--are somewhat
artificial, particularly between the latter two categories.
It is possible, however, to think of institutional
organization/capacity as an intermediate step in the
provision of public services. Political, economic,
constitutional, and legal factors, to a great extent,
determine institutional arrangements and capacity.
Institutional factors, in turn, directly affect the ability
of the public sector to generate revenue and provide public
goods and services equitably and efficiently.
Political and economic constraints are probably the
most important determinants of how the system of public
finance works in a particular developing country. It is
difficult or impossible to overcome economic (resource)
constraints, at least in the short run. Political context,
as has already been emphasized in the previous section, may
in many developing countries be the single most important
factor in determining the degree of public sector
decentralization. Political power can greatly influence or
determine, either directly or through changes in the legal
and/or constitutional context, the organization of and
interrelationships among government institutions, thereby
affecting their powers and their ability to meet public
service demands. Political power can also determine the
policy direction of existing institutions and/or individual
decisions made by them.
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This section develops a simple framework for analyzing
the fiscal role of local government in developing countries.
It incorporates the areas discussed above--public finance
objectives, institutional organization/capacity, and primary
contextual areas and constraints--and explicitly takes
account of their interrelatedness. Public finance issues are
dealt with first, followed by an examination of issues
related to institutional organization/capacity. Discussion
of the broader contextual issues and constraints and how they
affect the other areas is incorporated directly into the
discussion of public finance and institutional issues rather
than treated as a separate section. Examples of how these
primary constraints affect the operation of the public sector
have already been given in previous sections. This section
will show how they must be explicitly considered as they
relate to public service provision in analyzing and
evaluating the fiscal role of local government in developing
countries.
Public Finance Objectives
This section defines how public finance principles
should be applied to an analysis of the fiscal role of local
government in developing countries. Three interrelated
issues, service provision, revenue generation, and revenue-
expenditure linkages, are covered.
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Service Provision
Service provision is the key area involved in analyzing
local government because the fundamental purpose of local
authorities is to provide services to the people. The basic
issue regarding service provision is what services should be
provided by local government and for which services is more
centralized provision justified. There are also a variety of
other considerations related to this basic issue. The
following factors must all be taken into account in dealing
with service provision:
Need in the area for particular services based on local
economic activities and preferences. As discussed earlier,
in many developing countries the emphasis will be on
providing a minimum level of basic services. The nature of
these services, however, will differ among different types of
local authorities. For example, in some towns there may be a
need and sufficient resources for waterborne sanitation,
while in others pit latrines will be adequate. This sort of
decision can be made exclusively at the local level unless
there are externalities involved. It has also been noted
that rural and urban areas have different service needs, and
that even different rural areas require different types of
services to support different economic activities and
lifestyles.
Externality or scale-economy considerations. As
already discussed, there are some types of goods and services
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that can be more efficiently provided over a larger
jurisdiction by a higher level of government or jointly by a
group of local authorities. The example of water supply has
already been given as an example of economies of scale.
There are some unusual types of externalities in developing
countries that local authorities would be unlikely to pay
attention to. For example, livestock that originate in
certain areas are not adversely affected by particular types
of diseases carried by ticks or other parasites. Because
these livestock have a high degree of immunity to the
diseases, neither their owners nor the local government will
bother to take pest control measures. During the dry season
when the animals are moved into other areas in search of
water, they may come into contact with other animals that are
susceptible to the diseases and place them in life-
threatening situations. Some of these diseases can spread
like wildfire and kill hundreds of animals in a very short
period of time. Thus, a case can be made for providing
control measures cooperatively or centrally.
Some local government services must be provided
jointly. Certain local government services are highly
interdependent, and one must be provided if the other is to
be provided. It makes no sense, for example, for an urban
local authority to construct a sewerage system or a slaughter
house if an adequate water supply does not exist. Similarly,
a cattle dip in rural areas will not be usable if there is no
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water supply in the area.
Local government activities should support/aucment
private sector activities. It may be necessary for local
authorities to provide some services that are provided by the
private sector in more developed countries. Examples include
markets, slaughterhouses, grain storage facilities, and
veterinary services. Any of these could be provided
privately, but people in some areas may be too poor or just
unwilling to get involved because the expected returns are
not high enough and/or because the needed facility involves
significant scale economies or externalities.
Services should cover all relevant areas in the local
authority's iurisdiction to as great an extent as possible.
Residents who demand and are willing-to-pay for public
services should be provided with them. Rural-urban
distinctions and differences in service requirements within
the local authority need to be taken into account for
efficiency reasons. There is also an equity dimension here:
it may be decided that certain basic services should be
provided uniformly or wherever they are needed, regardless of
ability-to-pay.
Existing differences in per capita expenditures across
local authorities should be iustified on some reasonable
grounds. Such differences, for example, might reflect
intergovernmental differences in preferences, which are
related to such factors as economic base and wealth. To the
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extent that preferences are the determining factor in
interjurisdictional differences, the system is working
efficiently. Differences in service provision due to some
factors, such as wealth, may be undesirable, but can be
influenced by central government programs. Other types of
differences, however, may be difficult to justify and to
overcome. In some cases, for example, intergovernmental
differences in per capita spending may largely reflect
arbitrary central government decisions regarding the
assignment of service functions and revenue sources. 1 6
Central government has a coordinating role to play for
certain services. Particular services, even if they are
provided to some extent by local or regional authorities,
will need to be coordinated by central government. Such
services involve significant externalities, whether natural
or created through specific national development strategies.
A national roads network, for example, will need to be
centrally planned or coordinated, even if decentralized
governments have an important role to play in financing,
constructing, and maintaining parts of it.
In some developing countries, nongovernmental
organizations will have a role to play in local service
provision. Various types of charities and nonprofit
16 of course, there are problems in using per capita
spending as a measure of the level of service provision due
to such factors as interjurisdictional differences in costs
and quality.
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organizations are involved in basic education, health care,
veterinary, and agricultural extension and support, and a
variety of other services vital to the local communities,
particularly in rural areas. These activities should be
taken into account when planning the allocation of scarce
resources to local services.
Capacity of the local authorities to provide particular
services or some plan for developing such capacity. Although
there may be a good economic rationale for assigning a
particular service to local authorities, there is little
sense in doing so if the local authority is not capable of
providing it. In such cases, central government staff
support may be required, at least until local authority staff
can be properly trained to provide the service. In other
cases, varying degrees of financial support might be
required, perhaps on a continuing basis.
The role of national politics in assigning service
functions. In some cases, certain services are assigned to
the central government in order to further national goals
even if a case can be made for local provision. Education,
for example, is not only funded, but sometimes actually
provided by the central government in some developing
countries. This is probably not for scale reasons, but
because the government may use the system to further its own
ideology or demonstrate to the people how much the government
is doing for them. In such cases, it may be impossible to
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argue for the service to be locally provided regardless of
what economic considerations may suggest. In extreme cases,
the central government may consolidate power by controlling a
wide variety of services which could be provided locally.
Revenue Generation
The basic issue in evaluating revenue generation is
what sources of revenue are appropriate for local authorities
in a particular country. Appropriate revenue sources may
well differ across different types of local authorities in a
given country. It is also important to understand the
effects of the current revenue system and how well it
functions. The following considerations are important:
Local revenue sources should be appropriate to the
local economic base and local ability-to-pay. Local
authorities should have access to a reasonably well-
diversified revenue base. This would include some mix of
elastic sources of revenue and sources with a fairly stable
yield.17 In many developing countries, central governments
have a tendency to reserve the most elastic and most
productive revenue sources entirely for themselves. It will
be very difficult to build an effective system of local
17 The goal of having an elastic revenue base conflicts
with the goal of having a stable one. It is possible,
however, to diversify the revenue base in such as way to
include both stable and elastic sources. Having stable
sources will prevent overall revenue from falling too much in
bad years, and having elastic sources will ensure that there
is growth of the base in good years.
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government if this is the case unless local government
autonomy can be preserved in a system in which central
government essentially funds local authorities.
In the interests of preventing efficiency effects,
local government revenues should be derived from most or all
economic activities. This could be done either by some type
of fairly general tax or a set of taxes that cover different
types of economic bases. There may be an equity reason or
some other justification to exclude certain activities from
taxation, but this may erode the tax base, a situation which
few local authorities in developing countries can afford, and
it might generate undesirable efficiency effects.
The revenue structure should not provide perverse
incentives for private decision-makers. This is just a
standard warning to be aware of the efficiency effects of
taxation. It was argued earlier that mobility may not be as
great a problem in developing countries as it is in the
developed world.18 Poorly devised taxes, however, can still
generate undesired results. For example, a progressive rate
structure for an agricultural land tax might encourage land
subdivision, which could lead to less productive methods of
18 There is a possibility that certain types of mobility
may be more important in some developing countries. When
there are a few instances of large-scale domestic or foreign-
supported investment projects, the chosen location may well
depend on preferential tax treatment by central and/or local
government. This type of situation may generate very
significant consequences for the location and allocation of
resources, much more so than when many investment projects
are occurring over a large area.
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cultivation and lower crop yields. These types of effects
must be carefully avoided for economic reasons, although
subdivision for the purpose of land redistribution may be a
political goal in some developing countries.
Entrepreneurial revenue-raising activities should be
exploited by local authorities in developing countries. As
noted in the section on service provision, local authorities
in developing countries may be called upon to provide some
services that would be provided by the private sector in more
developed countries. The provision of these services may
have the side benefit of generating substantial income for
the local authorities. This is perfectly acceptable if the
charges for the various services are reasonable. The
additional revenue could be used by the local authorities to
provide infrastructure and services that generate further
local economic growth and improve the well-being of local
residents.
Self-help activities should be encouraged in areas
where it is possible to do so. As noted earlier, in some
developing countries, especially in Africa, the self-help
ethic is culturally pervasive. Local people contribute money
to the building and maintenance of school and health
facilities in addition to paying their regular taxes. They
also save the local governments some expenses by donating
materials and labor. This can be an important part of
service provision in some areas.
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Particular groups within a local authority might be
taxed more heavily than others for both equity and efficiency
purposes. The incentive problems noted above must, of
course, be avoided as much as possible. However, there is
room for some redistribution at the local level in developing
countries through the process of raising more taxes from
higher income people to provide services that are enjoyed by
the general population. There is also a simple benefit issue
involved here. In some areas, wealthier people use a higher
level of services than the poorer people, and they should be
made to pay for them.
The local government tax system should exhibit as much
eauity as possible. The case has already been made for some
degree of progressivity where possible, but the system, at
the very least, should be proportional in the interests of
vertical equity. Horizontal equity should also be respected
to as great an extent as possible. It is difficult, for
example, to justify taxing income from food crops at a higher
rate than income from cash crops unless there is a very good
reason to affect the composition of agricultural production.
Finally, there should be geographical equity. People in one
part of a local authority should not pay different rates on
the same taxes solely by virtue of differences in where they
live or work. Such differential treatment may be justified,
however, if economic base and incomes vary widely across
different areas in particular local authorities.
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Political, constitutional and legal constraints, as
well as deficiencies in administrative capacity, must be
considered when designing a local tax system. Many examples
of these constraints have already been given in this chapter.
Some of them can be overcome with time if the central
government is willing to work towards that goal. Others,
particularly those related to political considerations, may
be more difficult to deal with.
Revenue-Expenditure Linkage
The local government system must be set up in such a
way that there is a proper correspondence between service
responsibilities and revenue availability. The following
considerations should be weighed:
There should be consistent and defensible guidelines
for setting all tax rates and fees charged by local
authorities. In many developing countries, tax rates,
license fees, service fees and other types of taxes are set
arbitrarily or entirely on the basis of political favoritism.
Instead, there must be some rational and equitable basis
devised for doing this, and it should be consistently
applied.
Services that can be provided on a fee-for-service
basis should be self-financing to as great an extent as
possible for efficiency reasons. Those who benefit from a
service should generally be required to pay for it. Of
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course, there may be some legitimate reasons for
subsidization, such as the existence of externalities,
support of a particular growth strategy, or redistribution.
Some rural local authorities in developing countries, for
example, are in the business of providing veterinary
services, such as livestock dipping to protect herds against
disease-carrying ticks. If the dipping fee is too high,
owners may refuse to dip their livestock, and a serious and
economically costly epidemic could result.
General fund taxes (land rates, trading license fees,
etc.) should be set at a rate sufficient to cover costs of
services that are not self-financing. The arbitrary methods
of setting these rates in some developing countries means
that even if local authorities were to collect all of the
income due to them, they would still be unable to balance
their budgets. Of course, some local authorities do not have
the fiscal capacity to provide their services without taxing
at an unreasonably high rate. In such cases, it is the
responsibility of the central government to step in and offer
whatever assistance it can.
There should be some mechanism for recovery of costs
for services provided to residents of other iurisdictions.
The difficulties of applying the benefit principle in a
spatial context, in which residents of different
jurisdictions interact substantially, mean that residents of
one jurisdiction may use the services of another jurisdiction
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on a regular basis without paying for them. Various
mechanisms can be used to ensure that the benefit principle
is more closely followed, including various types of fees and
taxes that accrue to non-resident users of local services and
subsidization by more centralized levels of government.
Central government transfers may be required for some
poor local authorities or to subsidize certain services. It
is understood that many developing countries are too poor to
be able to provide central services fully much less
significantly fund local authorities, but there is usually
some role the central government can play in financially
assisting local government. Transfers may take the form of
revenue sharing from the central government general fund or
locally assigned shares in particular central government
taxes. In addition, categorical grants can be used to
subsidize priority local public services that generate
positive externalities and/or improve equity.
Institutional Organization and Capacity
The organization of local and central government
institutions, the ways in which they interact, and their
technical and managerial capacity are determined by the
political, economic, constitutional, and legal context in a
particular country. Institutional organization and capacity
have a significant impact on the ability of the public sector
to provide public services for which there is a demand.
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Institutional Organization Issues
The institutional procedures and relationships that
exist among different levels of government have an important
impact on the way the overall government system performs.
The following issues in this area need to be taken into
consideration when evaluating the fiscal role of local
government in developing countries:
Mechanisms for local intergovernmental cooperation may
have to be developed. As already noted, in cases where
demand is invariant across wide areas, or where significant
economies of scale or externalities exist, it would be more
efficient to provide services through formal
intergovernmental cooperation if a higher level of government
is not going to step in. Regulations and mechanisms should
be devised to permit the organization and operation of such
cooperative efforts. Provisions could also be made for
creating separate regional authorities to take responsibility
for particular services.
Some support services and supervision of local
authorities by the central government may be necessary.
Supervision may be particularly important in developing
countries where local capacity is inadequate and bribes and
corruption may be a way of life. Such supervision may help
local authorities to discharge their responsibilities more
efficiently and insure that national development goals and
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strategies are being met by the local authorities. Planning
and technical support from the central government may also be
necessary because of a lack of engineers, architects,
accountants, and other skilled personnel in local
authorities. There is a delicate balance to be maintained in
order to prevent overinterference and overcontrol by the
central government from actually impairing efficiency,
perhaps while attempting to improve it. Also, it is
important to ensure that central government institutions that
monitor and support local authorities are properly empowered,
staffed, and organized, and that their operating procedures
are consistent and efficient.
There is a need for effective intergovernmental
coordination of development activities in developing
countries. A complex multi-tiered public administration
system was installed by colonial powers and still exists in
many developing countries, and redundancy in service
provision responsibility as a means to achieving national
development objectives is not uncommon or necessarily
undesirable. In order for such a system to work
effectively, however, there must be coordination of the
activities of local authorities, central government
ministries, provincial, regional and district administration,
parastatals, non-governmental organizations, and other
agencies and organizations involved in various types of
public service provision in developing countries.
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There is likely to be a need for central government
support of local authority capital spending. In many cases,
local authorities in developing countries do not have the
resources to build the type of basic infrastructure that
encourages economic growth. Many local authorities do not
have access to private credit markets because they are
forbidden it by law, cannot afford to pay commercial interest
rates, or are not considered to be worthy of credit by the
lending institutions. If capital projects are to be
financed, the central government will have to provide access
to credit on some terms the local authorities can afford, or
will have to share responsibility for the planning and of
local authority infrastructure. The problem of existing
local authority debt may have to be dealt with in many
developing countries before additional loans can be made.
Local Administrative Capacity and Procedures
The preceding discussion focused on what the central
government should do to support local authorities. This
section deals with the major capacity and procedural problems
of local authorities, some of which can be alleviated
primarily through local action, while others require more
central government assistance. In developing countries, a
lack of skilled labor and efficient operating procedures can
cripple even properly empowered local authorities. These
considerations will affect the financial position of local
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authorities, their ability to provide the services and
collect the revenues they are supposed to, and the types of
central government interventions and supervision required to
ensure that local authorities operate as effectively as
possible. The following points merit attention in assessing
local administrative capacity and procedures:
Local authority operating procedures should be
appropriate to the types of responsibilities the local
authorities have and the level of expertise available. Many
developing countries adopted the accounting, recordkeeping,
and financial management systems of their colonizers. Some
of these procedures are unnecessarily complex and cumbersome,
and they are beyond the capacity of local authority officials
to manage properly. In general, administrative and operating
systems and procedures used by local authorities should be
simple and basic, requiring a minimum level of skills and a
minimum effort to use. Such procedures should also be
standardized, and all employees who use them should be
trained properly.
Local authorities should institute methods of cross-
checking records whenever financial transactions and
disbursements of materials are involved. Given the
institutionalized nature and cultural acceptance of
corruption and bribe-taking in some developing countries,
there must be procedures for handling financial transactions
and inventory control to ensure that records can be cross-
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checked by several independent officers. Corruption is a
major drain on local authority funds in some countries, and
the financial position of some local authorities could be
greatly improved if it were controlled to a greater extent
through local and/or central government action.
Local authorities should use incentives whenever
possible to encourage better performance by employees.
Public administration systems in developing countries are
notorious for poor pay and poor incentives, which may lead to
some of the inertia, corruption, and inefficiency they often
display. The use of such incentives as bonuses, pay raises,
and assignment of greater responsibility and promotions as a
reward for job performance may help to improve overall
revenue collection and service provision in some developing
countries.
Conclusion
No framework for evaluating the fiscal role of local
government in developing countries is going to be able to
take full account of all of the factors that affect the role
and operation of local government. Indeed, part of the point
of this thesis is to demonstrate the great diversity across
local government systems in developing countries along many
dimensions that affect the optimal assignment of public
service responsibility among levels of government. The
guidelines outlined above touch on many of the important
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issues, but critically examining real world cases in detail
will certainly reveal many additional considerations.
All of the factors discussed in the above guidelines
are affected by cultural, legal, political, and institutional
constraints that may strongly affect the possibilities for
the evaluative criteria to be met. Many examples of how
these various constraints operate have already been mentioned
or discussed, but a researcher will always have to be alert
for others that exist in particular cases. In some
countries, these constraints may be open to change over time.
In other cases, they may be fairly rigid or completely
insurmountable. The emphasis must be on attaining the best
system of local government that is possible over some
reasonable time frame given existing conditions. More
substantial reforms may be implementable as greater
development occurs over the longer term.
The following chapters turn to an examination of the
case study country, the Republic of Kenya. The framework
explained above, along with the analysis of important
historical factors to be discussed in Chapter 4 and
contextual factors which came to light during the fieldwork
conducted for this research, will be used to analyze the
system of local government in Kenya in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
In the process of conducting the analysis and evaluation of
Kenya, it will be possible to illustrate and to clarify
further the importance of context in the process of defining
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an appropriate fiscal role for local goverr ent in
developing countries.
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CHAPTER 4
HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, AND CURRENT STRUCTURE OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN KENYAI
This chapter begins by tracing the history and
development of local government in Kenya. This exercise
provides a background for understanding the way in which
local government currently functions, and it also provides
some insights into the possibilities for local authority
reform. After examining its history and development, the
present structure of local government in Kenya is described
in detail as a prelude to evaluating it.
Most local government systems in Africa were developed
during colonial rule earlier in this century. Local
governments were set up in the pre-independence period both
as a means to impose colonial control and to educate the
native people in the ways of the colonial powers. Early
colonial administrations were often highly centralized under
powerful colonial governors. Decentralized institutions
began to emerge only after European settlement began to
spread and substantial development had already taken place,
and only under pressure from settlers groups and African
nationalist movements.
1 This chapter is based largely on the following
sources: Akivaga, Kulundu-Bitonye and Opi (1984); Hicks
(1961); Huxley (1935); Kaplan, et. al. (1976); Oyugi (1983);
various Government of Kenya reports and laws; and, numerous
interviews with present and former Kenyan officials.
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In the British colonies in Africa, some type of local
institutions were set up almost from the beginning of
colonization, but most of these had few powers and resources.
There had traditionally been a dichotomy between local
governing institutions for the indigenous peoples and those
for the settlers. In Kenya, the local government
institutions for the natives were established prior to those
for the settlers. This is probably the case because in the
early years there were few settlers, and they were largely
concentrated in high potential areas where their needs could
be attended to by a central administration.
The two-tier settler/native system of local government
existed in most cases right up to independence, which for
most African nations occurred after 1960. In the post-
independence period, a number of important changes developed
as African nations struggled to find their own identity and
come to terms with their own culture and the western systems
and ideas that had been introduced to them during the
colonial era. The history and development of local
government in Kenya very much follows the pattern briefly
described above.
Local Government in the Colonial Era
Because the settler and native forms of local
government developed differently, it is appropriate to
consider them separately before discussing how they were
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merged into a single system after independence.
Native Local Government
Colonialist-designed native local government in Kenya
began, at least in name, just prior to the turn of the
century. The East African Order in Council was passed in
1897 to create councils called "native courts" among the
tribes. The function of these courts, however, was not
clearly specified, and they in fact had little authority.
The British had set up a provincial administration in Kenya,
and the function of these courts was only to have some sort
of official status for the African representatives who dealt
with the provincial commissioners.
In 1902, the Village Headman Ordinance was passed.
This law gave the provincial commissioner the authority to
name natives of his choice to be official headmen of villages
or groups of villages. The stated duties of these headmen
were to maintain law and order, to help the provincial
commissioner collect taxes, to maintain local roads, and to
assist as arbitrators in minor African disputes and legal
cases. The Townships Ordinance of 1903 provided for local
government under the provincial commissioners in urban areas,
with Nairobi and Mombasa the first settlements to be granted
township status.
Creating the position of headman was an attempt by the
British to set up an authority structure, based on trusted
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locals who would help to protect settler interests and
cooperate with the colonial administration. In fact, the
concept of chief or headman was somewhat alien to many Kenyan
tribes, which were traditionally governed by councils of
elders rather than individuals; nevertheless, the Village
Headsman Ordinance formed the basis for the colonial system
of administration in Kenya, known as the "Native Authority
System." This system, based on direct interaction between
the colonial administration and a strong native chief acting
as the head of a local council, was formally enacted and
detailed in the Local Authority Ordinance of 1912.
Following the passage of this ordinance, there were
attempts to establish provincial level councils that
incorporated both settlers and natives. There was strong
opposition to this concept from many settlers who preferred
to have separate institutions for the natives. There was
also a great deal of controversy about how these provincial
councils were to be selected, what their composition would
be, and what responsibilities would be assigned to them. In
the end, it proved to be impossible to come to an agreement
on these issues, and the idea of integrated provincial
councils was dropped.
World War I brought a new era of local government to
East Africa. In the years following the war, there was an
additional surge of British interest in the area, and Kenya
was officially transformed from the East African Protectorate
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to the Kenyan Colony. Kenyans who had fought in the war
returned to their villages with a new view of the world and
greatly expanded horizons. A number of native organizations
were formed, usually along tribal lines, and these later
became the basis for the nationalist movement in Kenya. The
growing political awareness of the Africans and the expanding
interests of the British colonialists necessitated that
changes be made in the way the colony was governed.
The Kenya Legislative Council passed the Native
Councils Ordinance in 1924. This legislation established
Local Native Councils (LNCs) in the districts, which were
administrative subdivisions of the British provinces. These
bodies were composed of the district commissioner, the
assistant district commissioner, native chiefs (headmen) and
other Africans appointed at the discretion of the provincial
commissioner. Thus, it was essentially a native
organization, which had colonial representation by the two
principal British administrators in the district. However,
all of the African members of the LNC were directly appointed
by the colonial administration.
The LNCs were given substantial responsibilities
relative to those enjoyed by earlier native councils. Their
powers included the ability to pass resolutions, enabling
them to collect the local native rate, a district tax on
Africans. This power was given well before the settlers were
allowed to levy their own local taxes. They were also
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responsible for certain important service functions,
including the provision, maintenance, and regulation of water
and food supplies; the regulation and use of forest,
agricultural, and pastoral lands; the provision of markets
and slaughter houses and the collection of market fees; and
the provision and regulation of services in the areas of
education, roads and bridges, sanitation (latrines), and
agriculture and livestock. Any resolutions passed by the
LNCs, however, were subject to the approval of the provincial
commissioner and the governor of the colony.
The role of the LNCs was sharply criticized by Kenyan
nationalist leaders. It was felt that these councils were
basically a useless showpiece devised by the colonial
authorities to make the Africans think they were gaining
control of their own affairs. The LNCs became extremely
unpopular in some areas because they were perceived as using
African leaders to force colonial policies on the African
people. Under pressure from nationalist groups, some
changes slowly occurred in the LNCs over a period of several
decades. In 1937, for example, a new Native Authority
Ordinance was enacted allowing some councillors to be
elected by the people to the district LNCs, although the
district commissioner could still remove any elected
councillor he perceived to be inappropriate.
The nationalist leaders were never satisfied with the
structure of the LNCs even after they were reformed. Oginga
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Odinga, a Luo leader and early LNC member who later became
the country's first vice-president, sharply attacked the
LNCs:
Matters already decided and finalized by the government
were brought to the councils for confirmation and
acceptance. Council members were powerless to change
anything or to make suggestions contrary to the
decisions already made.. .Measures which were unpopular
were imposed through the councils, punishments for
infringements of unpopular measures meted out through
us, and the government told the people: you elected your
representatives to the district councils, this is their
decision [Odinga (1967), p. 92].
Despite the lack of autonomy of the LNCs and the fact
that they provided only limited services, they were an
important step towards some degree of self-government by the
Africans. After many years of struggle between the colonial
administration and the Kenyan nationalists, and in response
to a strong directive from the British Colonial Secretary,
proposals were made to redefine and restructure the LNCs in
the 1940s. After further debate and struggle, the Local
Government Ordinance was finally enacted in 1950. This
legislation established the African District Councils (ADCs)
to replace the LNCs.
The African District Councils were not dramatically
different from the LNCs in terms of their level of autonomous
power, but there were a few important distinctions. First,
the majority of ADC councillors were elected, although the
method of choosing the chairman of the council was left to
the discretion of the district commissioner. Second, the
ADCs were given formal legal status: they could sue and be
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sued, and they could enter into legal contracts. Third, they
were given the authority to appoint administrative staff and
to set up committees to deal with specific functions, much
like present-day local authorities. Fourth, the ADCs were
given the authority to form joint committees with neighboring
councils to undertake joint projects of mutual interest and
benefit. Fifth, divisional and locational (subdivisions of
districts) councils were formally established as grassroots
advisory bodies to the ADCs. Finally, a system of central
government grants was begun with the establishment of a 50
percent grant for approved expenditures on health services.
ADCs did not become fully functional for some time
after they were legally allowed to be established. Soon
after the passage of the Local Government Ordinance in 1950,
some elements of the nationalist movement in Kenya turned to
violence, and the so-called "Mau Mau Emergency" ensued. This
crisis, which ultimately led to Kenyan independence,
prevented ADC elections from being held until 1958. The ADCs
were the last colonial form of native local government in
Kenya. After independence was achieved in 1963, the ADCs
were blended into the white settler system of local
government, which is explained below.
Settler Local Government
There was no formal local government institution for
settlers in Kenya during the early years of colonization, but
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settler associations were formed from around the turn of the
century. The Farmers and Planters Association was founded in
January 1903 under the leadership of Hugh Cholmondeley, Lord
Delamere, a leading spokesperson for the settlers until his
death in 1931. The association had 23 members, and its
primary purpose was to find a market for potatoes. As
settlement grew, its membership increased rapidly, and its
purposes broadened. In 1904, it was renamed the Colonists'
Association and welcomed all European settlers who wished to
join. The new organization was designed to protect the
interests of the settlers and to encourage additional
settlement by Europeans.
The Colonists' Association was the only major
grassroots organization representing the settlers until the
outbreak of World War I. In 1915, the Registration of
Persons Ordinance established District War Committees (DWCs)
to deal with local wartime problems and to manage the estates
of Europeans who were away at war. Rather than dismantle the
DWCs after the war, the administration reorganized them into
District Advisory Committees (DACs) in 1919. These DACs
operated only in districts in the white settler areas, the
so-called "white highlands." They were primarily designed as
a way to organize settlers at the district level and
formalize their relationship with the colonial administration
in order to protect their interests, although they had a few
official service functions, such as road maintenance.
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The settlers, however, were not satisfied with the
structure and responsibilities of the DACs. In response to
pressure from the settlers, the Governor of Kenya appointed a
Local Government Commission under R.H. Feetham to examine the
structure and functioning of local government in Kenya in
1926. The Commission recommended keeping separate
institutions for the natives and the settlers and
strengthening the settler councils. It further recommended
that elected district councils with full executive authority
be formed in the seven major settler areas. These semi-
autonomous councils would govern the rural areas in the
districts. Townships and municipalities would remain under
the administration of the district commissioner but would
have their own advisory committees.
In response to the Commission Report, the Legislative
Assembly passed the District Councils Ordinance in 1928. The
new district councils replaced the DACs in the European
settler areas. Membership on the council was through
election by fellow Europeans, although there was a provision
made for membership of Asians. No native Africans could vote
for candidates or serve on the district councils, even if
they lived in the white settler districts.
Nationalist movements in African countries and greater
awareness of the situation in the colonies at home began to
exert pressure on the British Government to reform the
colonial administrations during the 1940s. It was becoming
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evident that the colonies would eventually have to be granted
more, or perhaps total independence, and the British wanted
to ensure that the type of governments that would be set up
would be friendly and familiar. In 1947, the British
Colonial Secretary, Lord Creech Jones, issued a Local
Government Dispatch calling for a systematic introduction of
the Westminster type of local government in all British
colonies. This was seen as the first step of a programme to
set up systems of national self-government over time. The
Colonial Secretary stated in this Dispatch:
Since I took office in October, I have been considering
some of the basic problems of African administration; I
think that it is right that I should now address you on
this subject, since our success in handling these
problems, and the extent to which we can secure the
active co-operation of the Africans themselves, may well
determine the measure of our achievement in the
programmes of political, social and economic advancement
on which we have now embarked. I believe that the key
to success lies in the development of an efficient,
democratic system of local government. I wish to
emphasize the words efficient, democratic and
local. I do not do so because they import any new
conception into African administration.; indeed, these
have been the aims of our policies for many years. I
use these words because they seem to me to contain the
whole kernel of the matter: local because the system of
government must be close to the common people and their
problems; efficient because it must be capable of
managing the local services in a way which will help to
raise the standard of living; and democratic because it
must not only find a place for the growing class of
educated men, but at the same time command the respect
and support of the mass of the people. ... In urban
areas the special problem arises of developing
municipal government, or in some places, associating
African with non-African communities in municipal
government where it already exists. In rural areas
local government bodies may be native authorities, large
or small, or local native councils as in Kenya. Where
native authorities are large and responsible for
hundreds of thousands or even millions of people, the
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problem is building up a system of local government
below them in close touch with the people themselves;
where they are too small to be effective, the problem is
one of securing fusion or a federation of existing
units. The general policy must be applied differently
in different areas; the broad aim of securing an
efficient and democratic system of local government,
will, however, be the same everywhere. ...The problem is
fully recognized by the African Governments and is being
met in some Territories by the establishment of regional
or provincial councils, through which a chain of
representation from the people to the Legislative
Councils can be secured. The Native Authorities, as the
organs of local government, are the most important link
in this chain."2
The Dispatch has been interpreted as advocating the
institution in the colonies of what might be called the
classic British model of local government as set forth by
Headley Marshall, Ursula Hicks and Henry Maddick (Mawhood
(1987)]. This model presupposes the existence of a local
body that is constitutionally separate from government and
has responsibility for a significant range of services. This
body should have its own treasury, a separate budget and
accounts, and the power to raise a substantial portion of its
revenue. It should also have a staff under its own control,
with decision-making on policies and internal procedure in
the hands of a democratically-elected council. Finally, the
central government should have no direct role within the
local authority, with its agents serving at most in an
advisory or regulatory capacity.
2 Portions of Creech Jones Dispatch are quoted in both
Hicks (1961) and Akivaga, Kulundu-Bitonye and Opi (1984).
This quote has been assembled from material in both of these
sources.
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The response of the Governor of Kenya to the Dispatch
was relatively prompt and clear. The establishment of the
African District Councils in the native areas in 1950 was one
result of the Dispatch and has already been described. In
addition, a new system of local government based directly on
the British system was initiated in the white settlers area
by the County Councils Ordinance of 1952. The primary unit
of local government was the county council, which generally
covered several of the district councils, which were left
intact. The county councils had primary responsibility for
raising revenues and were the only councils allowed to charge
land rates. District councils and urban councils were below
the county councils, but remained fairly autonomous with
respect to their service responsibilities. There were also
further area subdivisions called local councils and area
councils, but these had little independent power.
The system of different local government institutions in
the settler and native areas remained in effect until
independence. The Mau Mau Emergency hastened the push for
independence and strengthened the Kenyan nationalist
movement. Kenya's independence constitutional conferences
began with the Lancaster House Conference in 1960, which
established the Macleod Constitution and provided for the
election of an African majority in the Legislative Council.
The role and organization of local authorities became one of
the key issues for both the British and the Kenyans at this
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conference. Soon afterwards, the Kenyan Legislative Council
issued Sessional Paper No. 2 of 1961, "The Reconstruction of
Local Authorities". This document was the basis for the
Draft Local Government Bill of 1962, which outlined the
organization of local government.
The Local Government Regulations passed in 1963 removed
the two-tier system of local government that had existed
between the settler and native areas. The African District
Councils were abolished and replaced by the county council
system that had been introduced into the settler areas in
1952. Area councils and urban councils were placed under the
jurisdiction of county councils, and municipalities and
townships were given full autonomy. All of the councils were
given significant responsibilities and revenue-raising
powers. Local authorities basically operated under the 1963
Local Government Regulations and subsequent minor amendments
until the Local Government Act, Chapter 265 of the Laws of
Kenya, was passed by the National Assembly in 1977.
Local Government and the Kenyan Constitution
Although the basic role to be assigned to local
authorities was decided in earlier meetings in the United
Kingdom to draw up a Constitutionfor an independent Kenya,
the overall degree of centralization and the structure of the
new government continued to be hotly debated in later pre-
independence meetings. Two Kenyan nationalist associations
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dominated these meetings and were at the heart of the debate.
The Kenya African National Union (KANU), under the leadership
of Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, Oginga Odinga, and James
Gichuru, was a coalition of the two dominant tribes in Kenya,
the Kikuyu and the Luo, with a sizeable allegiance from the
Kamba. The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), led by
Ronald Ngala, Masinde Muliro, and Daniel arap Moi, was a
defensive coalition of smaller ethnic groups who sought to
protect themselves against domination by the majority tribes.
The coalition included Kalenjin, Maasai, Luhya, Somali, some
Kamba, and several coastal groups, including the Mijikenda.
KANU, under Kenyatta's strong leadership, favored a
powerful central government under the banner of national
unity. KADU, on the other hand, favored regional autonomy in
a federal system with a fairly weak central government.3
Because of a substantial degree of tribal homogeneity within
regions, the KADU leaders felt that this type of system would
prevent domination of minorities by the majority tribes. The
KADU position was supported by the New Kenya Party (NKP), a
union of white settlers, and the Kenya Indian Congress (KIC).
Both of these parties obviously represented additional
minorities in the Kenyan population.
The Constitutional Conference to design the framework of
the new constitution was held in London in 1962. The
3 It is important to note that the KADU position
focused on the establishment of strong regional, i.e.,
provincial, rather than local government.
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surprise result was a victory for the regionalism supported
by the minority party, KADU. This is said to have occurred
for at least three reasons. First, the KADU delegation to
the conference was persuasive, persistent, and intransigent
on the issue of regional autonomy. Second, the KADU plan for
strong regionalism won the support of the British Colonial
Secretary. Finally, Kenyatta may have feared that
independence would be delayed if KANU put up a fight over the
centralization issue.
The Framework Constitution adopted in 1962 rejected a
truly federal system, but it did give strong constitutional
powers to the regions. After the Constitutional Conference,
the Kenyans returned to Nairobi and formed an interim
KANU/KADU coalition government to work out further details of
the new constitution until elections were held in May 1963.
Constituency boundaries were drawn up for the new regions
basically to coincide with the provinces that had been formed
under the colonial administration. These boundaries and
election rules somewhat favored KADU by giving greater
representation to less populated rural and pastoral areas
where regionalism was supported. The Kikuyu and Luo of KANU,
although dominant ethnic groups, lived largely in smaller,
densely populated areas around Mt. Kenya and Lake Victoria.
Elections were held in May 1963 for both national and
regional assemblies. KANU overwhelmingly won the National
Assembly, gaining 70 seats compared to 32 for KADU and 8 for
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a minor dissenting group, the African People's Party (APP).
The regional elections were evenly divided along
tribal/territorial allegiances to the two major parties; KANU
won in Nyanza, Central, and Eastern Provinces, while KADU
took the elections in Western, Rift Valley, and Coast
Provinces. No regional elections were held in Northeastern
Province because of dissent by the dominant Somali tribe.
In the wake of the elections, Kenya was granted self-
government in internal affairs on June 1, 1963 (Madaraka
Day). Despite the convincing victory of the KANU, the
Independence Constitution promoting regionalism was formally
adopted by a final Constitutional Conference in September
1983. This constitution is popularly known in Kenya as the
Majimbo Constitution.4 It followed the principles laid out
in the Framework Constitution of the previous year, granting
substantial power and autonomy to the regional governments.
Each region was to have an elected assembly with both
legislative and executive powers, the latter being handled by
committees. Their powers included control over matters
concerning education, health, agriculture, livestock, part of
the police forces, and local government. The national
administration was also further decentralized and new titles
were given to provincial and district administration
officers. Provincial commissioners were to be called civil
4 Majimbo is the swahili word for province, region, or
district.
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secretaries, and district commissioners were to be known as
regional government agents.
The implications of the Majimbo Constitution for local
government were substantial. Local governments, as was
discussed in more detail earlier, had long existed in Kenya
with certain types of independent powers. In practice,
however, provincial and district commissioners, as
representatives of the centralized colonial administration,
had a great deal of influence on the behavior and performance
of local authorities. Under the new constitution, however,
local governments were to be entirely under the jurisdiction
of the regional assemblies. This had the potential to reduce
dramatically the influence of the central government on local
authorities as well as lead to different roles and different
organization of local authorities in different regions. The
Majimbo Constitution mandated a system of government that was
far more decentralized than its colonial predecessor.
On December 12, 1963, shortly after the formal adoption
of the Majimbo Constitution, Kenya was granted independence
(Uhuru). The new government retained the Queen of England as
head of state, represented in Kenya by a governor general.
The head of government was the Prime Minister (Kenyatta), and
there was a bicameral National Assembly. Another important
aspect of the new Kenya was the powerful regional assemblies
discussed above, which took over approximately one-third of
the functions previously controlled by the colonial central
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government.
Unfortunately, it will never be possible to know if a
decentralized Kenya would have been successful. Largely
because of a lack of experienced personnel, inefficient
planning, and the strong opposition of KANU, the regional
assemblies ran into serious problems right from the start.
In August of 1964, the Kenyatta government forcefully
criticized the regional assemblies and announced its
intention to amend the Majimbo Constitution. The desired
changes included making the country a republic, unifying the
positions of head of state and head of government under an
office of the president, and abolishing the regional
assemblies. Kenyatta threatened to hold a national
referendum on the issue if the National Assembly would not
agree to his constitutional amendments.
The Majimbo Constitution had been written to make
amending it a very difficult process. However, KADU and
other opposition groups were unable to put up much of a
fight. In November 1964, the constitutional amendments
proposed by Kenyatta were overwhelmingly adopted by the
National Assembly. The new constitution, known as the
Republican Constitution, came into effect on Jamhuri Day,
December 12, 1964, the first anniversary of Kenyan
independence. The Queen was removed as head of state, the
office of prime minister and the regional assemblies were
abolished, and Jomo Kenyatta soon became the first president
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of the Republic of Kenya. The offices of provincial
commissioner and district commissioner were re-established
and placed under the Office of the President. In addition,
responsibility for police, education, health, agriculture,
livestock, land acquisition, local government, and some other
services was returned to the central government. Some of
these services were quickly reassigned to local authorities,
but this was done by administrative or legislative, rather
than constitutional, authority. Some additional
constitutional amendments occurred in later years, but the
centralized system imposed by the Republican Constitution
still stands in Kenya today.
Post-Independence Local Government Reform
The role of local authorities in Kenya has undergone
some important changes in the period since independence was
attained in 1963. The desire of KANU for a strong central
government has already been discussed, as has their
successful effort to reform the Majimbo Constitution.
Although the Kenyatta government was able to eliminate
regional government, the local authorities were left with
fairly strong local powers. The Kenyatta government
continued to consolidate its own power during the 1960s, and
there were strong political interests that wanted to limit or
eliminate the broad powers of local authorities. The real
reason for this desire was primarily to consolidate further
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political power in the hands of dominant ethnic groups and
to keep the power of "troublemakers" from minority tribes in
the districts at a minimum. Powerful county council leaders
who favorably impressed the local people might have ambitions
to Parliament and ideas that conflicted with KANU ideology.
The stated reasons for wanting to limit local
authorities were substantially different. Throughout the
1960s, it became fairly easy to criticize the idea of
retaining local authorities with significant
responsibilities. This was true for several key reasons.
First, national leaders could point to the divisive problem
of tribalism and the instability that it could potentially
lead to. Thus, they reasoned that there was a need for
national unity, which to them meant greater centralization
under their leadership. Second, although the performance of
local authorities was satisfactory in some of the wealthier
areas, there were serious problems in many districts,
particularly in the more remote rural areas. National
leaders were able to point to the financial and managerial
problems of local authorities as a reason for limiting their
responsibilities. To exacerbate the problem, population
growth and demand for some services, particularly education,
were growing rapidly during the 1960s. The national
politicians observed that local authorities having financial
and managerial problems were going to be in even worse shape
as demands on their limited capacity grew. Finally, there
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was a common perception among development experts at the time
that centralized administration and strong national planning
led to more efficient allocation and distribution of
resources, in turn leading to more rapid growth and
development. In the view of Kenya's leaders, an overly
prominent role for local government could undermine this
process.
In 1966, a Local Government Commission was set up by
President Kenyatta under W.S. Hardacre to look into the types
of reforms that would be necessary to make the local
government system in Kenya more viable. The Commission
called for sweeping reforms and a general strengthening of
Kenya's local authorities. In response to the Commission's
report, the Government issued Sessional Paper No. 12 of 1967,
which accepted most of the recommendations of the Commission
about revitalizing local authorities. The Sessional Paper
also indicated the Government's willingness to provide the
local authorities with both reliable revenue sources and
central government grants. The political will to implement
these reforms, however, was not there.
After much debate on the subject, the Government passed
the Transfer of Functions Act in 1969. Instead of
revitalizing local authorities, this legislation provided for
the transfer of several major services, including primary
education, health services, and road maintenance, from the
local authorities to the central government as of January 1,
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1970, except in the seven largest municipalities. This
legislation also transferred the Graduated Personal Tax
(GPT), a local payroll levy, to the central government, and
abolished general grant revenues to the local authorities.
The GPT had been the principal source of revenue for all
local authorities. When it was suddenly transferred to the
central government along with significant service
responsibilities, most local authorities were left in a
greatly weakened position. The local authority system itself
was left intact, but many of the councils were left with
little to do. The stated intent was that this transfer of
functions and revenue sources would be temporary. There was
to be a complete reorganization, restructuring, and
strengthening of local authorities, and service
responsibilities, and revenue sources were then to be
returned to them. This has never happened.
The major municipalities were least affected by the
Transfer of Functions Act. The GPT transfer was accomplished
gradually for the large municipal councils, and they retained
their major service functions. When the transfer of GPT was
completed in 1974, it was replaced with a compensating grant
that was also gradually reduced over time. The compensating
grant was finally abolished in 1978, but the Government
introduced various grants to subsidize the large municipal
councils for certain costs incurred in the provision of
primary education and health care. All of these grants,
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except grants for teachers salaries, were abolished in fiscal
year 1984/85, placing an additional financial burden on the
largest municipalities. No other financial assistance for
recurrent expenditure is given to Kenyan local authorities by
the central government except limited grants to needy
councils, which will be discussed later.
During the 1970s, the need to strengthen local
authorities was regularly highlighted by National Development
Plans, various special commission reports, and an
International Monetary Fund report commissioned by the
Government of Kenya.5 Little has been done to implement any
of the major recommendations proposed by these documents for
strengthening local government in Kenya. The coup d'etat
attempt in 1982 seems to have created additional resolve on
the part of the ruling party to consolidate power at the
central level.
Relevance of Historical Factors
The history and development of local government in Kenya
provides some useful insights into the possibilities for
strengthening local government in Kenya today. Several
factors stand out as important. First, in contrast to many
5 See, for example: The Report of the Public Service
Structure and Remuneration Commission, 1970-71; The Report of
the Nyaga Committee, 1973; Bahl and Mant (1976); Report of
the Civil Service Review Committee, 1979-80; Report and
Recommendations of the Working Party on Government
Expenditures, 1982; and, Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986:
Economic Management for Renewed Growth.
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developing countries, Kenya does have a history of semi-
autonomous local government. By and large, there is a viable
institutional and legal structure in place, which could, with
some reforms to be discussed later, permit local government
to have an important role to play in the development process.
Second, there has long been widespread official recognition
by the Kenyan government that local authorities should be
strengthened in order that they could fulfill their unique
and important responsibilities more effectively. Finally,
the unfortunate reality is that, in spite of the first and
second points made above, there has been strong political
resistance by the central government to any meaningful
strengthening of local authorities. It is this obstacle that
must be overcome if effective reform of local government will
ever be able to occur in Kenya.
The Current System of Local Government in Kenya
Having reviewed the history and development of local
government in Kenya, it is now appropriate to turn to a
description of how the system operates. This includes a
discussion of types of local authorities and their role in
the overall public sector, as well as an explanation of how
local authorities raise and spend resources and a description
of the local authority debt situation.
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Types of Local Authorities in Kenya
In 1977, the National Assembly passed The Local
Government Act, Chapter 265 of the Laws of Kenya. This
streamlined the organization of local authorities, laid out
the functions, powers and responsibilities of different types
of local authorities, and firmly established strict control
of local authorities by the Minister for Local Government.
There are four types of local authority allowed in Kenya
under the Local Government Act and its amendments of 1978,
1979, 1982, 1984, and 1988. Municipal councils are
established in large urbanized areas and have substantial
service provision responsibility. They provide many basic
urban services, including roads, sanitation, water, sewerage,
housing, and social services. As noted earlier, the largest
of these councils are also required to provide primary
education and health care. Town Councils are generally in
smaller urban areas and do not have as much service
responsibility. None are responsible for health and
education, and few have water or sewerage schemes. Both
municipal and town councils tend to provide some local
revenue-generating services, such as markets, busparks, and
slaughterhouses.
county councils are in almost every case geographically
identical with districts, the administrative subdivisions of
the central government. The service area of a county council
is all of the land area of its district not under the
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jurisdiction of a municipal or town council. County councils
have had substantially fewer service responsibilities since
being relieved of health, education, and road maintenance in
1970. They do provide social services, maintain some
secondary roads, construct and operate market and slaughter
facilities, and generally share in the provision of
veterinary services.
The final type of local authority in Kenya is the urban
council. These are in emerging urban centers being prepared
for transition to town, and ultimately municipal, councils.
They often provide marketing and other basic facilities but
do not have full fiscal independence. They are under the
jurisdiction of the county council in which they are located.
The local government revenue sources in Kenya are
extremely diverse and vary greatly both across and within
different local authority types. There is much less
standardization of revenue sources than there is of service
responsibilities for a particular type of council, and their
assignment is much more arbitrary. A more detailed
discussion of local authority revenue sources is presented
in a later section of this chapter.
Local authorities in Kenya are governed by elected
councils and managed by appointed administrative officers.
They are highly regulated and controlled by the central
government. There is little that a local authority can do
without the approval of the Ministry of Local Government;
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furthermore, the chief managing officers of the councils are
actually central government civil servants under the Public
Service Commission.
It is worth noting that a system of decentralized
central government administration exists alongside the local
government system. The country is divided into seven
provinces under the leadership of provincial commissioners,
and the provinces are divided into districts administered by
district commissioners. The districts are divided further
into divisions, subdivisions and locations, which are
respectively run by district officers, chiefs, and sub-
chiefs. The entire system, a holdover from the colonial
administration, is under the Office of the President.
The central government's decentralized administration,
usually referred to as the provincial administration, has
often been in conflict with local authorities, because there
is some degree of redundancy and ambiguity in their
responsibilities, particularly at the district level. In
1983, President Daniel arap Moi introduced the District Focus
for Rural Development strategy, which is supposed to
strengthen the role of district administration in the
development process. It is also supposed to coordinate the
activities of district-level offices of central government
agencies and local authorities through advisory boards known
as District Development Committees. This new strategy has
raised a number of important issues that will be addressed
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later.
The Structure of the Public Sector in Kenya
The central government is responsible for the vast
majority of public spending in Kenya. It is heavily
dependent on indirect taxes, such as sales taxes, export
duties, excises, and import duties, which accounted for 59.4
percent of total recurrent revenue in fiscal year 1985/86.
Income taxes raised another 30.2 percent of revenue in the
same year. On the expenditure side, the four main categories
are education, interest on public debt, general
administration, and defense, which respectively accounted for
23.4, 19.8, 12.9, and 8.5 percent of total central government
recurrent expenditures in fiscal year 1985/86.6
The relative importance of the central government in
public spending has increased dramatically since the early
days of independence. During the 1960s, local governments
accounted for almost one-fifth of all public-sector spending
in Kenya. After the transfer of certain local authority
revenues and service functions to the central government in
1970, which was described earlier, the importance of most
local authorities declined suddenly and dramatically. For
example, aggregate county council expenditures fell by 85
6 These figures are calculated from data in: Economic
Survey, 1987 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry
of Planning and National Development, Republic of Kenya,
1987), Chapter 6.
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percent from 1969 to 1970 (Oyugi (1983), p. 134]. Local
authorities in Kenya have never regained their former
importance.
Table 4.1 provides information on Kenyan public revenues
and expenditures in fiscal year 1985/86.7 In that year,
local government accounted for only 5.5 percent of total
public-sector recurrent revenues and 5.0 percent of total
government recurrent expenditures, with about 80 percent of
this being provided by the 20 municipal councils. If only
expenditures on goods and services are considered, local
authorities accounted for 8.5 percent of the total, the bulk
of which was again provided by municipal councils. The role
of local government in capital expenditures was more
significant. Local authorities accounted for 15.9 percent of
total public sector gross fixed capital formation in 1985,
with municipal councils alone accounting for 11.9 percent;
however, it is important to note that the bulk of local
authority capital financing comes from the central
government's Local Government Loans Authority.
Thus, the local government sector does not have a very
important fiscal role in Kenya relative to the central
government. Nevertheless, municipal councils provide most of
the major public services within their jurisdictions, and
7 In early 1988, the exchange rate between the Kenyan
shilling and the U.S. dollar was approximately 17:1. One
Kenyan pound equals 20 shillings, or about $1.18. The
shilling is the basic unit of currency. Pounds are used only
in official financial reports and documents.
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TABLE 4.1
KENYAN PUBLIC REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES, 1985/86
BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT (MILLIONS OF KENYAN POUNDS)
LEVEL ADJUSTED
OF RECURRENT RECURRENT RECURRENT CAPITAL
GOVERNMENT REVENUES EXPENDITURES EXPENDITURES* EXPENDITURES**
Central
Municipal
Councils
Other Local
Authorities***
All Local
Authorities
TOTAL
1186.36
56.74
12.69
69.43
1255.79
1244.26
52.67
12.76
65.43
1309.69
687.49
51 .69
11.83
63.52
751.01
150.04
21 .29
7.13
28.42
178.46
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
Central
Municipal
Councils
Other Local
Authorities
All Local
Authorities
* Adjusted recurrent expenditures represent
services only (exclusive of transfers).
outlays for goods and
**Capital expenditures include gross fixed capital formation only.
They specifically exclude loan repayments and transfers to funds.
***Town, urban, and county councils.
SOURCE: Economic Survey, 1987 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics,
Ministry of Planning and National Development, Republic of Kenya,
1987), Chapter 6.
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95.0 91.594.4
4.5
1.0
5.5
6.9
84.1
11.9
1.0 1.6
8.5
4.0
15.9
other types of local authorities provide services that are
extremely significant to their constituents. Thus, the issue
of the effectiveness of local authorities is of considerable
importance to many Kenyans.
Description of the Local Authority Fiscal System in Kenya
This section provides a brief description of the Kenyan
local government fiscal system in 1984 as a prelude to
analyzing the fiscal role and operations of the local
authorities. The composition and levels of revenues and
expenditures across different types of local authorities are
examined. This is followed by a look at the overall
financial position of the various types of local government
councils. 8
Composition and Level of Revenues
Several Acts of Parliament, including the Local
Government Act, the Rating Act, the Valuation for Rating Act
and the Regional Assembly Act, give local authorities in
Kenya the right to raise income from a wide variety of
8 The data used in this section come from field visits
to a sample of Kenyan local authorities in 1986-87. A
description of this fieldwork is presented in Chapter 5.
Detailed information on site visits, definitions of revenue
and expenditure categories, and problems with the data
collection and analysis is presented in Appendices I, II, and
III.
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sources. 9 No particular sources of revenue are reserved
exclusively for specific types of local authorities, but wide
variations in the use of many sources of revenue across local
authorities do exist for a number of important reasons. The
composition of land in a local authority determines the
extent to which rural and urban land taxes can be collected;
furthermore, some types of services for which fees are
charged are appropriate for some local authorities but not
for others. Public veterinary services, for example, are
often needed in rural areas, but only infrequently in urban
areas. Conversely, sewerage systems are the norm in
municipal councils, but are rarely operated in rural
councils.
Another important reason for the variation in reliance on
revenue sources across local authorities is that there are a
variety of problems in revenue collection that make it very
difficult to collect certain types of revenue in some local
authorities. These will be discussed in detail in later
chapters. In addition, there are wide variations in the
economic base from which local taxes are derived. Some
districts are highly productive agricultural areas abounding
9 The Regional Assembly Act of 1964 gave the regional
assemblies formed under the Majimbo Constitution the right to
levy a poll rate, which is a fixed fee head tax on all adult
citizens living in the taxing jurisdiction. When the
regional assemblies were dissolved, the poll rate was
transferred to the local authorities. It is not widely used
today because it is difficult to collect and because
President Moi recently criticized some of the extreme tactics
used by some local authorities to collect the tax.
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with potentially rich sources of revenue. Others are arid or
semi-arid with few or no very productive sources of revenue.
Finally, the problem of different revenue capacities is
sometimes a result of administrative decisions by the
Ministry of Local Government or long delays in approving
local authority by-laws, both issues to be dealt with in more
detail later.1 0
Type of council and geographic location are the major
factors that determine the principal revenue sources of a
local authority.11 As can be seen from the data in Table
4.2, municipal councils get most of their revenue from water
charges, land rates, market fees, house rents, plot rents,
slaughter fees and buspark fees. Large municipal councils
are less diversified in their principal sources of revenue,
10 By-laws are documents registered with the Attorney
General that give Local Authorities the legal power to raise
revenue from the sources allowed to them in the Local
Government Act and other legislation. Without a by-law for a
particular source of revenue, the local authority has no
legal authority to collect it.
11 The categories of local authorities used in Tables
4.2 to 4.8 require some explanation. Data for all county
councils is provided under the heading "County 1". "County
2" removes the counties which get more than 50 percent of
their revenue from tourism. This has been done because the
inclusion of these high tourism councils may distort some
results. "Municipal 1" includes all municipal and town
councils. "Municipal 2" excludes the largest municipal
councils because they have responsibility for health care and
primary education, so the composition of their revenues and
expenditures would be expected to be significantly different
from other urban local authorities. "Large Municipal" reports
separate data for the large municipal councils, and "Town"
reports separate data for the town councils, which tend to
have fewer service responsibilities than most municipal
councils.
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TABLE 4.2
COMPOSITION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY REVENUES (1984)
Income Sources as a Mean Percentage of Total Income
by Type of Local Authority*
(Number in Parentheses Indicates the Number of Observations)
Large
County 1 County 2 Municipal 1 Municipal 2 Municipal Town
Income Source
Licences 12.0 (13) 13.5 (11) 13.8 (13) 16.4 (10) 5.0 (3) 20.1 (3)
Land Rates 18.9 (8) 24.6 (6) 21.3 (13) 21.5 (10) 20.6 (3) 16.3 (3)
Plot Rents 4.7 (11) 5.2 (9) 5.3 (8) 6.0 (7) ** 9.8 (3)
Cess 33.8 (11) 38.7 (9) 2.7 (7) 2.7 (7) 0.0 (0) 3.4 (3)
House Rents 2.5 (10) 2.7 (8) 10.3 (11) 8.2 (8) 16.1 (3) 6.6 (2)
Water Charges 0.4 (7) 0.3 (6) 24.5 (8) 26.0 (5) 22.0 (3) 0.0 (0)
Sewerage Fees 0.9 (2) ** 6.2 (10) 4.4 (7) 10.5 (3) **
Market Fees 7.7 (13) 8.6 (11) 9.5 (13) 11.5 (10) 2.7 (3) 16.4 (3)
Slaughter Fees 1.7 (9) 1.8 (7) 4.7 (12) 6.0 (9) 0.8 (3) 4.0 (2)
Buspark Fees 0.1 (3) 0.1 (3) 5.7 (13) 6.9 (10) 1.6 (3) 12.1 (3)
Veterinary Fees 2.8 (11) 3.1 (9) 0.2 (3) 0.2 (3) 0.0 (0) 0.2 (2)
Works Fees 3.8 (9) 4.2 (8) 4.5 (13) 4.7 (10) 3.8 (3) 2.8 (3)
Poll Rate 3.2 (10) 3.9 (8) 1.9 (5) 1.9 (5) 0.0 (0) 2.6 (2)
Tourism Fees 25.9 (5) 4.8 (3) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
Interest 6.9 (8) 8.8 (6) 4.0 (8) 3.4 (6) 5.7 (2) **
Grants 8.9 (6) 12.0 (4) 21.0 (4) * 23.6 (3) **
* Definitions of Categories
County 1 = all county councils
County 2 = county councils without significant tourism
(less than 10% of revenue derived from tourism)
Municipal 1 = all municipal and town councils
Municipal 2 = all municipal and town councils except large
municipal councils responsible for health and
and primary education
Large Municipal = municipal councils responsible for
health and education
Town = town councils only
** means are not reported because there is only one observation
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and tend to rely heavily on water charges, land rates, house
rents, sewerage fees and grants for teachers salaries, with
very small percentages of income coming from all other
sources. Town councils rely less on land rates and
infrastructure-based revenues than on plot rent and income
from less capital-intensive services, such as market and
buspark fees.
County councils tend to have fewer substantial sources of
revenue than the local authorities in urban areas, except for
those councils that are permitted to charge cess on cash
crops or have significant access to land rates. 12 Most
county councils rely heavily on market-related fees and
trade licenses. Such fees are generally collected in
divisional headquarters as well as the administrative seat of
the county council. Some county councils have busparks and
slaughterhouses, and a few collect large amounts of revenue
from game reserves within their jurisdiction. A number of
county councils also have access to house rents, poll rates,
and a wide variety of other sources of revenue. Many of
these, however, are often very unproductive or unreliable.
The geographic location of local authorities also has a
significant impact on their revenue composition and capacity.
12 Cess is an ad valorem wholesale tax on agricultural
production. It varies across crops and districts, but is
normally in the range of one to three percent. The
Government has recently announced its intention to
standardize cess to a rate of one percent on a fixed set of
crops in all districts.
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Given the diverse agro-ecological conditions in Kenya,
location is a prime determinant of economic base. Thus, it
also determines the forms of economic activity that generate
public revenues. The fertile areas in the central and
western highlands are very productive, and agriculture-
related taxes tend to generate significant amounts of
revenue. Market fees and various types of cesses, where
permitted, are excellent sources of funding in these areas.
In much of the rest of Kenya, agricultural opportunities are
more limited. Even though market fees may still be important
for the local authority in these areas, they are much less
productive than in more fertile regions. Semi-arid areas
tend to be more dependent on livestock than on crops.
Conditions permitting, livestock-related taxes, such as
stock auction and slaughter fees, can be very important. In
all of north-central and northeastern districts, miraa cess
is one of if not the principal source of revenue.13
Per capita income from virtually all sources and in total
is higher in municipal and town councils than in county
councils, as can be seen from the data in Table 4.3. The
largest municipal councils have much higher per capita income
from land rates, house rent, interest, water charges,
13 Miraa is a green leafy plant that produces a mild
stimulant effect when chewed. It is grown in certain parts
of Kenya and is very popular, particularly among Moslems,
because they are forbidden to take alcohol. Some local
authorities in areas where miraa is popular have placed a
levy, or cess, on the wholesale and retail sale of miraa, or
on the export of miraa to other districts.
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TABLE 4.3
MEAN PER CAPITA LOCAL AUTHORITY REVENUES (1984)
in Kenyan Shillings by Type of Local Authority*
(Number in Parentheses Indicates the Number of Observations)
Large
County 1 County 2 Municipal 1 Municipal 2 Municipal Town
Income Source
Licences 1.95 (13) 1.90 (11) 25.53 (13) 26.96 (10) 20.77 (3) 41.04 (3)
Land Rates 3.24 (8) 4.02 (6) 50.92 (13) 39.08 (10) 90.38 (3) 44.95 (3)
Plot Rents .86 (11) .67 (9) 10.40 (8) 11.56 (7) 2.32 (1) 21.40 (3)
Cess 8.02 (11) 8.06 (9) 3.36 (7) 3.36 (7) 0.00 (0) 5.03 (3)
House Rents .61 (10) .37 (8) 30.54 (11) 14.96 (8) 72.08 (3) 18.59 (2)
Water Charges .10 (7) .08 (6) 58.86 (8) 38.96 (5) 92.02 (3) 0.00 (0)
Sewerage Fees .79 (2) ** 18.32 (10) 7.05 (7) 44.60 (3) **
Market Fees 1.29 (13) 1.10 (11) 17.87 (13) 20.01 (10) 10.74 (3) 38.89 (3)
Slaughter Fees .44 (9) .35 (7) 7.75 (12) 9.23 (9) 3.30 (3) 12.97 (2)
Buspark Fees .01 (3) .01 (3) 8.96 (13) 9.76 (10) 6.30 (3) 16.95 (3)
Veterinary Fees .44 (11) .37 (9) .20 (3) .20 (3) 0.00 (0) .24 (2)
Works Fees .62 (9) .63 (8) 9.15 (13) 6.90 (10) 16.65 (3) 3.72 (3)
Poll Rate .39 (9) .48 (7) 4.18 (5) 4.18 (5) 0.00 (0) 7.61 (2)
Tourism Fees 13.13 (5) .56 (3) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Interest 2.38 (8) 3.05 (6) 11.83 (8) 8.06 (6) 23.17 (2) 16.35 (1)
Grants 1.57 (6) 2.36 (4) 77.92 (4) ** 101.09 (3) **
Total 20.89 (13) 17.44 (11) 228.29 (13) 168.12 (10) 428.84 (3) 219.68 (3)
* Definitions of Categories
County 1
County 2
= all county councils
= county councils without significant tourism
(less than 10% of revenue derived from tourism)
Municipal 1 = all municipal and town councils
Municipal 2 = all municipal and town councils except large
municipal councils responsible for health and
and primary education
Large Municipal = municipal councils responsible for
health and education
Town = town councils only
** means are not reported because there is only one observation
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sewerage charges, and works fees than do other municipal and
town councils; however, these large councils have lower per
capita income from licenses, plot rents, market fees,
busparkfees, and slaughter charges.
Variation in per capita income and reliance on particular
revenue sources are extremely great for virtually all sources
of income for all different types of local authorities. 14
Some county councils, for example, get a majority of their
revenue from land rates or agricultural cess, while others
derive most of their income from trading license and market
fees.
In summary, market fees, trade licenses and rents/rates
tend to be important sources of revenue common to all local
authorities. The relative intensity of their use depends
largely on the composition of local economic activity. Use
of these and other revenue sources also depends on the type
of council, geographic location/agro-ecological conditions,
and authority granted by the Ministry of Local Government.
Tremendous variations in per capita income and the
composition of income exist both across and within different
types of local authorities.
Composition and Level of Expenditures
As might be expected, different types of local
authorities in Kenya provide different types of services.
14 Details may be found in Smoke (June 1987).
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This is true largely because of differing needs, input costs,
human resources, and financial capacities. This section will
present data on the variations in the composition and level
of local expenditures within and across different types of
local authorities.
The data in Table 4.4 indicate that county councils are
fairly consistent in devoting most of their budget to
expenditures on administration, social services, works,
councillors expenses, markets, and veterinary services,
although there is some diversity in the relative importance
of each. A few county councils with game reserves also spend
a significant portion of their budget on maintenance and
operating expenses for these facilities.
Municipal and town councils spend the bulk of their
resources on administration, works, water, housing, markets,
and sewerage. Large municipal councils devote still higher
percentages of their budgets to housing, and they must also
spend heavily on primary education and health care, which
they are required to provide. Town councils provide many of
the same urban services as municipal councils, but few of
them provide water and sewerage services.
The data in Table 4.5 demonstrate that mean per capita
expenditures are higher in municipal and town councils than
in county councils for all types of spending, without
exception. The large municipal councils have substantially
higher per capita spending than the smaller municipal and
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TABLE 4.4
COMPOSITION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY EXPENDITURE (1984)
Expenditure Type as a Mean Percentage of Total Expenditure
by Type of Local Authority*
(Number in Parentheses Indicates the Number of Observations)
Large
County 1 County 2 Municipal 1 Municipal 2 Municipal Town
Expenditure Type
Administration 33.0 (13) 35.0 (11) 30.9 (13) 36.2 (10) 13.3 (3) 40.6 (3)
Engineer ** 5.1 (8) 6.1 (6) 2.2 (2) 0.0 (0)
Councillors 12.3 (13) 12.1 (11) 4.7 (13) 5.7 (10) 1.6 (3) 7.0 (3)
Primary Education 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 31.7 (3) 0.0 (0) 31.7 (3) 0.0 (0)
Social Services 17.2 (13) 18.9 (11) 6.3 (13) 6.9 (10) 4.3 (3) 5.6 (3)
Works 14.1 (13) 15.7 (11) 18.7 (13) 19.8 (10) 15.1 (3) 16.1 (3)
Housing 2.9 (4) 2.9 (4) 8.5 (11) 4.5 (8) 19.2 (3) **
Water 1.4 (7) 1.1 (6) 14.4 (10) 13.8 (7) 15.7 (3) **
Sewerage 0.9 (2) ** 5.4 (9) 5.4 (6) 5.4 (3) **
Markets 9.9 (11) 10.7 (10) 7.9 (13) 9.2 (10) 3.6 (3) 17.1 (3)
Veterinary 4.6 (10) 4.3 (8) 2.0 (3) 2.0 (3) 0.0 (0) 1.8 (2)
Health ** 12.4 (3) ** 12.4 (3) 0.0 (0)
Slaughter 1.4 (5) 1.8 (3) 4.6 (12) 5.9 (9) 0.7 (3) 7.7 (2)
Tourism 14.1 (5) 2.7 (3) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0) 0.0 (0)
* Definitions of Categories
County 1 = all county councils
County 2 = county councils without significant tourism
(less than 10% of revenue derived from tourism)
Municipal 1 = all municipal and town councils
Municipal 2 = all municipal and town councils except large
municipal councils responsible for health and
and primary education
Large Municipal = municipal councils responsible for
health and education
Town = town councils only
** means are not reported because there is only one observation
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TABLE 4.5
MEAN PER CAPITA LOCAL AUTHORITY EXPENDITURE (1984)
in Kenyan Shillings by Type of Local Authority*
(Number in Parentheses Indicates the Number of Observations)
Large
County 1 County 2 Municipal 1 Municipal 2 Municipal Town
Expenditure Type
Administration 6.62 (13) 5.09 (11) 65.04 (13) 67.66 (10) 56.31 (3) 106.71 (3)
Engineer * * 9.00 (8) 9.08 (6) 8.79 (2) 0.00 (0)
Councillors 2.48 (13) 1.69 (11) 9.23 (13) 10.11 (10) 6.30 (3) 16.11 (3)
Primary Education 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 126.97 (3) 0.00 (0) 126.97 (3) 0.00 (0)
Social Services 3.34 (13) 3.02 (11) 11.79 (13) 9.98 (10) 17.83 (3) 10.13 (3)
Works 2.59 (13) 2.64 (11) 40.87 (13) 34.73 (10) 61.35 (3) 43.65 (3)
Housing .40 (4) .40 (4) 28.35 (11) 8.27 (8) 81.92 (3) **
Water .19 (7) .12 (6) 35.23 (10) 21.18 (7) 68.02 (3) **
Sewerage .79 (2) * 14.70 (9) 10.77 (6) 22.55 (3) **
Markets 1.37 (11) 1.38 (10) 12.97 (13) 13.46 (10) 11.33 (3) 24.61 (3)
Veterinary 1.06 (10) .62 (8) 3.08 (3) 3.08 (3) 0.00 (0) 1.48 (2)
Health ** 50.60 (3) * 50.60 (3) 0.00 (0)
Slaughter .44 (5) .21 (3) 8.25 (12) 10.15 (9) 2.55 (3) 18.09 (2)
Tourism 10.11 (5) .43 (3) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Total 18.41 (13) 15.02 (11)224.46 (13) 172.86 (10) 396.46 (3) 232.91 (3)
* Definitions of Categories
County 1 = all county councils
County 2 = county councils without significant tourism
(less than 10% of revenue derived from tourism)
Municipal 1 = all municipal and town councils
Municipal 2 = all municipal and town councils except large
municipal councils responsible for health and
and primary education
Large Municipal = municipal councils responsible for
health and education
Town = town councils only
** means are not reported because there is only one observation
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town councils in several major categories. This is
particularly true for housing, works, water, and sewerage.
It is also true for social services, despite the fact that
larger municipal councils devote a smaller percentage of
their total budget to these services than do smaller
municipal councils. The large and small municipal councils
have roughly comparable per capita spending for
administration, engineering, and markets, while the larger
councils spend substantially less per capita on
slaughterhouses and councillors expenses.
The variations in expenditure composition within
particular local authority groups are sometimes large, but
substantially smaller than the variations exhibited by income
composition, which were described above. 15 It thus appears
that Kenyan local authorities of a particular type are
somewhat consistent in the way they use their resources
despite having very diverse revenue bases. There is,
however, substantial variability in per capita expenditure
figures within local authority groups.
The variations in per capita spending and expenditure
composition within and across local authority types are
partly due to differences in service needs. More urbanized
and highly travelled local authorities might spend more on
things like road surfacing and street lighting than other
councils even if they are not very heavily populated. These
15 Details may be found in Smoke (June 1987).
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spending differences can also be partially explained by type
of council and geographic location of the council. Municipal
and town councils, for example, generally have greater
responsibilities for providing public services than do county
councils; furthermore, some councils need certain services
more than others. A county council in livestock-intensive
areas where certain diseases are a problem, for example, will
spend more on veterinary services than other county councils.
Some of these spending differences, however, depend heavily
on variations in wealth and the types of revenues the local
authority is permitted to raise. These issues, which are
important in understanding local government finance in Kenya,
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Financial Position of Local Authorities
This section examines the overall surplus/deficit
position of Kenyan local authorities on their current
accounts for fiscal year 1984.16 It also explores how the
surplus/deficit varies among different types of councils, how
financial positions on the general fund differ from those on
16 Information on surpluses and deficits may often say
very little about fiscal health. Some countries may not
allow local authorities to incur deficits, and surpluses and
deficits may only reflect accounting procedures. In the
current case, these issues are not a concern or have been
taken into account in the discussion. It is true, however,
that surpluses and deficits say nothing about the ability of
a government to provide the services required in its jurisdiction.
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special-purpose funds'7 , and the general debt position of
local authorities.
Overall Surplus/Deficit
The overall financial positions on 1984 current accounts
of the local authorities examined in this study are
summarized in Table 4.6. There are two types of financial
position considered: (1) general fund activities only; and,
(2) all sources of income and expenditure. In the first
case, Financial Position Type 1, activities for which there
are separate funds are not figured into the calculations.
Thus in the case of many municipal councils, income and
expenditure on water, sewerage, housing and occasionally
other services are excluded. For a few county councils,
tourism revenues and expenditures are excluded. In
Financial Position Type 2, all types of revenue and
expenditure are included regardless of source.
In examining Financial Position Type 1 for 1984, it can
be seen that eight county councils ran a surplus and five ran
a deficit. It should be noted, however, that of the eight
surpluses, two were in councils that normally run deficits,
17 As is the practice in many countries, urban local
authorities in Kenya keep a general account (fund) and
separate accounts (funds) for certain major services,
including water, sewerage, housing, and, occasionally, other
services. This is not only to keep separate records, but
also to keep separate reserve funds for replacement
investment in future years. Some county councils in Kenya
also keep separate accounts for game reserves.
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TABLE 4.6
OVERALL FINANCIAL POSITION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES (1984)
A. Financial Position Type 1*
Type of Number of Number of
Council Surpluses Deficits
County 8 5
Municipal 2 8
Large Municipal*** 1 2
Town 2 1
Total 12 14
B. Financial Position Type 2**
Type of Number of Number of
Council Surpluses Deficits
County 9 4
Municipal 5 5
Large Municipal*** 3 0
Town 2 1
Total 16 12
* Financial Position Type 1 includes only general funds
for municipal councils. Thus, municipal councils with
separate funds for housing, water, sewerage, etc.,
will not have these revenues and expenditures figured into
the surplus/deficit calculations. For county councils, game
reserve income and expenditures would not be included here.
** Financial Position Type 2 includes all sources of
revenues and expenditures for all types of councils.
* Large municipal councils are also included in the
category "municipal."
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one was in a council that has run deficits since 1984, one
was in a council that has run deficits in three of the past
six years, and another was in a council that has budgeted for
a deficit in fiscal year 1988. Thus, the number of surpluses
seems to make the financial positions of the county councils
studied look better than they are. In reality, only a
handful of the county councils being considered run surpluses
on a regular basis.
Among municipal councils, eight of ten ran a deficit on
the general fund, while only two ran a surplus. Included in
these ten are three large municipal councils with
responsibility for health and education, two of which ran a
deficit. Among the three town councils, two ran a surplus
but one of these habitually runs a deficit and the one that
ran a deficit in 1984 has been running surpluses since then.
Overall, fourteen of the twenty-six local authorities in this
study ran deficits on the general fund.
An examination of Financial Position Type 2 changes the
situation somewhat. Only one additional county council runs
a surplus when tourism revenue and expenditure are included
in the analysis. However, when revenue-generating activities
such as water and housing are included for municipal
councils, three of the eight that ran deficits on their
general funds now have overall surpluses. Because no town
councils have separate funds, they are unaffected by
considering Financial Position Type 2. Clearly, some
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councils are substantially helped by surplus revenue from
separate funds, while others are not.
Surplus/Deficit Relative to Total Revenue and Population
The financial position of local authorities is further
explored in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Table 4.7 presents mean data
on surplus/deficit as a percentage of total local authority
revenue by type of local authority, while Table 4.8 gives
mean per capita surplus/deficit by type of local authority.
Two types of surplus and deficit are reported in the
tables: SD, which is the surplus or deficit for the general
fund only. This excludes all separate funds and is the
equivalent of Financial Position Type 1 in Table 6; and, 2)
TSD, which is the surplus or deficit including all sources of
income and expenditure. It is equivalent to Financial
Position Type 2 in Table 4.6. Six statistics are presented
in each table: number of observations, minimum, maximum,
median, mean, and standard deviation.
The first thing that is apparent from these tables is
the tremendous variation that exists in both the magnitude of
surpluses and deficits as a percentage of total income and
their per capita levels across and within all types of local
authorities. Each of these figures will be examined in turn
for all types of councils.
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Surplus/Deficit as a Percentage of Total Revenue
As can be seen in Table 4.7, the financial positions of
all county councils (County 1) show a mean deficit of -7.8
percent of total revenue, with the median being a surplus of
1.3 percent. The variation across councils is enormous, as
is evident from the standard deviation of 42.2. When tourism
finances are included in the analysis (TSD), the mean and
median jump to respective surpluses of 3.3 and 8.3
percent. 1 8 Tourism clearly has an important impact on the
financial position of at least some county councils.
The financial position on the general fund for all
municipal and town councils (Municipal 1) reflects mean and
median deficits of -7.3 and -11.0 percent, respectively.
Again the variation is large as evidenced by the standard
deviation of 18.3. When including revenues and expenditures
from separate funds, such as water and housing, the mean and
median improve significantly. Clearly there is a positive
impact on some councils from including surpluses derived from
separate fund activities.
Large municipal councils (Large Municipal) appear to do
better financially than smaller municipal and town councils
(Municipal 2). The small municipal and town council general
18 The mean and median surpluses are actually very
slightly larger when excluding county councils with major
tourism (County 2), but this is because one of the tourism
councils has a large deficit on the general fund and
continues to run a small deficit even after the game reserve
surplus is included.
176
TABLE 4.7
SURPLUS/DEFICIT AS A PERCENTAGE
BY TYPE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY
OF TOTAL INCOME (1984)
Standard
Type of Council* Number Minimum Maximum Median Mean Deviation
County 1
So" 13 -125.5 36.6 1.3 -7.8 42.2
TSD*** 13 -56.2 36.6 8.3 3.3 22.6
County 2
SD 11 -56.2 36.6 1.3 2.6 25.1
TSD 11 -56.2 36.6 9.5 3.4 24.6
Municipal 1
SD 13 -38.3 25.5 -11.0 -7.3 18.3
TSD 13 -38.3 25.5 0.7 -2.0 19.1
Municipal 2
SD 10 -38.3 25.5 -17.5 -10.0 19.2
TSD 10 -38.3 25.5 -6.5 -5.8 19.3
Large Municipal
SD 3 -11.0 15.9 -0.2 1.6 13.5
TSD 3 0.7 26.9 3.9 10.5 14.3
Town
SD 3 -38.3 8.5 7.1 -7.6 26.6
TSD 3 -38.3 8.5 7.1 -7.6 26.6
* Definitions of Categories
County 1 = all county councils
County 2 = county councils without significant tourism
(less than 10% of revenue derived from tourism)
Municipal 1 = all municipal and town councils
Municipal 2 = all municipal and town councils except large
municipal councils responsible for health and
and primary education
Large Municipal = municipal councils responsible for
health and education
Town = town councils only
** SD is the surplus or deficit on the general fund. It excludes all separate fund
revenues and expenditures, including water, sewerage, and housing for some municipal councils,
councils, and game reserve income for county councils.
*** TSD is the total surplus or deficit resulting from the consideration of all sources
of income and all types of expenditure.
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funds (SD) show respective mean and median deficits of -10.0
percent and -17.5 percent, while the large municipal council
mean and median are 1.6 and -0.2. Both groups show
significant cross-council variation, but it is larger for
the small municipal and town councils.
When considering all sources of revenue and expenditure
(TSD), the mean and median deficits for small municipal and
town councils decline, but remain significant (-5.8 and -6.5
percent). The financial position of large municipal councils
improves, registering mean and median surpluses of 10.5 and
3.9 percent. Thus, the financial position of larger
municipal councils improves more from separate fund surpluses
than does the average small municipal council. 19
Per Capita Surplus/Deficit
The data on per capita surplus/deficit by type of
council are presented in Table 4.8. In a few cases, the sign
and magnitude of the figures in this table differ from the
figures on surplus/deficit as a percentage of total income
presented in Table 7. For example, county councils show a
mean deficit of -7.8 percent of income, but a mean per capita
surplus of K.Sh. 0.78. There are not, however, many
19 It is true, of course, that only three large
municipal councils of the eight in the country are considered
and only one has a substantial surplus. It is also true,
however, that none of the large municipal councils has a very
large deficit, even on the general fund, while many smaller
municipal councils do have substantial deficits, even when
all sources of income and expenditure are considered.
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TABLE 4.8
PER CAPITA SURPLUS/DEFICIT BY TYPE OF LOCAL AUTHORITY (1984)
(in Kenyan Shillings)
Standard
Type of Council* Number Minimum Maximum Median Mean Deviation
County 1
SD** 13 -10.56 18.06 0.29 0.78 6.58
TSD*** 13 -3.40 18.06 1.18 1.98 5.39
County 2
SD 11 -3.40 18.06 1.18 2.35 13.27
TSD 11 -3.40 18.06 1.39 2.43 5.67
Municipal 1
SD 13 -73.62 50.02 -14.63 -9.37 36.84
TSD 13 -73.62 84.07 3.29 4.74 38.65
Municipal 2
SO 10 -73.62 48.38 -16.35 -12.21 35.07
'SD 10 -73.62 48.38 0.90 -4.72 33.96
Large Municipal
SD 3 -48.60 50.02 -1.13 9.40 49.32
TSD 3 3.29 84.70 20.77 36.25 42.85
Town
sD 3 -73.62 28.45 5.45 -13.24 53.54
TSD 3 -73.62 28.45 5.45 -13.24 53.54
* Definitions of Categories
County 1 = all county councils
County 2 = county councils without significant tourism
(less than 10% of revenue derived from tourism)
Municipal 1 = all municipal and town councils
Municipal 2 = all municipal and town councils except large
municipal councils responsible for health and
and primary education
Large Municipal = municipal councils responsible for
health and education
Town = town councils only
** SD is the surplus or deficit on the general fund. It excludes all separate fund
revenues and expenditures, including water, sewerage, and housing for some municipal
councils, and game reserve income for county councils.
*** TSD is the total surplus or deficit resulting from the consideration of all sources
of income and all types of expenditure.
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striking major differences between the overall patterns
exhibited by the two sets of data. For that reason, the per
capita figures will not be discussed in any detail.
The principal conclusions reached from an examination of
the per capita figures are basically identical to those
derived from an examination of the surplus/deficit as a
percentage of income figures. These are: (1) The inclusionof
income and expenditure figures from separate fund accounts
tends to improve the overall financial position of most local
authorities for whom it is relevant, although some of the
councils continue to run a deficit; and, (2) Large municipal
councils on average do better with both their general and
separate fund accounts than do smaller municipal councils, a
majority of which continue to run a deficit even after
separate fund accounts are considered. This may reflect a
variety of factors, including greater efficiency in service
provision or better revenue collection in larger municipal
councils. It may also reflect less positive factors as
well. Larger councils tend to have large reserve funds from
water and housing accounts that have been built up over the
years. Some of these councils seem to use internal transfers
as income to offset expenses for some services that are not
self-financing. Furthermore, one of the large municipal
councils appears to get more revenue from grants for teachers
salaries than it spends for primary education, indicating
that the Ministry of Education is subsidizing other municipal
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services. These factors may make some large municipal
councils appear to be in better financial shape than they
actually are.
Now that the financial position of Kenyan local
government has been briefly described, several important
points need to be raised regarding local authority fiscal
health. First, recent evidence indicates that the financial
positions of some local authorities, including a number of
the largest municipalities, have been steadily deteriorating
in the last few years. Second, interviews with local
authority officials and examination of local authority
financial records indicate that deficits in local authorities
are frequently financed by drawing down the reserve funds of
such separate accounts as housing and water. In some cases,
these reserve funds, which have been built up over the years,
are being depleted at an alarming rate. This raises the
question of how these councils will manage when their reserve
funds are fully drawn down; furthermore, the purpose of
these reserve funds is to set aside money for replacement
investment, not to finance deficits on the general fund.
Finally, the Ministry of Local Government is not supposed to
approve budget estimates that reflect a deficit, so most
councils write their estimates to reflect a surplus. An
examination of budgeted versus actual figures for 1984 in
about a dozen councils indicates that these two sets of
figures often bear little resemblance to each other. Budget
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estimates often overstate revenues and sometimes understate
expenditures. Some councils essentially construct a budget
reflecting a surplus to gain Ministry approval, knowing full
well that they are likely to run deficits, which must be
financed by drawing down reserve funds or securing bank
overdrafts.
Local Authority Debt
It is extremely difficult to get any reliable
information on the indebtedness of local authorities in
Kenya, primarily for two reasons. First, debt is a very
sensitive issue with local authority officials. Some local
authorities are deeply in debt and far in arrears on their
repayments, and they are unwilling to discuss the issue,
especially with someone who comes as a representative of the
Ministry of Local Government. Second, the Local Government
Loans Authority (LGLA), a parastatal agency within the
Ministry of Local Government that provides the vast majority
of capital financing for Kenyan local authorities, is
extraordinarily disorganized and does not keep proper records
or bill local authorities for their repayments.20 The LGLA
is directly controlled by the Minister for Local Government.
20 LGLA accounts are currently being updated by a
private accounting firm and statements are being sent to all
local authorities. The same firm is exploring options for
reorganizing the LGLA into a well-managed and financially
viable municipal development bank, which will be discussed
later.
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Despite the inability to get accurate data, it is clear
that the local authority debt problem is of staggering
proportions. Recent estimates indicate that local
authorities owe the LGLA more than two billion Kenyan
Shillings, at least several hundred thousand of which are in
arrears. The local government debt issue is very complex
because it is tied into a major intergovernmental problem,
the failure of central government ministries and parastatals
to pay rates and charges due to local authorities.2 1 This
will be discussed later in this thesis.
The Future of Local Authorities in Kenya
As has been demonstrated earlier in this chapter, Kenyan
local authorities are a diverse group with significant
financial problems, and there has long been some degree of
controversy about an appropriate role for them. Certain
factions in the current Government of Kenya would undoubtedly
like to see the responsibilities of local authorities further
reduced, with some going so far as to advocate the abolition
of county councils. There is a possibility that this could
happen, but it seems an unlikely move in the foreseeable
future.
At the present time, there is also significant support
in Kenya for reforming the local authorities. The discussion
21 Unlike in the United States, the central and local
governments in Kenya are not exempt from each other's taxes.
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in Chapter 1 about reasons for interest in strengthening
local government in the developing countries is very much
applicable to Kenya. In particular, the central government
has been growing too rapidly and is trying to reduce its
expansion at a time when the rate of population growth is the
highest in the world and the demand for services is growing
rapidly. Furthermore, large central government deficits and
debt burdens require a more cautious attitude toward new and
expanded central government responsibilities. 22 Local
authorities are seen as an underutilized source of revenue
and administration, so an expanded role for them seems
attractive.
The Government of Kenya is also embarking on a new
decentralized growth strategy that will substantially
increase the responsibilities of many local authorities in
areas where they have traditionally been weak. Sessional
Paper No. 1 of 1986, "Economic Management for Renewed
Growth", outlines a rural-urban balance development strategy
designed to encourage widespread growth in Kenya by promoting
linkages between rural agricultural areas and a hierarchy of
urban centers. The document criticizes past urban and
spatial development policy for focusing on location and
settlement patterns in isolation rather than in the context
of rural-urban linkages and overall macroeconomic conditions
22 The 1986/87 deficit was originally planned to be 200
million Kenyan pounds. The actual figure was just over 400
million pounds, or 8 percent of gross domestic product.
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and priorities.
The new rural-urban balance strategy intends to focus
scarce Government of Kenya resources in designated small
trading centers located in high potential, underurbanized
rural areas known as Rural Trade and Production Centers
(RTPCs). Resources will be used to provide basic packages of
infrastructure as well as services and facilities designed to
support the growth of agricultural and non-agricultural
(primarily informal sector) activities in these centers and
their surrounding hinterland. Thus, the policy is designed
to strengthen both sectoral and rural-urban linkages and to
stimulate multiplier effects. Up to 80 RTPCs are expected to
be initiated during the next ten years.2 3
The RTPC Programme will be implemented at a
decentralized level through the District Development
Committees and will require a great deal of support from the
districts and local authorities. Although design and
construction of the RTPCs will be coordinated largely by
district-level offices of the central government, local
authorities are expected to play a key role in the planning
process. More importantly, local authorities will have
primary responsibility for ownership, maintenance and
recurrent costs of most of the facilities constructed under
the RTPC Programme.
23 More information on the Government of Kenya's rural-
urban balance strategy is presented in Appendix IV.
185
In order for Kenyan local authorities to be able to meet
their expanding development responsibilities in the coming
years effectively, the Government of Kenya must direct
serious effort towards increasing their viability. If this
is to be accomplished, two major issues need to be
confronted.
First, a consensus on the basic role and functions of
local authorities in Kenya needs to be reached and explicitly
articulated. This is something that has never been done
despite decades of debate on the matter. Second, if local
authorities are to be expected to fulfill their designated
service responsibilities and perhaps assume new ones, a
number of persistent problems need to be understood better
and more effectively dealt with. These include ensuring
access to sufficient sources of income, improving revenue
collection, strengthening the managerial capacity of local
authority officials, and correcting institutional and
procedural problems in central government ministries and
agencies which affect the performance of local authorities.
Each of these issues will be discussed in subsequent chapters
as part of an evaluation of the Kenyan system of local
government.
Having outlined the history and described the current
structure and possible future role of local government in
Kenya, the next chapters will use the analytical framework
outlined in Chapter 3 to define an appropriate fiscal role
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for Kenyan local authorities and to evaluate how well the
current system in Kenya fits that role.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE FISCAL ROLE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN KENYA. PART I:
PUBLIC FINANCE ISSUES
The framework outlined in Chapter 3 for analyzing and
evaluating the fiscal role of local government in developing
countries will be applied to Kenya in this and the following
chapter. This chapter focuses on the major public finance
issues: service provision, revenue generation, and revenue-
expenditure linkages. Chapter 6 deals with issues related to
institutional organization and capacity, which affect the
ability of the system to meet public finance objectives.
Before beginning the analysis, a brief description of the
fieldwork on which the analysis is based is presented.
Fieldwork Sites and Methodology
The data and information analyzed in Chapters 5 and 6
were collected between July and December of 1976 in a series
of field visits to a sample of Kenyan local authorities. The
sample was selected by the Ministry of Local Government to be
broadly representative of different types of local government
and different regions/agro-ecological zones in Kenya. The
focus was on municipal and county councils, but a few town
councils were also visited. At the time of sample selection,
there were 84 local authorities in Kenya, so that the sample
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of 26 covers almost one-third of the total number.1
Thirteen of 39 county councils (33 percent), 10 of 20
municipal councils (50 percent), and 3 of 7 town councils (43
percent) were visited. None of the 18 urban councils, which
are fledgling local authorities technically under the
jurisdiction of county councils, were included. The research
covered local authorities in 7 of 8 provinces (excluding
Nairobi Province) and in 19 of 41 districts (excluding
Nairobi, Mombasa, and 20 other Districts). Appendix I
contains additional details on the local authorities included
in this study.
A typical visit to a local authority lasted at least
several days. Copies of budget estimates were obtained from
each council, and the treasurer normally provided access to
other financial records. Financial, managerial, and
institutional issues were discussed in-depth with appropriate
local authority officials, and site visits were made to local
authority facilities and projects, as well as to divisional
headquarters in some of the county councils.
Because of numerous data collection and availability
problems, the quantitative analysis in this research focuses
on only one year of data. This is 1984, the most recent year
1 Since the completion of the data collection, the
Minister for Local Government has created 22 new urban
councils and upgraded 12 former urban councils to town
council status. The number of municipal and county councils,
the principal units of local government, has remained
unchanged. Thus, as of early 1988, there are 106 local
authorities, but some of the new ones are not yet functioning.
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for which actual, as opposed to budgeted, financial data are
generally available.2 The financial data categories used
throughout the analysis are defined in Appendix II, and the
major conceptual and empirical problems encountered with the
data are explained in detail in Appendix III.
In addition to collecting information from local
authorities, in-depth interviews were conducted with
officials from the central office of the Ministry of Local
Government, all of the provincial local government officers
stationed in the provincial capitals, and officials of other
ministries related to the functioning of local authorities.
Data relevant to local authorities were collected from the
Ministry of Local Government, the Ministry of Lands and
Settlement, and the Ministry of Planning and National
Development. These efforts, which were conducted between
January and July of 1987, provided various types of data and
information, including personal opinions and observations.
This report uses all of these quantitative and qualitative
sources of information in analyzing the situation and drawing
conclusions about the fiscal role and operation of local
2 This is not an ideal year for the analysis because
the country experienced a severe drought during it, but data
for a more recent year were not available at the time the
fieldwork was conducted. Use of an earlier year would have
been complicated by the fact that, during the early 1980s,
local authorities were in the process of converting from a
calendar fiscal year to the central government's fiscal year
(July 1 to June 30). Local authorities made this change at
different times, so that it was not possible to find an
earlier year when all local authorities in the sample were
using the same fiscal year without going back to the 1970s.
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authorities in Kenya.
Evaluation of Public Finance Obiectives
The framework, defined in Chapter 3, outlined three
public finance areas that need to be examined in evaluating
the fiscal role of local government. These are: service
provision, revenue generation, and revenue-expenditure
linkages. Each of these will be examined for Kenya using the
guidelines developed in Chapter 3.
Expenditures and Service Provision Issues
The basic function of a local authority is to provide
services to the people living in its jurisdiction. The logic
behind the assignment of service responsibility to local
authorities in Kenya will be discussed in this section. In
addition, there will be an examination of some of the major
issues related to local service provision, the most important
of which is the factors affecting the variations in the level
of expenditure made by the different types of councils.
Assigning Services to Local Authorities
Data presented in the previous chapter demonstrated
some variations in the composition of local authority
expenditures on services and suggested some possible
explanations for them. To what degree are these variations
based on the assignment of certain services to local
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authorities? In fact, the Government of Kenya actually
assigns very few mandatory services to local authorities.3
Seven of the largest and oldest municipal councils4 are
required to provide certain services, including health care,
education, and roads within their jurisdiction, but only a
few minor caretaking services, such as providing for the
burial of destitute persons who die in their jurisdiction,
are required by law of all local authorities. Most local
authority functions set forth in the Local Government Act are
permissive, i.e., the local authorities may undertake the
provision of these services if they wish, sometimes with the
stipulation that such provision must be according to the
specifics of another law or with the consent of an overseeing
ministry. For example, any local authority in Kenya may be a
water undertaker if the Ministry of Water Development gives
formal consent. The Minister for Local Government may make
permissive functions mandatory by administrative directive,
but this power in not exercised frequently.
Given this situation, the assignment of functions to
local authorities in Kenya is often by custom or historical
accident, or is decided simply on the basis of what the
3 More information on the mandatory versus the
permissive functions of local authorities in Kenya may be
found in: Oyugi (1983), and Akivaga, Kulundu-Bitonye, and Opi
(1984).
4 The seven municipal councils with responsibility for
health and education are: Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru,
Eldoret, Thika, and Kitale.
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council can afford and needs, and whether particular services
are being provided by the central government or the private
sector. There were attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to define
and standardize the types of services that should be provided
by rural councils and urban councils of different types and
sizes, but little effort was made to enforce these guidelines
or assist the local authorities in complying with them.5
Because of this, there is some degree of diversity in the
major types of services undertaken by local authorities,
particularly by the rural and smaller urban councils.
Although little formal service assignment to local
authorities actually takes place in Kenya, the criteria
developed in Chapter 3 can be used to make some observations
about the pattern of local government service delivery that
has evolved since the colonial era. It is first important to
note that in the Kenyan context, very few services are truly
local in the sense that varying preferences exist which
dictate the need for providing them at a decentralized level.
Because of the geographic dispersion of local authorities and
the largely local impact of some services, however, it is
possible to make a convincing argument for providing them at
the local level. Examples of these types of services include
5 The most recent definition of the different types of
settlements and the types of services they are supposed to
provide is found in: Government of Kenya, Human Settlements
in Kenya: A Strategy for Urban and Rural Development
(Nairobi: Ministry of Lands and Settlement, Republic of
Kenya, 1978).
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trash collection, sewerage/pit latrines, street lighting,
fire services, social services6 , and local roads. In
addition, a strong case can be made for local authorities,
particularly in the rural areas, to provide some private-
sector-type facilities and services that are not provided by
the private sector. Such activities include market places,
slaughterhouses, housing7 , and livestock auction yards. In
fact, most local authorities in Kenya do provide many of
these services.
At the other end of the spectrum are some services for
which there are clear economies of scale or
interjurisdictional externalities, and for that reason they
should be provided centrally. Such services are, in fact,
provided centrally in Kenya by parastatals or central
6 "Social services" in Kenya is normally used to
classify a wide variety of miscellaneous community services,
including pre-primary education, community centers, local
public sports facilities, orphanages, and parks. Most of
these services are very local in nature. Although for some
of them, such as orphanages, it may be justifiable for the
central government to intervene on equity grounds, self-help
fundraising is more likely to be a more workable solution to
funding problems, particularly in the rural areas.
7 In some developed countries, housing is seen as a
basic need and is therefore provided at subsidized rates for
those who cannot afford other options. Housing is rarely
provided as a public service in that sense in Kenya, except
in a few of the largest cities. Housing needs are very
simple in most areas, and there is a great deal of sharing
among extended family and friends. Public housing in Kenya
is normally provided for one of two reasons: (1) as a service
for civil servants or local authority employees; or (2) as a
revenue-raising enterprise for the local authorities, who
have found that they can normally earn a healthy surplus by
providing housing in urban centers, often for middle- and
higher-income residents of their jurisdiction.
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government ministries. Examples include electricity and
telephone service, which are provided in Kenya by two
national parastatals, Kenya Power and Lighting Corporation
and Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation. Other
more obviously public services are also provided centrally,
such as primary national trunk roads, which are the
responsibility of the Ministry of Transport and
Communication. This Ministry also coordinates the system of
all types of roads for the entire country.
In between the obvious local services and the obvious
national services are a whole range of services which have
both local and national qualities. In such cases, the
assignment of responsibility is much less clear, and it is
probably decided largely on the basis of political judgments,
which are sometimes defensible and sometimes questionable.
Examples of such services are: health, education, social
services, water, and veterinary services.
Health and education, two of the major public services
in Kenya, are both goods that can be considered local to some
extent, because it is clearly possible for preferences and
needs for them to vary widely across jurisdictions. However,
in most countries around the world there is some central
government involvement in the provision of these services,
both because they generate positive externalities and serve
national goals, and because there are equity considerations
in providing an invariant minimum level of these services.
195
Kenya, like most developing countries, is still striving to
provide minimum levels of education and health care to its
people, so a strong case can be made for the central
government to intervene at least to the extent of providing
standards and financial assistance. In Kenya, however, the
central government completely controls the provision of
health and education services except in the eight largest
municipalities.
It is very difficult to justify the extreme degree of
central control over education.8 There are qualified
teachers all over Kenya, and it would be possible to
establish minimum standards for all schools and still allow
different local areas to tailor the curriculum to local
needs. The probable main reason why this is not done is that
the central government wishes to maintain strict control over
the educational system. This was clearly articulated by the
Luo leader, KANU Secretary General and Minister for Justice
and Constitutional Affairs Tom Mboya in a speech to the
8 If local preferences for education vary widely and
mobility is high, the efficiency loss from central provision
of education may be significant. There is no good
information available on educational preferences in Kenya.
It seems likely, however, that some heterogeneity of
preferences should be expected. Although preferences for
training in basic skills are probably fairly homogeneous
(and, in any case, there is an externality issue here), there
are significant cultural and language differences in
different parts of the country. Furthermore, the types of
skills that need to be taught in vocational schools and
polytechnics will vary to some extent with differences in
economic base and other local conditions. Thus, a case can
be made for some local control over education.
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National Assembly in the late 1960s, shortly before the
central government took responsibility for education away
from the local authorities. He stated:
There is a need to have more government say and control
in the education of the people of the country. We can
no longer continue with the system by which you have
pockets of authority all over the country, deciding what
and how to conduct education throughout the country.
There must be established a definite area of government
control if we are going to implement our policies.9
It is not as easy to make a case for some local control
over health care, except perhaps for simple dispensaries that
provide treatment for minor illnesses and injuries. The
health care system is not as advanced as the educational
system in Kenya, and there are many areas where basic needs
are not being met. There is a national shortage of qualified
medical personnel and most local private sector providers in
many areas only practice traditional medicine, so that it
would be difficult to find people to staff health centers and
dispensaries in some areas if they were not posted there by
the central government. Thus, the government's
centralization of the health care system in Kenya is
relatively easy to justify.
Some of the other major public services in Kenya have
both local and national characteristics. Services such as
water and veterinary health care can be provided locally and
often are in Kenya, but there is also some justifiable
9 National Assembly, Official Record, January 8, 1968,
column 3522.
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central government involvement. Water is a basic human need,
which is often difficult to obtain in many parts of Kenya,
particularly at certain times of year. If local authorities
have the capacity to provide water reliably, there is no need
for the central government to get involved unless there are
externalities or scale economies involved. If local
government does not have the required capacity, a strong case
can be made for intervention by the central government.
Water in Kenya is provided by local authorities in some areas
and by the Ministry of Water Development (MWD) in others.
There are, however, no clear guidelines for deciding whether
a local authority or the Ministry will be the water provider
in a particular area--this decision is left entirely to the
discretion of the Minister for Water Development. This has
led to a situation in which some local authorities who are
probably capable of providing water have been refused
permission to do so by the MWD. Other local councils who
have the authority from MWD to provide water cannot provide
the service adequately. This is a contentious issue not only
because of the service implications, but also because water
is often a good source of surplus revenue for local
authorities.
Another reason why water is so important is the fact
that it must be provided jointly with some other services in
order for those services to operate effectively. Health
centers, schools, slaughterhouses, sewerage systems, cattle
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dips, and other services require water on a regular basis.
There are cases in which these facilities have been built
without first planning to insure that an adequate supply of
water would be available. In some cases, water must be
provided by the same level of government as certain other
services, or coordination and service provision problems will
arise. For example, some municipalities are sewerage
providers, but not water providers. Without control over the
water supply, these local authorities cannot force people to
pay their sewerage charges unless the Ministry of Water
Development cooperates.
A somewhat ambiguous assignment situation exists with
the provision of veterinary care in Kenya. Some types of
veterinary health services, particularly facilities such as
crushes and dips10 , can be provided by local authorities in
rural areas, and in.many cases are. When local authorities
cannot afford to provide such facilities in areas where they
are needed, a strong case can be made for central government
financing or provision because of the potential externalities
and costs to the local economy involved in livestock
diseases. However, although there are guidelines, the
Ministry of Livestock Development (MLD) seems to be fairly
10 Crushes are small structures used to restrain
livestock when vaccinating them or treating them for a
disease. Dips are long narrow pools filled with water and
chemical solutions that repel ticks and other parasitic
insects that spread diseases. During certain seasons of the
year when insects are prevalent, livestock must be forced to
swim through the dip once every week or so.
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arbitrary in what it requires of local authorities and what
it provides centrally. In some cases, for example, local
authorities must construct, staff, and operate cattle dips.
In other cases, the Ministry constructs the dips, but
requires the local authorities to operate them. In still
other cases, the MLD constructs, staffs, and operates the
dips. There is sometimes little correlation between need for
dips, the local authority's ability to finance the dips, and
the degree of MLD involvement. In some cases, the Ministry
provides the whole package in relatively wealthy areas and
provides little or no assistance in poor areas with a need
for the services.
Turning from specific services to specific types of
local authority, the observed pattern of service provision
across different types of local councils is generally
reasonable. As has been shown earlier, councils in urban
areas provide many traditional urban public services, such as
sewerage, water, trash collection, street lighting, etc.
Some of the largest and oldest municipal councils have been
assigned greater responsibility than their smaller and newer
counterparts in the areas of health and education. In the
rural areas, local authorities tend to provide services
related to basic human requirements as well as agricultural
and livestock needs. Local authorities in both urban and
rural areas provide certain entrepreneurial services that
serve the dual need of filling in where the private sector
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fails and raising, at least in some cases, a substantial
volume of revenue.
Thus, although it is possible to make a case on
economic grounds for assigning additional service
responsibilities to some local authorities, particularly
county councils, the service role of local authorities that
has developed in Kenya over the years, with a few prominent
exceptions, makes a lot of sense. There are, however,
numerous difficulties with the actual operation of many
services. Most of the problems that have arisen in local
service provision have been not as a result of improper
assignment or self-assignment of public services to local
authorities, but due to a lack of local authority capacity to
provide the services that should logically be their
responsibility. The primary problems have been inadequate
revenue, poor management, and lack of skilled personnel to
provide the services. These issues will be discussed in this
and the next chapter, while possible improvements in local
authority service assignment will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Variations in Per Capita Total Expenditure
Having dealt with the composition of local authority
expenditures, it is appropriate to turn to the issue of
expenditure levels. It is clear from the information in the
previous chapter that there is significant variability in the
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level of expenditures within and across different types of
councils. The general differences across the various types
of council can be largely explained on the basis of different
service responsibilities. This section uses regression
analysis to try to identify the factors that seem to be most
highly related to variations in per capita total expenditure
on services within council groups in order to see if there is
some reasonable and/or discernable basis for them. Various
demographic and economic characteristics of local authorities
were explored in order to measure their degree of association
with per capita total spending. Among those frequently used
by local finance analysts to explore local spending patterns
are size (population), per capita wealth, and population
density (population per square kilometer). These variables
were selected because they are expected to have an influence
on the demand for local authority services, and/or costs of
service provision, and/or the ability of local authorities to
raise revenue.
It should be noted that the simple reduced-form model
used in this analysis, a basic version of which was first
estimated for the United States in the 1960s, has been much
improved upon by more recent analysts. The simple model
does not separate the demand and supply sides, and it is
plagued by various econometric problems.11 The reduced-form
11 The simple methodology on which this is based was
first used by Fisher (1961) in an attempt to explain
variations in state and local government per capita
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model is used here because the data necessary to estimate a
more adequately specified model are not available for Kenya.
Even the simple specification, however, sheds some light on
the determinants of local government spending.
Higher population might be expected to exert a positive
influence on spending for several reasons. The demand for
local services may rise as population increases because of a
wider variety of preferences. In part, higher spending for
public services in populous local authorities may be a
reflection of higher costs, which are due to congestion. In
addition, the number of public services provided is likely to
be greater in high population areas. There are certain fixed
costs involved in the provision of any service, and it may
not be efficient to provide some services until population
reaches a certain size. Thus, more populous jurisdictions
have a wider range of services and higher levels of spending,
a phenomenon dubbed the "zoo effect" by Oates (1986, p. 9).
Finally, the degree of bureaucratic power, which can affect
spending mix and levels, may be positively associated with
population size.
expenditures in the United States. This research was
followed by a variety of other investigations on the same
topic, which have come to be collectively known as the
"determinant" studies in state and local finance. There are
a variety of significant problems in the specification of the
equation (Bahl, 1968), but it is adequate for the present
purpose of getting a rough idea of association between
spending levels and other variables in local authorities.
More recent models of supply and demand for local government
services are summarized and critiqued in Oates (1986).
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Wealth (property valuation) is expected to be of
importance because wealthier councils are likely to have the
ability and desire to raise more money than poorer councils
to provide services. High property values are often
associated with more densely and highly developed land, which
occurs in areas where there is a high level of economic
activity. This activity generates a high demand for
services, as well as high levels of local authority revenue
from property taxes, business-related taxes, marketing fees,
and charges for public services, such as water, sewerage, and
trash collection. 12
The impact of population density on local public
spending is not always clear. Densely populated areas might
have reduced costs because of potential economies of scale in
providing services on a larger scale to a more densely
clustered target population. Alternatively, density could
raise the costs of some types of services because of
congestion.
The local authority expenditure regressions in this
analysis were, for the most part, run separately for county
12 Income may affect the supply side of service
provision because of its observed inverse relationship with
costs in certain cases. This suggests that higher income may
have a negative effect on per capita spending for some
services. Because income and wealth would be expected to be
highly correlated, the same may be true for wealth, although
the various positive effects of wealth on spending levels may
overshadow this effect in the aggregate. A detailed
discussion of the effect of income on the supply side of
local public services is provided in Oates (1986).
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and municipal councils. This was done for a variety of
reasons, the primary one being that municipal and county
councils are very different entities with different principal
sources of revenue and different service responsibilities.
Different factors might be expected to influence spending in
the two cases. Furthermore, wealth is defined differently
for municipal and county councils, and some of the data used
in this analysis were available for only one or the other
type. The problem with doing the regressions separately for
county and municipal councils is that the number of
observations in each group is small. Nevertheless, the
analysis yields some unambiguous results from which certain
generalizations can be made.
County Councils 13
It might be expected that certain basic county
characteristics would influence the level of spending by
county councils. The initial analysis used as explanatory
variables the local characteristics discussed above. In
13 There is much more economic and demographic data
available for county councils than for municipal councils.
This is because county councils are, for the most part,
geographically identical to districts, the administrative
subdivisions of the central government. Various data have
been collected at the district level for years, and they have
become more readily available because of the growing interest
in district-level research precipitated by the District Focus
for Rural Development strategy initiated in 1984. This
strategy is an attempt to deconcentrate planning and
implementation responsibility for development projects to the
district level. It was introduced in Chapter 4 and will be
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
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fact, population, per capita wealth, and density have very
little association with the level of per capita spending in
county councils, either separately or together. The
regression results in Table 5.1 show that all of the
variables are highly insignificant, and the overall power of
these variables to explain the variations in per capita
spending across councils is effectively nil, as evidenced by
the coefficient of determination (R-squared) of -. 188.14
These results, in fact, are not at all surprising in the
Kenya case. The population figures used in this analysis, as
explained in more detail in Appendix III, are not good
measures of serviced population, particularly in county
councils. The percentage of total population benefitting
from county council services no doubt varies dramatically
across councils and types of service, and there is no
practical way to get accurate, disaggregate serviced
population figures.
The low significance of wealth results from a variety of
factors. As explained in greater detail in Appendix III, the
measure of wealth used in this analysis is not entirely
satisfactory. It measures the per capita surplus of county
councils by aggregating sales of livestock and agricultural
14 The high degree of multicollinearity among the
explanatory variables undermines the significance of any one
variable. This is not, however, an important consideration
here because multicollinearity does not affect the overall
explanatory power of the regression, which in this case is so
low that it is clear that the relationships are insignificant
both individually and collectively.
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TABLE 5.1
REGRESSION 1 FOR PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN COUNTY COUNCILS
Explanatory
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Standard Error
Population
Per Capita Wealth
Density
-0.000014393
-0.00017976
0.008924600
-0.610
-0.043
0.169
0.000023611
0.004165500
0.025658000
Intercept : 23.97797
Coefficient of Determination (R-Square) : 0.109
Adjusted R-Square :-0.188
Multiple R 0.330
Standard Error of Estimate 14.727
Correlation Coefficients for Explanatory Variables
Population and Per Capita Wealth
Population and Density
Per Capita Wealth and Density
: 0.614
: 0.851
: 0.502
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produce to state marketing boards (as a crude measure
ofsurplus for large-scale landowners/farmers) with savings
data generated in a rural household budget survey of
primarily small-scale farmers and landowners.15 This
measure, for reasons detailed in Appendix III, probably
underestimates the wealth of the semi-arid pastoralist
districts in northern and eastern Kenya.
In addition to the problems with the measure of wealth
used, there is no reason to expect spending to be highly
related to wealth because of the way in which county councils
raise their revenues. Kenyan counties have not historically
had general and consistent authority to tax wealth in their
jurisdictions. The primary source of wealth in a local
authority is land. As demonstrated earlier, some county
councils get a great deal of revenue from land rates, while
others get little. This is true not only because the value
of land is low in some areas, but also because some places do
not have the authority to levy such rates or because the rate
they are allowed to charge by the Ministry of Local
Government is very small. Some councils that do not have
broad use of rates on land have been allowed to levy a cess
15 Livestock and agricultural sales information is
available from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry
of Livestock Development, as well as from the marketing
boards themselves. These include the Coffee Board of Kenya,
the National Cereals and Produce Board, and the Kenya Meat
Commission. The rural household budget survey was conducted
by the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of
Planning and National Development during 1981-82, but it has
not yet been published.
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on the value of crops grown on the land. However, the power
to levy cess, until very recently, has been arbitrarily
granted only to certain councils and only for certain crops.
Two adjacent county councils growing basically the same crops
were not always allowed to cess them at a uniform rate, or
one of them might not be allowed any cess at all. Some
councils, for example, were allowed to use coffee or maize
cess, while others were not. Certain important crops that
are the principal source of income generated in some
districts, such as tea, were not cessed at all. Furthermore,
a number of councils have little or no access to land rates,
cess, or any other particularly productive sources of
revenue. Given the inconsistent assignment and productivity
of wealth-based taxes across councils, it is not surprising
that wealth does not exert an influence on total spending.
Population density should not really be expected to have
much of an impact on county council spending because it
varies so greatly within county council areas. Thus, the
population density for an entire jurisdiction may have little
to do with the required pattern of service provision. Most
county council services are concentrated in more urbanized
areas and trading centers. The quality and levels of the
various services also vary greatly across urban areas and
trading centers. Much more disaggregate analysis would need
to be done to see if density has an impact on spending levels
in county councils, but the data required for this analysis
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are not available.
Having failed with the variables traditionally used to
explain local authority spending, a variety of other
variables were tested for their degree of association with
per capita spending in county councils. Many of these were
failures, but a few variables have emerged as being
significantly related to the level of per capita spending.
These are: per capita cess and land rates, per capita
livestock, and per capita wage earnings.
The use of per capita cess and land rates as an
explanatory variable may seem suspect, because they are
principal sources of revenue in many county councils.
Indeed, it is, at the very least, a partial identity:
expenditures are made from revenues, so will obviously be
strongly dependent on them. In this case, however, the point
is that these sources of revenue are not consistently and
uniformly available to all county councils, even though most
councils have requested permission to use them. It would be
expected that the councils that are allowed to use these
productive sources and do raise substantial revenue from them
are to a great extent the ones who are able to have higher
per capita spending and provide a higher level of services.
It is also interesting to note that there is virtually no
correlation (.099) between per capita wealth and per capita
revenue from cess and land rates. To some extent, this
finding reflects problems with the measure of wealth. It
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also, however, strongly reflects the fact that some low
wealth councils in northern and eastern Kenya get substantial
income from miraa cess, while some councils with high
agricultural potential get comparatively little or no money
from cess or land rates.
Per capita livestock, the second significant variable
used in the analysis of county council expenditure, reflects
an important component of wealth, particularly in the
northern and eastern semi-arid areas, which have little
productive land, little agricultural activity, and with a few
exceptions, insignificant access to land rates. Yet, these
areas do raise revenue from markets, stock auction yards,
slaughter houses and slabs, veterinary services, and a
variety of other sources, many of which are
livestock-related. Thus, this variable probably helps to
explain some of the variation in spending in some of the more
marginal districts of the country.
The final variable used in the analysis of county
council expenditures is per capita wage earnings. Wage
earners represent a small percentage of total employment in
many counties, but they are a good reflection of income
generated in the formal sector. Wage earnings can be
expected to have multiplier effects in both the local formal
and informal sectors, leading to greater local economic
activity and boosting local authority taxes dependent on such
activity.
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The relationship between per capita spending and each of
the three explanatory variables--per capita cess and land
rates, per capita livestock, and per capita wage
earnings--was found to be positive and significant. The
pairwise correlations among the three variables are not
significant, so they were all combined into the same
regression equation, the results of which are presented in
Table 5.2. All of the variables, as evidenced by the
t-statistics, are highly significant, and together explain
81.7 percent of the variation in per capita spending across
county councils.
Per capita livestock is the least significant of the
explanatory variables. This is not surprising, as it
primarily helps to explain spending in a small number of
councils in which livestock activities are the primary
economic activity. Per capita cess and land rates is the
most significant variable, as would be expected. The lesson
from this is very clear and bears repeating: those county
councils having good access to cess and land rates are able
to spend more on providing services to the residents of their
jurisdictions. The Government of Kenya has recently taken an
important step towards improving inequities in revenue
generation and disparities in fiscal capacity across county
councils by announcing its intention to make cess generally
available to all county councils and allowing it to be levied
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TABLE 5.2
REGRESSION 2 FOR PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN COUNTY COUNCILS
Explanatory
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Standard Error
Per Capita Livestock 1.1172 4.2
Per Capita Wage
Earnings 0.01331 2.1
Per Capita Cess
and Land Rates 1.1889 5.
Intercept -5.862591
Coefficient of Determination (R-Square) 0.863
Adjusted R-Square 0.817
Multiple R 0.929
Standard Error of Estimate 5.793
Correlation Coefficients for Explanatory Variables
Per Capita Livestock and Per Capita
Wage Earnings
Per Capita Livestock and Per Capita
Cess and Rates
Per Capita Wage Earnings and
Per Capita Cess and Rates
97
85
014
0.0047278
0.023714
0.058
:-0.117
0.319
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on a standardized set of crops. 16
Municipal and Town Councils
Variations in the level of per capita spending in
municipal and town councils are much easier to explain than
they are in county councils. The traditional variables,
population, per capita wealth, and population density, go a
long way in explaining per capita spending in the urban
areas.
Table 5.3 presents the results of a regression analysis
using per capita expenditure in municipal councils as the
dependent variable and population, per capita wealth, and
density as the explanatory variables. Together these
variables explain 90 percent of the variation in per capita
spending. Wealth is by far the most significant variable at
the .001 level of confidence. Density is also significant at
a lower level, with population being substantially less
significant.
It is interesting to note that wealth alone explains
78.3 percent of the variation in per capita total spending in
municipal councils. When used individually as single
explanatory variables, neither population nor density is very
significant. Both of these variables become more significant
when used in the same regression as wealth. The correlation
16 This will not, of course, help the county councils
located in arid and semi-arid areas where few or no crops are
grown.
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TABLE 5.3
REGRESSION 3 FOR PER CAPITA TOTAL EXPENDITURES IN MUNICIPAL COUNCILS
Explanatory
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic Standard Error
Population
Per Capita Wealth
Density
0.000375
0.018095
0.000141
Intercept
Coefficient of Determination (R-Square)
Adjusted R-Square
Multiple R
Standard Error of Estimate
1.173
8.229
2.738
0.00031974
0.02199
0.00005134
: 20.58066
: 0.933
: 0.900
: 0.966
: 46.505
Correlation Coefficients for Explanatory Variables
Population and Per Capita Wealth
Population and Density
Per Capita Wealth and Density
0.231
0.217
-0.151
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coefficients among wealth, population, and density are low,
indicating that multicollinearity should not be a problem.
The conclusion must be that there is some type of moderate
interactive effect among the three explanatory variables.
The results for municipal councils are exactly what
would be expected. Wealth has been defined for municipal
councils as per capita property valuation, and, as discussed
earlier, property value is a good measure of economic
activity in municipal councils. Municipal council revenue
sources are much more closely related to wealth than are
those of county councils, so it is clear why wealth exerts
such a strong positive impact on per capita spending.
Higher population and density also exert some small
positive influence on spending, but it is overshadowed by the
effects of wealth. A higher level of services and a stronger
revenue base tend to exist in some of the higher population
councils, and it is reasonable for density to be associated
with higher land values and higher spending in some cases.
The interaction effect among the three explanatory variables
probably comes from the fact that a few of the wealthiest
municipal councils are also among the largest and most
densely populated ones.
When looking at both municipal and town councils
together, the same general relationships hold, but the
significance of all of the explanatory variables declines,
and the overall explanatory power of the regression is
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diminished. This is probably because two of the town
councils have very high per capita land values. Their level
of per capita spending, however, is well below that of the
largest municipal councils, the other group with very high
per capita land values. The town councils are not
responsible for health and primary education, and generally
they do not provide water and sewerage services. Thus, the
strong positive relationship for municipal councils between
per capita wealth and per capita expenditure is diminished by
the inclusion of town councils.
Summary of Major Points Regarding Expenditure Determinants
Variations in per capita total spending in municipal
councils are highly and positively related to variations in
wealth (per capita property valuation). The wealthy councils
tend to spend at a substantially higher per capita level than
poorer councils. Size (population) and population density
also have a moderate positive impact on per capita spending,
but the former is less significant than the latter.
Variations in per capita total spending in county
councils are almost completely unrelated to wealth. There is
no tendency for wealthier county councils to spend at a
higher per capita level than poorer county councils. This is
true primarily because there is no consistent and
standardized taxation of wealth across county councils, but
there are also several peculiarities with the data that
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contribute to this situation.
The most significant factor affecting per capita total
expenditures in county councils is per capita cess and land
rates. The implication of this seemingly obvious finding is
that county councils given significant access to these
sources of revenue are able to spend more than other councils
on service provision. These privileged councils are not
necessarily the wealthiest ones.
Other factors significantly affecting per capita total
spending in county councils are number of livestock per
capita and per capita wage earnings. The former is a good
measure of wealth, economic activity, and ability to raise
public revenues in marginal pastoralist districts. The
latter is a good measure of income generated in the local
formal sector, which stimulates business in the local economy
and generates additional revenue from business-based local
taxes.
It is important to note that the analysis in this
section focuses only on variations in per capita expenditure
patterns across local authorities. These variations could be
the result of differences in labor and other input costs,
differences in the quality of service provision, and/or other
factors. No attempt has been made to explain the importance
of the various components of differences in per capita
expenditures across councils, but some of them could be
extremely important. For example, it is very likely that
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some of the expenditure differences may be due to differences
in material and labor costs and productivity, implying that
some councils may be more efficient providers of services
than others. Labor costs for the councils visited for this
study range from about 60 to more than 90 percent of total
expenditures. Some of this difference is clearly
attributable to differences in the service packages provided
by different types of councils. Rural county councils, for
example, provide only a very few labor-intensive services,
such as social services and market-related services, so that
their expenditures on labor will be high relative to other
inputs regardless of differences in wages and productivity.
Some councils, however, may well be able to get materials at
lower cost and use less labor than they currently do to
provide certain services.
Other Issues Related to Service Provision
Some of the major issues related to service provision,
such as inadequate revenues and intergovernmental
cooperation, will be analyzed in later sections of this and
the next chapter. However, a few other issues regarding
service provision should be briefly mentioned here.
Privatization of public services has not received much
attention in Kenya. In some areas of the world, local
governments contract with private firms to provide certain
types of public services, such as refuse collection and
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facilities management. The rationale for privatization is
that, even though it may involve some loss of public sector
jobs, it may be more cost efficient than providing services
directly by the public sector. There seems to be some
interest on the part of certain local authorities in the
possibility of hiring firms to perform particular services,
such as refuse collection, and perhaps even to manage major
facilities, such as slaughterhouses or markets. There are a
few cases of minor private sector involvement in Kenyan local
authorities in which private firms have increased revenue
intake for the local authority while also earning a
reasonable profit for themselves.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have a significant
role to play in service provision in Kenya, particularly in
the rural areas. Schools, health care, water, veterinary
care, agricultural extension, and other basic services are
all provided by NGOs. Although it is not possible to
estimate the importance of NGO service provision in monetary
terms, it is clear that the central government and local
authorities rely on NGOs in many rural areas to provide
services that the Kenyan public sector would otherwise find
difficult or impossible to provide.
Finally, public service coverage within local
authorities is often far from uniform across the entire
jurisdiction. Sometimes this is justified on the basis of
differing service needs, but it is more frequently nothing
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more than a manifestation of limited financial resources.
Some local authorities do not have the capital or recurrent
resources to extend certain services across all of the areas
for which they are responsible.
Income Generation
The problem of income generation is unquestionably the
most significant problem facing Kenyan local authorities. As
shown in Chapter 4, there is tremendous diversity in the
sources of revenue employed by local authorities, and many of
them run substantial deficits on a regular basis. Part of
the problem is that there is an inadequate revenue base, and
part is due to serious intergovernmental, administrative, and
political problems that seriously constrain the income
generation process. This section will discuss public finance
issues related to revenue generation, but a discussion of
constraints will be reserved for the next chapter.
Inelasticity
One of the principal revenue problems for local
authorities is the relative inelasticity of certain major
components of their revenue bases with respect to income,
prices, and population. Although there have not been formal
studies to estimate elasticities, there is plenty of evidence
to suggest that revenue inelasticity is a significant
problem. Some important sources of revenue, such as land
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rates and house rents, are almost completely fixed for
significant periods of time. Even though valuation rolls are
supposed to be updated every five years, there are long
delays in this process. Local authorities are permitted to
impose interim rate increases between revaluations, but this
is often difficult for political reasons, so that the revenue
yield from land rates remains essentially static for five-
year periods, except for small additions to the base from
supplementary valuation rolls. Most local authorities do not
employ their own valuer, so they rely on the Ministry of
Lands and Settlement, which is not staffed to deal with the
enormous workload in a timely fashion. Furthermore,
valuation in Kenya is based on unimproved site value, so that
the property tax base does not grow substantially with
increases in local economic activity.
Other local taxes, such as market fees, are partially
based on the level of economic activity, but they are almost
always per unit rather than ad valorem charges, so that the
revenue derived from the taxes grows slowly as the volume of
trading grows. This problem is exacerbated by the failure of
many local authorities to raise their per unit fees regularly
as the cost of living goes up. If such taxes were indexed to
the rate of inflation or based on the value of the product
(e.g., 1% of the expected sales value of a bag of potatoes
instead of three Kenyan shillings per bag), the revenue
elasticity would be greatly enhanced. Of course, reasonably
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accurate price information would be required to institute
indexing.
The inelasticity of local revenue sources creates
serious problems for the local authorities. It essentially
means that the growth of revenue is slower than the growth in
costs and demand for services. Expenditure requirements may
greatly increase with the growth of commercial activities and
population, but revenue does not. As a result, some local
authorities are faced with growing deficits each year, as
noted in the previous chapter.
Instability/Overreliance
Some local authority revenue sources, such as house
rents, do not grow regularly or rapidly over time, but are
rather stable. Others sources of revenues, however, are much
more unstable. Market and stock auction fees, for example,
are dependent on the level of trading. Thus, in years when
there is a crop failure or low animal sales because of
drought or disease, the volume of revenue can be
substantially reduced. This is especially a problem in
semi-arid areas where the arrival of rain is uncertain. It
could also, however, be a problem even in relatively wealthy
agricultural areas at certain times because of the extreme
dependence of some local authorities on one or two main
sources of revenue. Some of the county councils who are
permitted to charge agricultural cess, for example, are so
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dependent on cess revenue that a serious crop failure could
possibly render them insolvent. Some local authorities may
get 40 or 50 percent of their annual income from coffee or
miraa cess.
The problem of local government revenue instability is
clearly demonstrated by the data in Table 5.4. There was a
serious drought in Kenya in 1984 during which agricultural
production fell by 3.7 percent from the previous year and
gross domestic product increased by only 0.9 percent. This
did not affect the growth trend of central government
recurrent revenues and expenditures greatly. In spite of the
downturn in economic activity, revenues rose by 10.4 percent
between 1983 and 1984, from 923.62 to 1019.59 million pounds,
while expenditures rose by 10.8 percent, from 984.58 to
1091.32 million pounds. During the same time period, the local
authority revenue base was greatly eroded. Municipal
council revenues fell by 11.1 percent, from 52.73 to 46.89
million pounds, and expenditures fell by 19.0 percent, from
50.55 to 40.93 million pounds. Other local authorities,
primarily county councils with jurisdiction over rural areas,
were even more dramatically affected. Their income fell by
36.2 percent, from 12.94 to 8.26 million pounds, while
expenditures declined by 38.6 percent, from 11.6 to 7.16
million pounds. In all cases, local authority revenue and
expenditure increased in 1985 as the country recovered from
the drought.
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TABLE 5.4
RECURRENT PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES, 1982-86
BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT (MILLIONS OF KENYAN POUNDS)
LEVEL OF
GOVERNMENT 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986*
EXPENDITURES
Central 861.40 984.58 1091.32 1244.26 1551.62
Municipal
Councils 46.99 50.55 40.93 52.67 46.06
Other Local
Authorities** 11.07 11.66 7.16 12.76 5.41
REVENUES
Central 832.17 923.62 1019.59 1186.36 1477.50
Municipal
Councils 51.19 52.73 46.89 56.74 55.69
Other Local
Authorities 13.15 12.94 8.26 12.69 15.38
*The figures for 1986 are provisional and should not be considered
accurate, particularly for the local authorities. This is true
because there are extensive delays in the issuing of local authority
financial figures on account of slow auditing procedures and
administrative delays on the part of local authorities and the
Ministry of Local Government. It is highly unlikely that local
authority revenues actually went down as the figures suggest. The
Kenyan economy had a good year in 1986. Real value-added in the
manufacturing sector grew by 5.9 percent, the agricultural sector grew
by 4.8 percent, and real gross domestic product rose by 5.7 percent.
**Town, urban, and county councils.
SOURCE: Economic Survey, 1987 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics,
Ministry of Planning and National Development, Republic of Kenya,
1987), Chapter 6.
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In general, there is too much dependence of Kenyan local
authorities, particularly county councils, on sources of
revenue that are not stable and reliable. Furthermore, in
some cases, there is far too much reliance on only one or two
sources of revenue that are subject to forces beyond the
control of local authorities.
Efficiency
Largely because of the diversity and inconsistency of
the revenue base, local authority taxes in Kenya are not
often very general in coverage. In some municipal councils,
there is, in fact, fairly general coverage of most economic
activities through a system of land rates, business and
trading licenses, and marketing and vending fees. In other
urban and most rural areas, tax system coverage is much less
general. In a few county councils, there are agricultural
land rates or cesses in the rural areas and land rates and
trading fees in the urban areas. However, many of the county
councils with agricultural land and/or production taxation do
not bother much with taxes in their urban centers, while
those who do not have agricultural taxes tend to tax very
heavily in their urban centers.
The diversity and lack of generality of the local
authority tax base certainly creates the possibility of
serious efficiency effects, but it is very difficult to
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measure them. There are significant interjurisdictional
differences in both the local tax base and local tax rates
that could generate locational efficiency effects. This is
not very likely, however, for several reasons. First, there
are clear cultural constraints on mobility in Kenya. Many
people will not want to give up their residence or business
in their home area even if taxes are higher than in other
areas. Of course, this is not to say that large-scale
industrial investors will not, to some extent, react to
interjurisdictional tax differences, but most large-scale
industry in concentrated in a few large urban centers in
Kenya, and there are needed inputs and local business tax
incentives in these places. Second, the absolute levels of
most local tax rates and charges in Kenya are fairly low, and
it is likely that many people would not respond even to
relatively large interjurisdictional tax differences,
particularly if there were other more important
considerations, such as access to labor or nearness to
family.1 7 Third, information about tax differences in other
districts is probably not widespread. It will be shown
later, for example, that there are enormous differences in
17 The Institute for Development Studies at the
University of Nairobi has just completed a detailed study of
the informal sector in four districts in Kenya. The results
of the study clearly show that, although informal sector
workers complain about license fees and taxes, only three
percent of the respondents in the survey indicated that
license fees and taxes were a barrier to them in setting up
their businesses. Details may be found in Ng'ethe, Wahome
and Ndua (1987).
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business license fees and land taxes between local
authorities in the same district or contiguous districts, yet
there is no clear evidence of a migration to the less
expensive area. Finally, many producers in Kenya must
operate in a particular region because of the nature of their
business. A coffee grower must operate in a particular agro-
ecological zone. He/She is not in a position to move to a
semi-arid district even if it has lower agricultural or land
taxes than a district that has good coffee land. Although
food crops might be grown in the semi-arid district, the
after-tax return from coffee or other cash crops is likely to
be much higher.
The possibility of intrajurisdictional efficiency
effects is somewhat greater than in the interjurisdictional
case. For example, there are sometimes great differences in
the cess rate charged on different agricultural crops in the
same district. This may induce a farmer to shift to the less
highly taxed crop if the after-tax return is higher.
However, this is probably not common. Higher cesses are
normally on higher-value crops, so the after-tax return on
the more highly taxed crops may still leave the farmer
indifferent or better off. Similarly, sometimes not all
sections of an urban area are surveyed and valued, and there
are no land rates charged in unsurveyed areas. This may
induce some businesses and residents to move to unsurveyed
sections of the urban area. It is also doubtful that this is
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widespread, but there are certainly some cases of it in
Kenya.
Eguity
It is difficult to assess adequately the equity of local
authority revenue sources in Kenya because of a lack of
relevant data, but it is possible to make a few observations.
First, it is clear that there is little equity across local
authorities. The fact that some farmers have to pay cess and
others do not is certainly not equitable, nor is the fact
that the same taxes are charged at such different rates in
similar local authorities.
There are also clearly some vertical and horizontal
inequities within local authorities.
stock auction and market fees but no
land rates might be a case in point.
farmers or herders who sell one bag o
locally in the period of a week will
local authority, but a wealthy farmer
thousands of acres may pay little or
In many local authorities, most
A local authority with
cess or agricultural
In this example, small
f potatoes or one cow
have to pay fees to the
who may cultivate
nothing.
of the major tax revenu
comes from center city merchants and businessmen. They often
have to pay land rates or rents, fees and charges for water,
sewerage and conservancy, and license fees. Although they
may be among the wealthiest people in the jurisdiction, some
of their middle and higher income counterparts who are less
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centrally located or located in unsurveyed parts of the city
center may be much less heavily taxed. In general, only
businesses are taxed to any significant degree in many local
authorities, and some of them are treated very differently
from others.
Another potential equity issue is relevant in county
councils where there are great differences in agro-ecological
conditions and economic activity in different parts of the
counties. In a county such as Meru, for example, the
landscape ranges from productive, wealthy agricultural
divisions near Mt. Kenya, where coffee is cultivated, to
semi-arid areas in which little can be grown, with many
people relying on subsistence herding for their existence.
In such cases, fees, charges, and taxes are usually uniform
across the entire jurisdiction, despite the tremendous
divisional differences in ability-to-pay.
Thus, there is no general statement that can be made
regarding the horizontal, vertical, and geographical equity
of local authority taxes in Kenya. There are clearly equity
problems, but their nature and severity differs widely across
local authorities.
Other Revenue-Generation Issues
The data presented earlier in Table 4.2 clearly
demonstrate that many local authorities in Kenya exploit
entrepreneurial revenue-raising activities, at least to some
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extent. Virtually all local authorities build and operate
marketplaces, and many provide livestock slaughter facilities
(houses and slabs), housing, and busparks as well. In some
cases, these activities provide a significant proportion of
revenue for local authorities. This is particularly true for
rural local authorities who may have few other good sources
of revenue. In many cases, these revenue-raising activities
involve services that could be, but are unlikely to be,
provided by the public sector.
A final important point regarding local authority
revenue is that Harambee (self-help) projects raise a great
deal of money in Kenya to assist in the provision of public
services, some of which would otherwise have to be financed
by local authorities.18 People voluntarily contribute large
sums of money, labor, and materials over and above central
and local government taxes towards community projects that
are often undertaken independently of local authorities.19
Most of these contributions are used for the construction
costs of capital investment projects. The education sector,
which is primarily funded by the central government, is the
major beneficiary of Harambee, but fund-raising events are
sometimes held for local government services. Community
18 Harambee was the name for the self-help movement in
Kenya coined by the late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta.
19 Barkan and Holmquist (1986) conducted a survey of
Harambee contributors, the results of which suggest that
Harambee can be considered, at least in some areas, a
progressive form of voluntary local taxation.
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centers, water supply projects, markets, cattle dips, and
other facilities and services have benefitted significantly
from Harambee. In 1985, over 37 million Kenyan pounds
(about US $45 million), both cash and in-kind, were donated
to Harambee projects, a sum about twice as great as total
local authority gross fixed capital formation in the same
year. Large-scale Harambee projects, however, tend to occur
primarily in the areas where people can afford to donate.
The poor districts in arid or semi-arid regions rarely, if
ever, have significant Harambee projects.
Some observers of Harambee have noted that it has become
very controlled by the central government over the years and
cannot be truly considered local self-help.20 The
government controls Harambee activities by licensing
fundraising activities and requiring approval of such
activities by district officials. Furthermore, local
Harambees are often hosted by prominent national politicians
who use the occasions to further their own political
interests.
Revenue-Expenditure Linkages
The issue of revenue-expenditure linkages is a very
20 Central government control of Harambee is discussed
extensively in Colebatch (1974). More recently, Ngau (1987)
has argued that central government interference has biased
the nature of Harambee projects towards large, costly social
amenity projects, and has undermined the degree of broad-
based participation in making project selections.
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complex one in the Kenyan case, and the situation varies
greatly across local authorities.2 1 Because most services
are not assigned by the central government per se and most
sources of revenue are allowed to all local authorities
provided the proper clearances are obtained, it does not, on
the surface, seem that there should be difficulties in
obtaining a correspondence between service provision and
sources of income. Unfortunately, the situation is not
nearly that simple.
Most municipal councils provide traditional urban
services. Many of these services can be financed by charges
if the charge levels are properly set and the revenue is
actually collected. Land rate and license income should go a
long way towards covering the costs of most services for
which charges cannot be made. Some of the largest municipal
councils have additional responsibilities for health and
education, but the latter is largely financed financially by
generous grants for teachers salaries from the Ministry of
Education. Health is the one service where significant
problems might be foreseen because of an inability to charge
fees and a lack of aid from the central government. In
general, however, there seems to be a fairly good
corresppndence between services provided by municipal
- 21 The principal discussion of intergovernmental
grants, an important revenue-expenditure linkage issue, is
presented in the next chapter under the treatment of
intergovernmental institutional issues.
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councils and their sources of income. Unfortunately, this
correspondence breaks down because of institutional,
managerial, and political constraints, which will be
discussed in the next chapter.
In the rural councils, the correspondence between
expenditures and income is much less apparent. There are few
fee-for-service type activities in many county councils, and
some of the major ones, such as water and veterinary
services, often require subsidies. Furthermore, local
authorities in urban areas all have access to land rates, but
there is no general and productive source of revenue
available to all county councils except license fees. As
shown earlier, some county councils have land rates, others
have agricultural cess, a few have both, and still others
have neither. The situation is further complicated for
county councils by the same institutional, managerial, and
political constraints that plague municipal councils.
Even in the case where an revenue-expenditure
correspondence seems to exist, there is no guarantee that
sufficient revenue will be raised to cover the costs of
service provision. Tax rates, fees, and charges must be set
on a reasonable and rational basis in order for adequate
income to be raised, and this is not often the case in Kenyan
local authorities. The rest of this section will deal
largely with issues related to cost recovery and setting the
levels of fees and taxes.
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Cost Recovery
Poor cost recovery from service provision is a serious
problem in many Kenyan local authorities. Tables 5.5 and 5.6
present some basic information on the number of councils
examined in this study who ran surpluses and deficits on the
provision of particular services in 1984. Note that not all
councils provide all of the services listed in these tables.
Furthermore, in several cases, it was not possible to get the
information for a few services for some of the local
authorities being studied.
County councils do not do very well financially with
most of the services they provide. The data in Table 5.5
indicate that only four of eleven county councils ran
surpluses for markets in 1984 and only three of five ran
surpluses for slaughterhouses. Few county councils run
surpluses on housing (two of four), water services (one of
six) or sewerage (zero of two).
Certain other services also seem to be financially
disastrous for many or most county councils. Only two of
eight councils generate surpluses on veterinary services,
with similar or more dismal records for social services (zero
of thirteen), works (one of eight), and conservancy (one of
five). Only tourism, for which four of five county councils
earn surpluses, seems to be a promising source of surplus
revenue. The one case of a deficit is for a remote council
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TABLE 5.5
SURPLUS/DEFICIT OF SPECIFIC SERVICES IN SELECTED
COUNTY COUNCILS* (1984)
Number of Number of
Service Surpluses Deficits
Conservancy 1 5
Housing 2 2
Markets 4 7
Sewerage 0 2
Slaughter 3 2
Social Services 0 13
Tourism 4 1
Veterinary 2 8
Water 1 5
Works 1 8
TABLE 5.6
SURPLUS/DEFICIT OF SPECIFIC SERVICES IN SELECTED
MUNICIPAL AND TOWN COUNCILS* (1984)
Number of Number of
Service Surpluses Deficits
Conservancy 2 4
Housing 8 2
Markets 8 5
Sewerage 5 4
Slaughter 6 6
Social Services 0 13
Veterinary 0 2
Water 6 2
Works 0 13
*There were 13 county and 13 municipal and town councils
included in this study. The sum of surpluses and deficits
does not always add to the total number of local auhorities.
Not all councils provide all of the listed services. In
addition, in a few cases, finanical records were not
sufficiently disaggregate to allow the extraction of data
for particular services.
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whose only tourist activity is an unprofitable guest house.
It could be argued that some of these services should be
subsidized by county councils, and some by their nature are
not revenue-generating activities. It is not reasonable, for
example, for a council to expect to make revenue from works
services. This basically involves the provision of roads and
street cleaning, with only minor sources of revenue, such as
planning fees, plot allocation fees, and revenue from
equipment rental. It is also clear that local governments
might be expected to subsidize social services (primarily
nursery schools) and veterinary services because of the
externalities they generate.
Other types of services, however, such as housing,
water, sewerage, markets, slaughter, and conservancy, are
essentially fee-for-service activities. The local
authorities should, to as great an extent as possible, charge
fees that reflect the costs of service provision. In some
very poor areas where people truly cannot afford to pay for
basic services, a case can be made for Government of Kenya
subsidization through grants to needy councils or ministerial
assumption of responsibility for providing certain services.
With very few exceptions, the county councils that do tend to
generate surpluses on some services are those located in high
potential agricultural areas, such as the Kipsigis, Nakuru
and Wareng County Councils.
Municipal and town councils are more likely to generate
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surpluses on specific services than are county councils, as
can be seen in the data presented in Table 5.6. The poorest
performance is primarily in those services for which
subsidization would be expected. All 13 councils run
deficits for the provision of works and social services, and
both of the councils providing veterinary services run
deficits.
Some of the services that would be expected to be
profitable, in fact, generally are: eight of ten councils run
surpluses for housing services and six of eight do for water
provision. It is worth noting that the housing deficits are
incurred in Nakuru and Eldoret, two of the largest municipal
councils in Kenya. This is a disturbing sign, particularly
because both have very large housing schemes and housing is
one of the services that has historically provided surplus
revenue to cover deficits on general funds in large municipal
councils. Now, water and sewerage seem to be saving the day
in these particular councils.
It is also disturbing that certain services that should
cover costs through fees do not do so in a substantial number
of municipal and town councils. Only five of nine councils
generate a surplus for sewerage and only eight of thirteen do
so for markets, which are a source of enormous surplus in
some other councils. Similarly, only six of twelve councils
have a surplus for slaughterhouses and only two of four for
conservancy services.
238
Deficits on water and sewerage seem to be experienced
primarily in a few of the smaller and/or less-developed
councils, such as Bungoma, Kisii, Muranga, and Karatina.
This is not true of the councils who have deficits for
conservancy, markets, and slaughterhouses. These councils
range from some of the largest (Nakuru, Kisumu and Eldoret)
to some of the smallest (Kitui, Busia and Karatina, all of
which are town councils). Most of these councils run
deficits on only one or two of these services.
Discussions with local authority officers, observation
of revenue collection procedures, and examination of local
authority financial records suggest that there are three
primary reasons why councils run deficits on services that
should be profitable. First of all, in some councils, fees
are set too low to cover the actual cost of services.
Sometimes this occurs because of local political pressures,
but sometimes it is nothing more than a matter of poor
planning and management. Second, costs for some services are
extremely high due to poor productivity, and/or a supply of
workers larger than what is necessary to provide the
services, and/or salary increases imposed by the Public
Service Commission or the Industrial Court. Efficiency can
clearly be improved in many cases, while in others the fees
for service provision need to be raised to match the
necessary costs. Finally, revenue collection and enforcement
are extremely lacking for some or all services in many
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councils. This situation results from a combination of
factors: insufficient and/or poorly trained staff,
corruption, inadequate collection and enforcement procedures,
insufficient enforcement authority, and interference from
local politicians. All of these collection issues will be
discussed further in the next chapter.
Setting Fees and Taxes2 2
There are no established guidelines for setting tax
rates and user charges in local authorities in Kenya.
Service charges, land tax rates, and license fees vary
dramatically across local authorities, and there seems to be
little rational basis for these differences. Part of the
blame for this situation lies with the local authorities, who
have no system or guidelines for setting tax rates and
charges. The Ministry of Local Government, which is required
to approve all rates and charges levied by the local
authorities, must also share the blame. The Ministry does
not have guidelines for approving rate and charge requests
from the local authorities, so that many of these decisions
are arbitrary and open to political manipulation.
There is some clear evidence to demonstrate the lack of
uniformity in fees and taxes across local authorities.2 3
22 Issues related to setting fees, charges, and taxes
in Kenya are discussed in greater depth in Smoke (February 1987).
23 The only ad valorem tax collected by most local
authorities is land rates, which vary from a two percent to
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Tables 5.7 through 5.9 present selected summary data on the
level of license fees and user charges in county, municipal
and town councils. Mean fee and charges across different
types of local authorities generally follow an expected
pattern. For the most part, the fees and charges of
municipal councils are substantially higher than those of
county councils, while those of the town councils are
somewhere in between. There are a few exceptions to these
general trends, but they are rare.
The fees and charges levied by a particular type of
council, on the other hand, vary dramatically across local
authorities. It is not unusual, for example, for two county
councils with similar characteristics to charge very
different fees for the same license or service. Although
there are sometimes rational explanations for these
variations, many of the differences seem arbitrary, with no
apparent justification on the basis of population, wealth, or
costs of service provision.
more than a ten percent actual tax rate. They are not dealt
with here because of problems in interpreting the differences
in land rates across local authorities. Almost all land
valuation is done by the Ministry of Lands and Settlement in
Kenya, and they are sometimes years behind schedule in doing
local authority valuations, which are required every five
years by law. In years between valuations, local authorities
are permitted to raise their land tax rates annually, an
option that some take advantage of but most do not. Diverse
rates are levied on bases valued at various percentages of
market value. There is no measure of equalized valuation, so
that it is not possible to derive effective tax rates. Thus,
it is not possible to compare land tax rates across local
authorities in any meaningful way.
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TABLE 5.7
COUNTY COUNCILS FEES AND CHARGES
SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS
(in Kenyan Shillings)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FEE/CHARGE Number Mean Median Maximum Minimum
A. LICENSE FEES
RETAIL
Bakery
Butchery
Chemist
Grocer
Hides/skins
SERVICES
Bar License
(on)
Bar License
(off)
Barber
Garage
Hotel
(maximum)
Petrol Station
Shoe Repair
585
375
483
212
567
10 528
10 365
165
,033
,510
973
192
350
300
500
200
400
1,550
650
750
400
2,000
450 1,000
350
200
875
1 ,000
1 ,000
200
500
275
2,000
5,000
2,500
400
OTHER
Auctioneer
Stock Trader
Wholesale
(Local)
Wholesale
(Travel)
9 1,472 1,000 5,000 300
9 653 300 2,000 250
12 983 675 2,500 400
7 1,979 2,000 3,750 600
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200
150
200
50
100
375
200
50
400
200
300
100
TABLE 5.7 (CONTINUED)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FEE/CHARGE Number Mean Median Maximum Minimum
B. USER CHARGES
Bus Park Fees 7 These vary a great deal across councils
that use them. Some councils charge annual
fees while others charge on a per trip
basis.
Conservancy 9 131 100 240 50
(annual)
Market Fees 13 Charges are usually levied per bag/bundle
of goods to be sold and vary by type of
product. Such charges are generally small,
c. 1 to 15 K.Sh., and are fairly comparable
across county councils.
Slaughter Fees
- cattle 10 18 15 40 5
- smallstock 10 7 7 15 2
Stock Auction
- cattle 10 15 15 40 5
- smallstock 10 6 5 10 2
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TABLE 5.8
MUNICIPAL COUNCILS FEES AND CHARGES
SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS
(in Kenyan Shillings)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FEE/CHARGE Number Mean Median Maximum Minimum
A. LICENSE FEES
RETAIL
Bakery (Lg)
Bakery (Sm)
Butchery (Lg)
Butchery (Sm)
Chemist
Grocer
Supermarket
Hides/skins
SERVICES
2,016
1,488
1,100
665
4,106
494
2,832
1,810
2,500
1 ,500
800
725
3,000
550
2,560
1 ,500
3,500
3,500
2,500
1 ,000
5,000
1 ,000
4,500
4,000
500
400
400
300
700
300
1,350
200
Bar License
(on)
Bar License
(off)
Barber
Garage
(enclosed)
Garage
(open-air)
Hotel
(residential)
Hotel
(tourist)
Petrol Station
(fuel only)
Petrol Station
(fuel/repairs)
Shoe Repair
9 925
9 453
317
2,313
10 800
10 1,032
900 1,500
400
300
1,990
700
550
4,500
600 1,500
850 2,000
400
300
100
600
500
300
10 3,465 3,500 5,500 1,000
10 2,315 2,125 5,250 600
10 3,215 3,500 5,250 1,000
10 196 180 400 100
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TABLE 5.8 (CONTINUED)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FEE/CHARGE Number Mean Median Maximum Minimum
OTHER
Auctioneer
Stock Trader
Wholesale
(local)
Wholesale
(travel)
B. USER CHARGES
Bus Park Fees
- bus
- matatu
Conservancy*
Market Fees
Nursery**
Sewerage***
(monthly
minimum)
Slaughter
- cattle
- smallstock
Water***
(monthly
minimum)
2,136
467
2,045
2,250
500
2,000
4,000
800
4,620
6 1,773 1,625 3,000
(per trip)
8
8
10
9/67
4/13
17
1 ,000
100
600
750
7/50
2
7/50
10 Charges are usually levied per
bag/bundle of goods to be sold and
vary by type of product. Such
charges are generally small, c. 1 to
15.K.Sh., and are fairly comparable
across municipal councils.
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20
77
27
150
14
840
45
80 150
* monthly charge
** annual charge
charges for water and sewerage vary with volume of use in
all cases.
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TABLE 5.9
TOWN COUNCIL FEES AND CHARGES
SELECTED SUMMARY STATISTICS
(in Kenyan Shillings)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FEE/CHARGE Number Mean Median Maximum Minimum
A. LICENSE FEES
RETAIL
Bakery
Butchery
Chemist
Grocer
Hides/skins
SERVICES
Bar License
(on)
Bar License
(off)
Barber
Garage
(enclosed)
Garage
(open-air)
Hotel
(residential)
Hotel
(tourist)
Petrol Station
Shoe Repair
1,167
833
1,100
733
450
3 650
3 367
307
1 ,267
3 617 500 850
3 567 700 800
3 1,467 1,500 2,500
1 ,833
233
OTHER
Auctioneer
Stock Trader
Wholesale
3 1,600 1,500 1,800 1,500
3 600 300 1,200 300
3 1,800 1,200 3,500 700
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1 ,000
500
1 ,800
300
450
700
400
300
1 ,000
1 ,500
1 ,500
400
1 ,500
500
750
500
500
1 ,800
1 ,000
500
1 ,100
200
400
500
200
120
1 ,000
500
200
400
1 ,500
200
1 ,500
200
2,000
300
TABLE 5.9 (CONTINUED)
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FEE/CHARGE Number Mean Median Maximum Minimum
B. USER CHARGES
Bus Park Fees (per trip)
- bus 3 13 15 15 10
- minibus 3 8 10 10 5
- matatu 3 5 5 7/50 3
Conservancy 3 110 100 240 100
(annual)
Market Fees 3 Charges are usually levied per
bag/bundle of goods to be sold and
vary by type of product. Such
charges are generally small, c. 1 to 15
K.Sh., and are fairly comparable
across town councils.
Slaughter
- cattle 2 50 50 60 40
- smallstock 2 17/50 17/50 20 15
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The major reason for the existence of these variations
is probably the lack of standards for setting fees and taxes
both at the local level and within the Ministry of Local
Government. Some local authority officers undoubtedly look
at the fee and tax levels of other local authorities and
service costs when setting their own fees, but many are
unable to provide a reasonable explanation of how they set
their rates. The Ministry has no guidelines and criteria for
making decisions about local authority requests for approval
of fees and charges and no basis for making comparisons
across councils.
Another important factor in explaining the differences
in the levels of fees and charges across local authorities
may be the differential access that councils have to other
sources of revenue. Some of the county councils in wealthier
agricultural areas or municipal councils with water systems
and housing estates may not need to charge high license fees
because they have access to far more productive sources of
income, which may also be less troublesome to collect.
Muranga County Council, for example, gets a great deal of
revenue from coffee cess, and Wareng County Council has
extensive and productive land rates. Some of the poorer
county councils in semi-arid districts, such as Turkana and
Marsabit, have no access to such productive sources of
revenue and thus end up charging higher fees than their
wealthier counterparts for many types of licenses. There is
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a possibility that the lower fees in wealthy areas further
encourage business, while the higher fees in poor areas may
discourage it, but this is difficult to verify empirically
because of a lack of relevant data.
The degree to which local authorities make distinctions
in fee and charge levels on the basis of location, size, and
other business characteristics varies greatly. All of the
councils make some license fee distinctions between wholesale
and retail traders, but most make few other distinctions on
the basis of scale of operation. A few differentiate on the
basis of such factors as: sidewalk versus shop traders and
service providers; mechanized versus manually-operated
equipment; lodging house capacity; and, snack bar versus
restaurant versus restaurant/bar.
Few of the local authorities studied make fee and charge
distinctions on the basis of location. Several county
councils, however, do have different fees and charges for
urban centers and rural areas. A handful of the municipal
councils charge different fees in different areas of the city
or distinguish between the town center and its extended area.
Most local authorities have between 100 and 200
different types of charges, with fees varying dramatically
across different types of professions and trades. Although
some of these distinctions are very important and easily
justified, many of them cannot be considered very meaningful.
For example, Embu Municipal Council charges an annual fee of
249
2550 Kenyan shillings (K.Sh.) for a bakery license, while its
fee for a butchery license is only 750 K.Sh. Local officials
are not able to justify this distinction. Do bakers
generally earn more than three times as much income as
butchers, or is it that they use more local authority
services? The fee structure does not seem to be justifiable
on rational grounds.
A related issue is the degree to which local authorities
actually collect revenue from the license fees they have on
their books. Most local authorities have many different
types of fees listed in their schedule of fees and charges,
but how many of these fees actually provide revenue?
Unfortunately, this information is often difficult or
impossible to get due to the way local authority records are
kept. There are, however, a few bits of information
indicating that local authorities may, in some cases, collect
revenue from only a limited number of fees. Wareng County
Council, for example, collected revenue from only 61 of the
116 fees listed in its schedule of fees and charges (52
percent) in 1984. A more dramatic case is Turkana County
Council, which recently collected revenue from only 28 of the
108 fees on its schedule (26 percent). The fact that little
or no revenue is generated from many gazetted fees may help
to explain why local authorities tend to take little
systematic care in setting fee levels.
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Recovery of Revenue from Nonresidents
A serious revenue problem faced by some municipal
councils is the fact that there is no mechanism for local
authorities to recover revenue from residents of other local
authorities who use some of their services. This is not
true, for example, of nonresidents who use the local bus park
or sell in the local market, but it can be a serious problem
for such services as health care, and to a lesser extent,
education, which are provided by some of the larger municipal
councils. Municipal hospitals, for example, may be
better-staffed and better-supplied than district hospitals,
so that people may have to wait less time and will be more
likely to be able to get needed drugs. Thus, some residents
of the county council's jurisdiction come to the municipal
hospital for their health care requirements. Because health
care is free in Kenya by Presidential decree, the municipal
council cannot charge for these services, and there is no
mechanism for recouping this revenue either from the county
council or the Ministry of Health. This can create a serious
burden on the municipal council, and it means that residents
of the municipal council are subsidizing the residents of
other jurisdictions.
This problem of revenue recovery is a lesser problem
with some other general local authority services.
Nonresidents who come into a local authority benefit from the
local roads, street lights, sanitation, conservancy services,
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etc., but do not contribute to the costs of providing these
services in any meaningful way.
Summary of Public Finance Issues
The pattern of service provision that has emerged in
Kenyan local authorities is, to a great extent, justifiable
on the basis of the criteria outlined in Chapter 3. There
are a few ambiguities in the assignment of certain services,
such as water supply and veterinary care, and a case could be
made for greater decentralization of responsibility for
education. For the most part, however, a majority of "local"
services are provided locally, and the central government
does intervene in the provision of services that involve
economies of scale and externalities. There are problems
with arrangements for intergovernmental and interagency
coordination of service provision, but a discussion of this
is reserved until institutional issues are discussed in the
following chapter.
On the revenue side, efficiency effects generated by
local taxes are not likely to be severe except in particular
cases. In addition, many local authorities augment their
revenues by exploiting entrepreneurial revenue-raising
activities, and Harambee and nongovernmental organizations
supply funds for certain facilities and services that would
otherwise have to be provided by local authorities.
In spite of these positive aspects of the local public
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finance system, there are significant problems with local
authority revenue generation in Kenya. There are substantial
horizontal and vertical inequities in local tax systems both
within and across local authorities. More importantly, the
task of local service provision is often seriously undermined
by the inelasticity or instability of many local revenue
sources. Finally, the central government is frequently
arbitrary in granting local governments the authority to use
particular sources of revenue, a practice that generates
artificial fiscal disparities across local authorities.
There are also serious deficiencies in the
correspondence between revenue-raising authority/capacity and
expenditure responsibility in Kenyan local authorities. It
would appear that the correspondence between revenues and
expenditures should be adequate for municipal councils. In
reality, there are major problems, largely due to
institutional and procedural weaknesses to be discussed in
Chapter 6. The situation is much worse for county councils,
where there is often little correspondence between revenues
and expenditures. There are no guidelines and procedures for
setting local fees, charges, and tax rates, and cost recovery
is a serious problem in many local authorities.
It is evident that the revenue side presents the major
deficiencies and problems with local public finance in Kenya.
Both the revenue and expenditure sides, however, are
seriously affected by problems with the institutional
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organization and capacity of the Kenyan public sector. The
next chapter turns to an examination of these institutional
issues and the impact they have on local government finance
in Kenya.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF THE FISCAL ROLE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN KENYA, PART II:
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A variety of problems related to institutional
organization, capacity, and procedures have imposed major
constraints on the fiscal performance of Kenyan local
authorities. Many of these institutional issues are
intergovernmental in nature, while others relate primarily to
the local authorities. This chapter examines major
institutional problems that affect the fiscal role of local
authorities in Kenya and their ability to provide public
services.
Intergovernmental Issues
In any multitiered government system, intergovernmental
institutional arrangements are an important determinant of
the quality of public service provision. Some of the
existing intergovernmental relationships and procedures in
Kenya, however, constrain rather than facilitate local
authority performance in meeting local service needs. Other
relationships and procedures that could be productive for
local authorities do not exist, or are poorly conceived and
implemented. This section will examine the most important of
these intergovernmental institutional issues, including
interjurisdictional coordination of local authorities,
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central government monitoring and control, intergovernmental
grants, local authority capital financing, and the
relationship between local authorities and other public
sector institutions.
Interjurisdictional Coordination of Local Authorities
Interjurisdictional cooperation among local authorities
is very rare in Kenya. The Local Government Act does provide
for the formation of joint committees and joint boards across
local authorities for the planning and provision of mutually
beneficial projects subject to the approval of the Ministry
of Local Government. However, not one of the local
authorities visited or officials interviewed for this study
could provide a single example of interjurisdictional
cooperation. There have been cases observed for this
research in which such cooperation would have been very
appropriate. For example, a municipal council putting in a
water line to serve part of its constituency was to pass its
line through villages under the jurisdiction of the county
council. Water service was also being planned for the county
council villages, although it was not scheduled to be
implemented right away. Nevertheless, it would certainly
have been more cost-effective for both the county and
municipal councils if they had coordinated their efforts
rather than each undertaking a fully separate project, but it
is clear that they will end up taking the latter route.
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Various forms of intergovernmental cooperation at the local
level are widely used in countries with developed local
government systems. The local authorities in Kenya seem not
to realize the potential benefits of coordination, and they
have no precedent or encouragement from the central
government to arrange joint undertakings that increase
efficiency.
The one genuine form of intergovernmental cooperation
in Kenya--the regional development authority--is too new to
evaluate, and it is limited in its geographical coverage. In
1980, the Government established three regional development
authorities: the Lake Basin Development Authority, the Tana
and Athi Rivers Development Authority, and the Kerio Valley
Development Authority. Each covers at least several
districts. Their primary goal is to manage and plan
activities related to hydrological resources within their
jurisdiction, but they are also supposed to monitor,
coordinate, and evaluate all development activities
undertaken in their areas. Although there have not been many
major accomplishments yet, there is certainly potential for
valuable projects and activities that might be undertaken by
these regional authorities. However, their relationship to
other levels of government and agencies is not very clear,
and this ambiguity may constrain their ability to provide
effective coordination.
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Central Government Monitoring and Control of Local
Authorities by the Ministry of Local Government
The central government in Kenya has a major role to
play in monitoring and supporting the service provision
activities of local authorities. This may be considered
necessary, at least to a certain extent, because of
widespread limitations in local authority capacity. It is
clear, however. that the type and degree of control over
local authorities currently exercised by the central
government is neither justifiable nor productive. This
inefficient control has remained in place for a variety of
reasons, some of which are related to bureaucratic inertia
and resource constraints. The primary reason, however, is
probably political. The history of local government in post-
independence Kenya, as discussed in Chapter 4, suggests that
strong central government control of local authorities has
been motivated more by politicians who desire to keep the
local authorities dependent and weak than by a concern for
their operating efficiency.
The major agent for central government control of local
authorities in Kenya is the Ministry of Local Government
(MLG), which supervises the functioning of all local
authorities in Kenya. Under the Local Government Act, the
Minister for Local Government has broad powers of control
over local authority activities. Annual budget estimates,
employment requests, by-laws, and schedules of fees and
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charges must all be submitted to the MLG for review and
approval. The Ministry also reviews capital spending plans,
approves loan requests, and processes requests for raising
additional revenue. Thus, all major activities of local
authorities are subject to MLG review and control. Some of
the ways in which MLG exercises its control, however,
generate a variety of significant problems. The information
in this section on problems in the relationship between MLG
and local authorities comes from personal observations as
well as extensive interviews with local authority and
Ministry of Local Government officials.
Excessive Control/Centralization
Among the local authority officials and Provincial
Local Government Officers (PLGOs) interviewed for this study,
there was no general agreement about what the role of the MLG
should be. Some felt that strong central control over the
local authorities was necessary, while others felt that local
authorities needed a much greater degree of autonomy.
Virtually everyone agreed, however, that the degree of
centralized control of the local government system in Kenya
is unnecessary, and that it prevents local authorities from
operating more efficiently.
The PLGOs, who are highly experienced in local
authority affairs, currently have no substantial
decision-making authority. Although they do review and
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analyze most local government requests, the PLGOs do not have
much power to act on these requests. They must forward most
of their recommendations to the MLG in Nairobi for final
action. Most local authority officials seem to have a high
regard for the PLGOs, and they believe that the PLGOs are
much more familiar than the Nairobi-based officers with
conditions in the field. In their current virtually
powerless form, however, PLGOs are also seen from a local
authority perspective as being little more than an extra
layer of delays in the process of securing approval for
requests submitted to the MLG.
Internal MLG Problems: Staffing and Procedures
There are a number of serious problems with MLG
staffing and the procedures used by MLG officers in
performing their assigned duties. These problems may result
in arbitrary and delayed action being taken on both routine
and extraordinary requests made by local authorities to the
MLG.
MLG Organization and Staffing
The organizational structure of the MLG is a frequent
target of criticism from local authority officials and PLGOs.
officers from 18 of 26 local authorities have argued that
there is insufficient and unclear delegation of
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responsibility in the central office of the MLG in Nairobi.
The officers contend that they often do not know whom to see
about particular problems when they arise, because there is
no clear designation of responsibilities, at least as far as
the local officers know. Local authority officials visiting
Nairobi may be sent from one MLG officer to another in an
attempt to deal with their problems, and nothing gets
resolved or even heard by the right person. There is also
the issue of junior- and middle-level MLG officials not
having the authority to make many decisions. Thus, there is
a strong tendency for local officers to contact very senior
level MLG officials directly, even for small requests and
problems that arise in the day-to-day running of local
authorities. Most of the PLGOs and several MLG officials
confirm the existence of these organizational and procedural
problems, although they note that many local authority
officers prefer to see high-ranking MLG officials for
political reasons anyway.
One of the problems most frequently cited by local
authority officials is that some of the MLG officials who
make decisions about local authorities are recent college
graduates who have no practical experience in local authority
finance and administration. In spite of this, it is alleged
that they sometimes overrule the decisions of the PLGOs, who
are senior officials and do have substantial local authority
experience. Sometimes this is done without satisfactory
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explanation. This allegation was supported by all of the
PLGOs and several officials from the MLG's central office.
The MLG is greatly understaffed and unable to handle
the volume of work for which it is responsible. The number
of local authorities and the size and problems of existing
ones have grown significantly over the years, while the MLG
staff has grown comparatively slowly. This means that there
are often long delays in processing even the most routine
requests from local authorities.
Excessive Delays in Processing Local Authority Requests
The most consistent and strongest complaint about the
Ministry is the excessive delays encountered by the local
authorities in obtaining MLG approval of requests. Officials
from all 26 local authorities studied cited this as a
widespread problem that affects even some of the more
efficient councils. It is not at all uncommon for approvals
of schedules of fees and charges to be received after the
date on which they were supposed to go into effect. This
creates problems for the local authorities if they have
already started collecting the charges--they may have to make
refunds or collect additional revenue depending on whether
the old or new charges were being collected and what changes
were made by the MLG. This problem is exacerbated by the
fact that, as discussed in the previous chapter, the MLG has
no standard guidelines for evaluating fee and charge levels.
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It is also not unusual for a local authority to receive
MLG approval of its annual budget estimates near or even
after the end of the year under consideration. Technically,
it is not legal for the local authorities to spend or raise
revenue without ministerial approval, but some local
authorities operate in this way on a year-to-year basis,
making the process of submitting estimates virtually
meaningless.
The local authorities also share a significant part of
the blame for the delays involved in estimate approvals.
Although there are clearly major bottlenecks in the MLG, some
local authorities submit their estimates to the provincial
offices much too late for them to be approved on time. The
PLGOs, who are the liaisons between the local authorities and
the MLG, agree unanimously that the blame for delays in
approving the estimates must be placed on both the local
authorities and the MLG.
Long delays in the approval of by-laws are not
uncommon, largely because the MLG does not have a legal
section and must process these requests through the office of
the Attorney General. In a few cases, several years have
passed without the necessary approval forthcoming. This can
make some types of revenue collection very difficult or
impossible for the affected local authorities.
Another area in which excessive delays are a problem is
the MLG approval of employment requests. Local authorities
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are not permitted to hire new employees of a certain grade
and above, even to replace those slots left open by death or
retirement, without MLG approval. Such approvals sometimes
take long periods of time, so that vacancies or "acting"
appointments may drag on for a year or more. In some cases,
it takes a year or more for a vacant position even to be
advertised.
MLG Communication of Policies to Local Authorities
There were a number of complaints from local authority
officials and PLGOs about the timeliness and presentation of
official MLG circulars. 1  Local officials indicated that
the assignments outlined in important circulars are sometimes
unclear, and that responses to clarification requests are
often very slow in coming from the MLG.
Perhaps even more important than unclear circulars is
the fact that they are sometimes sent out so late that
officials have difficulty implementing the orders by the
required date. Several officials even complained of
receiving circulars postmarked from Nairobi significantly
later than the date when the order was supposed to go into
effect.
1 Circulars are official communications from a
Government of Kenya Ministry outlining official procedures
and guidelines. For example, local authorities receive
circulars from the Ministry of Local Government detailing how
to prepare their budgets estimates or the procedures for
hiring new employees.
264
Finally, some local authority circulars on important
guidelines and procedures were issued ten or more years ago
and have not been updated to reflect changing conditions.
Several local authority officers and PLGOs have argued that a
number of standing local authority circulars are irrelevant
and unrealistic because they have not been reviewed to
determine where revisions are required.
Effect of MLG on Revenue Position of Local Authorities
The most important consequence of inadequate staffing
and deficient procedures and guidelines in the MLG is the
frequently arbitrary pattern of use of local authority
revenue sources, which was documented in the previous
chapter. Although all local authorities seem to be allowed
to collect license fees, market fees, and a few other fairly
standard sources of revenue, the disparity in permission
granted to use some sources is extensive. Some local
authorities are wealthy merely because they have been granted
permission to levy cess on coffee or some other cash crop.
Some other coffee-growing districts, however, have not been
permitted historically to charge cess. As a result, they are
much poorer than their counterparts, or they must tax
themselves much more heavily from other sources. The same
situation exists with cess on other crops and land rates as
well: Some local authorities have been permitted to raise
income from these sources and others have not. Although
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there may be theoretical guidelines, access to certain other
sources of revenue seems just as arbitrary. Some councils,
for example, receive significant forest fee revenue from the
central government for protected forest lands within their
jurisdiction, while others do not. These inconsistencies in
granting revenue sources to local authorities are clearly one
of the main reasons for the interjurisdictional spending
disparities documented in Chapters 4 and 5.
In addition to the problem of inconsistency in
allowable revenue sources across local authorities, there is
also the issue of greatly different rates on many revenue
sources across local authorities, which was detailed in
Chapter 5. Of course, local authorities are different and
are subject to local political pressures, so there will
always be some degree of rate disparity. But sometimes
similar local authorities may have very different rates, even
though the ones with lower rates may have applied to the
Ministry for rate increases. Although there are good reasons
to remain flexible on this issue and avoid full
standardization, the MLG has developed no standards and
criteria for making decisions about local tax rates and
charges, as discussed in detail earlier. Differences in
rates rarely seem to be justifiable, based on differences in
type of council, differences in area wealth, or differences
in local preferences as expressed through informed local
government council decisions.
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Overall MLG Policy and Control
Perhaps the single greatest inefficiency with MLG
policy is its underlying tendency to treat all local
authorities as if they were the same. This might not be
fully true in practice--there are some signs that the
Ministry may be less likely to modify the estimates of
financially capable local authorities. In terms of required
submissions and procedures, however, the same degree of
control and monitoring basically takes place for all local
authorities. This prevents the Ministry from using its
limited resources to concentrate on the local authorities
that are most in need of attention. Although a case can be
made for the MLG to retain its general guardian/watchdog
function over all local authorities, governing all local
authorities as if they were equally insolvent and/or corrupt
and/or poorly managed is clearly counterproductive.
The inefficiency of MLG operations is highlighted by
the fact that the MLG seems to have very little real control
over what is going on in any of the local authorities. There
is a fairly widespread consensus among local authority
officers, PLGOs, and even some MLG officers that technical
assistance and monitoring on financial matters by MLG is
lacking. Despite the facade of strict control, i.e., the
requirement that the Ministry approve almost everything of
any consequence and some decisions of little consequence,
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such approvals often come so late as to be relatively
meaningless. By conducting the required review processes and
eventually issuing approvals, the MLG may be fulfilling the
letter of the law, but certainly not its spirit and intent.
Effective control and monitoring in other important areas is
lacking as well. Some local authorities have not produced
audited final financial accounts in 10 or 15 years, if ever.
Other local authorities have never, or rarely, made payments
on their long-outstanding debt. Treasurers in several of
these councils have indicated that in the five, ten, or more
years that they have been in office, no officials from MLG
have ever even asked why they have not produced final
accounts or paid their debts, much less tried to do something
about it.
In short, the local authorities in Kenya are subject to
a great deal of control, which is arbitrarily,
inconsistently, and inadequately administered. Although this
control can have serious effects on local authority
performance, it is, in some important respects, extremely
perfunctory. If the MLG actually knew what was going on in
the local authorities and had control over the situation,
they would be more likely to be able to do something about
the genuinely inefficient and corrupt local authorities. As
things currently stand, some of the local authorities with
the greatest problems seem to be among the most neglected.
The above criticisms are levied with the understanding
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that MLG has resource and staffing problems of its own that
need to be solved by the Government of Kenya if the MLG is
ever to be able to operate at its full potential in its role
of supporting local authorities. Given the political
realities of Kenya, it is clear that the MLG will continue to
have a strong regulatory role to play in the managing of
local authorities, although the nature and degree of that
control may be open to debate. It is also clear, however,
that at this point in time there is a great deal of room for
improving the equity and efficiency with which MLG discharges
its responsibilities. Although there may be much room for
improvement in the local authorities as well, the MLG clearly
creates and exacerbates some of the current problems of local
authorities through inconsistent and arbitrary decisions on
local revenue sources, excessive delays in approving local
authority requests, and negligence in monitoring and helping
to rectify some of the truly serious problems of local
authorities, such as corruption and insolvency.
It is important to note that the MLG has been
intensifying its efforts recently to deal with many of the
institutional and procedural problems discussed above. Many
of the required changes are difficult and slow to implement,
but MLG officials are clearly beginning to move in the
direction of instituting important reforms in MLG procedures
and policies, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. It is far
from clear, however, that the MLG will be given the support
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they need from the central government.
Intergovernmental Grants
There is very little to say about central government
grants to local authorities in Kenya because, despite the
urgent need for grant programs to deal with
interjurisdictional fiscal disparities and the lack of basic
local services in some areas, there are very few of them. As
noted in Chapter 4, there used to be a substantial system of
grants to the local authorities during the colonial period
and in the 1960s after independence was established. For
example, between 1964 and 1969, grants to all county councils
ranged from 21.3 to 30.1 percent of their total expenditures
(Colebatch (1974), p. 69]. As explained in Chapter 4, grant
programs to local authorities have been gradually eliminated
since 1970, and now only two grant programs of any importance
exist.
The most important grant program in Kenya is the
Ministry of Education's grants for teachers salaries, which
go to the large municipalities that have retained
responsibility for education. In fiscal year 1985, 70
percent of the 14.3 million Kenyan pounds in central
government grants to local authorities was for teachers
salaries. Education is one of the main expenditure functions
of these municipal councils, and teachers salaries are the
largest expense; therefore, this grant can be fairly
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important. In the three large municipal councils examined
for this study, grants for teachers salaries accounted for an
average of 23.6 percent of total council revenue. However,
aggregate central government grants for all purposes
accounted for only 7.3 percent of aggregate municipal council
revenues in 1985.2
The other grant program is made from a small annual
allocation to the Minister for Local Government to assist
"needy" councils. There are no specific criteria for
defining "needy," so that the money is distributed according
to the Minister's judgement. The grants are usually small,
somewhere between 2,000 and 15,000 Kenyan pounds, and they
almost invariably go to county councils, often in the semi-
arid areas. Among the 13 county councils studied for this
report, 6 received needy council grants, which accounted for
an average of 8.9 percent of their total revenue. Other
types of councils are not usually awarded these grants,
although at least one town council has received grants in
recent years because of extraordinary circumstances. Grants
to needy councils represented only 3.5 percent of central
government grants to local authorities in 1985.3
2 This figure was calculated from data in the Economic
Survey. 1987 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry
of Planning and National Development, 1987), Chapter 6.
3 The 3.5 percent figure for grants to needy councils
and the 70 percent figure for grants for teachers salaries
cited in the previous paragraph do not add up to 100 percent
of total central government grants to local authorities for
fiscal year 1985. This is because 1985 was the last year of
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Furthermore central government grants accounted for only 1.5
percent of total revenue in all non-municipal councils in the
same year.4
Local Authority Capital Financing
Local authorities in Kenya are permitted to borrow on
the open market, but few can afford commercial interest
rates, and most would be considered poor credit risks. In
recent years, a few booming communities have successfully
applied for loans from private institutions, but this is a
very rare occurrence.
The vast majority of financing for local authority
capital investments comes from a central government authority
overseen by the Ministry of Local Government. As noted in
Chapter 4, the Local Government Loans Authority (LGLA) has
been poorly managed and has a reputation for allocating funds
on arbitrary or political grounds. It has also been
extremely inefficient at recovering the loans it has made,
and it has been unable to provide the volume of capital
required for basic local authority infrastructure.
Nevertheless, it is, and will for the foreseeable future
remain, the main source of investment finance for the local
the phasing out of various other grant programs, which was
described in Chapter 4.
4 This figure was calculated from data in the Economic
Survey, 1987 (Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics,
Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1987), Chapter
6.
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authorities. Because of its importance, the Government has
made it a priority to reorganize and revitalize the
institution, an issue that will be discussed in the next
chapter.
Relationship Between Local Authorities, Other Central
Government Ministries, and Provincial Administration
Although the Ministry of Local Government is the primary
link between the central government and the local authority,
there are working relationships between the local authorities
and other operating ministries. The Ministry of Works,
Housing, and Physical Planning (MWHPP) is in charge of
physical development plans and infrastructure development.
The Ministry of Lands and Settlement (MLS) deals with land
issues and does the surveying and valuation for all local
authorities except for some portion of a few of the largest
cities, such as Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. Other
ministries work with the local authorities on specific
projects. A local authority wishing to be a water provider,
for example, must obtain permission from and work with the
Ministry of Water Development (MWD). Similarly, local
authorities wishing to provide veterinary facilities or a
dispensary must work closely with the Ministry of Livestock
Development (MLD) or the Ministry of Health (MOH). In other
cases, specific services are provided on a one-time basis by
a central government office. The Attorney General's
Chambers, for example, must prepare and approve by-laws that
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give the local authorities power to undertake certain of
their functions, such as raising revenue from a specific
source.
Coordination between local authorities and these
ministries is often plagued by problems of bureaucratic
delay, inadequate technical and financial assistance, and
lack of staff at the central ministries. Many specific
projects suffer long delays or never get off the ground
because of these problems. Sometimes a ministry is supposed
to provide an ongoing service that the local authorities rely
on, but the Ministry is unable to keep up with its
commitments. Local authority land, for example, is supposed
to be revalued at least every five years, and supplementary
valuation rolls are supposed to be prepared every year by the
Ministry of Lands and Settlement. The MLS, however, is
literally years behind schedule, and some local authorities
are just having their 1983 or 1984 revaluations conducted.
The Attorney General's Chambers sometimes take years to
approve local authority by-laws.
These types of delays can cause serious problems for
local authorities. Needed services are not provided in a
timely fashion, and the revenue base can also be eroded. If
the Ministry of Works, Housing and Physical Planning takes
more than a year to provide designs for a housing scheme or
the Ministry of Water Development delays in organizing water
provision, residents of local authorities are denied basic
274
services that they need and are willing to pay for. If the
Ministry of Lands and Settlement does not do revaluations on
a regular basis or the Attorney General does not approve by-
laws enabling local authorities to collect a particular fee
or tax, the local authorities can be left in a serious
financial situation.
Local authorities also have close relationships with the
provincial administration, which includes the district
administration and all decentralized offices of the Office of
the President. An important policy greatly affecting the
relationship between provincial administration and local
authorities in Kenya is the District Focus for Rural
Development strategy, which became operational in July 1983.
This deconcentration policy involves shifting the
responsibilities for planning and implementing rural
development from the Nairobi headquarters of the ministries
to the district level. The District Development Committees
(DDCs) are the district level bodies with responsibility for
implementing District Focus. Basically, District Focus is
designed to generate greater local input into district
development projects. Although the ministries retain
responsibility for general policies and the planning of
multidistrict and national programmes, districts have been
delegated responsibility for the operational aspects of
district-specific rural development projects. Districts are
also responsible for the implementation of district-specific
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subcomponents of national or multidistrict activities. DDC
responsibility for planning and coordination of development
activities covers not only projects sponsored by the
ministries, but also projects supported by Harambee, local
authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign
donors.
Local authorities are required to submit their planned
development projects to the DDCs before they are forwarded to
the Ministry of Local Government for approval and help in
identifying sources of funding. Projects being jointly
implemented by a local authority and a ministry must also go
through this review process. The purpose of DDC approval is
to ensure coordination of local authority projects with other
development activities in the district.
Although there seems to be a great deal of support for
the concept of District Focus, there also seems to be much
confusion and dissatisfaction among local authority officials
with the way in which District Focus is currently being
implemented, at least with respect to the relationship
between the DDC and local authorities. Some local authority
officers regard the DDC as a rubber-stamp organization, as
nothing more than another level of bureaucracy through which
they must channel their project plans, and there is evidence
in some districts to back up these allegations. In a few
cases, there is a lot of friction between local authorities
and the DDC--there are examples of DDCs holding up local
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authority capital projects for as long as several years, even
in cases in which the local authority had clearly
demonstrated its financial capacity to undertake the project
as well as the need for it. In these cases there is
apparently a great deal of political infighting that slows
down the review process.
There is a strong feeling among local authority
officials that local authorities are inadequately represented
on the DDCs. Officials from half of the local authorities
under study have cited this as a major concern. The only two
official members of the DDC from local authorities among the
fifty or more total members are the Clerk to Council, an
appointed officer who is the chief administrator, and the
Chairman of the Council, an elected official. There are also
Members of Parliament and District Officers on the committee,
but it is dominated by technocrats from the central
government ministries, many of whom are not from the local
area but have been assigned to the district from Nairobi.
Thus, there is a feeling that the organization that is
supposed to be soliciting input from local people is not
really the grassroots organization it is so often claimed to
be by national politicians.5 Yet, this organization has a
great deal of control over most of the development projects
5 It is clear from a careful reading of the District
Focus for Rural Development guidelines that the strategy is
one of deconcentration rather than devolution. It is
normally discussed by politicians and the press, however, as
if it were genuine grassroots decentralization.
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undertaken locally.
It should be noted that divisional DDCs, which function
in specific areas of the districts, have much more local
representation that the DDCs, but in many places they are not
very powerful and in some areas may not be active at all. 6
If the decentralized DDCs were more effective, it might be
argued that the largely technocratic and nonlocal composition
of the DDC is a good thing. The decentralized groups would
provide the local input, while the main DDC would add an
element of technical expertise and objectivity to the system,
possibly minimizing the number of decisions based purely on
local/tribal politics. This is the direction in which the
process is supposed to be moving, but whether or not it will
be successful remains to be seen.
Perhaps the strongest complaint registered by local
authority officers regarding District Development Committees
is that they do not provide any funding to local authorities
or help them to identify potential sources of funding.
Although it may be argued that the DDC is not required to
fund local authorities, it is legally possible for the DDC to
identify and fund rural development projects to be
constructed and operated by a county council. It has been
argued that such projects might improve the relationship
6 The divisions, locations, and sublocations of
districts are permitted to organize development committees to
channel information on needs and problems to the DDCs, but
few places have yet organized such an extensive network of
local input.
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between rural local authorities and the DDCs, and serve to
provide additional revenue-generating projects for some local
authorities.
The DDCs do a poor job of initiating coordination among
local authorities for mutually beneficial projects. As noted
earlier, not a single case of such inter-council cooperation
was discovered in any of the districts visited for this
study. This type of coordination is supposed to be the
responsibility of the DDCs. They have the power to require
coordination, which has the potential to introduce greater
efficiency and reduce certain inequities in the provision of
local authority services.
In summary, the concept of District Focus is sound and
desirable and the idea of a stronger and more cooperative
relationship among local authorities, district officers of
the central government ministries and decentralized
representatives of the Office of the President is a good one.
In a strong centralized state such as Kenya, the local
authorities will be able to operate more effectively if they
have the cooperation and support of the most powerful
elements of the central government. The current
implementation of the new policy, however, has not yet
realized much of its valuable potential.
Local Institutional Capacity and Procedures
Having examined intergovernmental institutional issues
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relevant to local authorities in Kenya, it is appropriate to
turn to a discussion of problems with local institutional
capacity and procedures. It is somewhat misleading to
isolate these problems as "local" because central government
actions and policies, or lack thereof, can greatly affect
local institutional organization and performance.
Nevertheless, these problems are largely local in their
impact, and it is useful to make this distinction for
purposes of the analysis.
A variety of local institutional problems currently
exist in Kenya, many of which have already been mentioned in
this evaluation. These problems, which have a tremendous
impact on the fiscal role and financial viability of local
authorities, will be explored in greater detail in this
section. Particular attention is paid to general
administration and management problems, the most important of
which relate to local authority revenue generation. There is
also some discussion of how conflict between appointed
officers and elected officials sometimes leads to poor fiscal
decisions in local authorities.
General Management and Administration Problems
The local authority accounting procedures inherited by
Kenya from the British seem to be cumbersome and difficult
for most councils to use effectively. The detailed and
complicated system of final accounts that are supposed to be
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prepared at the end of each financial year are a particular
problem. Although some local authorities are reasonably up
to date in their final accounts, most are at least a few
years behind, some are 10 or 20 years behind, and some have
never produced them.
In general, the system of record-keeping in local
authorities is inadequate. Poor and inaccurate records kept
on council financial transactions lead to poor revenue and
expenditure management and control, and make it very
difficult to plan for the future and prepare forward budgets.
Data on specific revenue/activity at particular revenue
collection sites, for example, would help the local authority
officers to monitor and project their revenue trends for that
source of revenue more accurately. This type of detailed
data is very rarely kept.
In some local authorities, the process of preparing
budget estimates is not a very meaningful exercise. These
estimates often include revenues that the council knows it
will not be able to collect, and the revenue projections, in
some cases, seem arbitrary. Things are not much better on
the expenditure side. Because of poor expenditure management
and control, the budgeted figures for some categories of
spending are meaningless, as they are often not used as
expenditure ceilings. After the budgeted amount has been
spent, some councils just keep on spending.
Cash-flow management is a serious problem in many local
281
authorities because a great deal of council revenues often
come in during only a few months, while expenditures are made
on an ongoing basis. Some local authorities seem to make
little effort to deal with this problem. They spend all of
their money when it comes in and then have none to cover even
basic expenditures, such as salaries, later in the year. It
should be emphasized that such extreme behavior happens
largely in very poor councils, but there is room for improved
cash-flow management in other local authorities as well.
There is a serious problem with a lack of incentives for
local authority employees, a problem that is shared with the
Kenyan Civil Service. The pay scale is very low compared
with the private sector, and there is no clear system for
raises and promotions. In addition, there are few benefits
or opportunities for bonuses. The result is that the local
authorities to a significant extent employ those who cannot
find private sector employment. These employees have little
incentive to work hard, and there is substantial inertia, low
productivity, and some degree of corruption in many local
authorities.
A significant number of local officers lack the
training, experience, and skills required to discharge their
responsibilities properly. MLG and USAID have instituted a
training program for local authority officers, which will
help deal with this problem, and the Kenya Institute of
Administration in Nairobi and the Government Training
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Institute at Mombasa offer a wide variety of courses for
local authority employees. Thus, the government is well
aware of the problem and is expanding its efforts to
alleviate it. Some of the training programs, however, are
superficial and poorly conceived. In any case, no training
program can be expected to have a major impact unless some of
the major institutional constraints being discussed in this
chapter are relaxed.
There is also a problem of dishonesty and misuse of
council funds by some local authority officers. In most
local authorities visited for this study, proper internal
auditing and cross-checking of records were greatly lacking.
The internal auditor in Kenyan local authorities is directly
under the control of the treasurer, the individual who
controls the council's money. Interviews conducted with
several internal auditors for this study indicate that a
number of them are extremely frustrated with what they
perceive as improper or excessive spending in certain
categories. They may protest to the treasurer or a
councillor up to a certain point, but they generally fear for
their jobs and do not feel that they have the security to
pursue the issue. Again, it is important to emphasize that
this is not a problem in all councils, but it is clearly a
major issue in some.
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Revenue Collection
The most important administrative problem for many local
authorities is their inability to collect fully the revenue
that is due to them. Some types of revenue are relatively
easy to collect because there are simple ways to deal with
defaulters. If, for example, a resident does not pay
water/sewerage fees or house rents, it is easy to turn off
water or evict the tenant as long as there are not political
obstacles to doing so. Similarly, if a trader does not pay
the annual license fee, he/she can be refused other services
or have his/her business closed down. Some revenue sources
are not even collected directly by the local
authority--certain cesses are collected by central marketing
boards and the local authority's only collection effort is
depositing the check it receives from the board.
With many types of local taxes, however, it is much more
difficult to collect revenue. In some cases, local
authorities collect only 25-50% of the revenue they should
receive from a particular source. There are five principal
reasons for these collection difficulties: (1) lack of
collection and enforcement personnel; (2) dishonesty of some
revenue collectors; (3) lack of proper enforcement authority;
(4) political pressure on local officers to be less
aggressive in revenue collection; and, (5) great delinquency
on the part of some government agencies and parastatals.
Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
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Lack of Enforcement/Collection Personnel
Although some local authorities claim to have enough
collection personnel, many are clearly understaffed, a
problem that affects almost all sources of revenue.
Officials from 15 of 26 local authorities reported that they
had an inadequate number of revenue collectors.
Market-related activities tend to be a problem, especially in
areas without properly fenced markets and stock auction
yards. In some cases, very large markets are staffed by as
few as two or three revenue collectors. Lack of staff can be
a crippling problem in some county councils, where there are
sometimes not enough revenue collectors to assign even one to
every division.
In such cases, revenue collectors must travel between
divisions, making collection more sporadic and difficult to
enforce. These traveling revenue collectors are sometimes
further hampered by lack of adequate and reliable
transportation, a problem mentioned by officials from eight
county councils. Some county councils cannot afford to buy
new vehicles or to keep their old vehicles in good repair,
and petrol becomes a major expense. Monitoring revenue
collections in this type of situation is very nearly
impossible.
Lack of enforcement personnel is also an issue here.
Many local authorities do not have enough staff to send them
around regularly to help collect unpaid land rates, unpaid
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license fees, unpaid house rents, etc. Officials in 21 of
the 26 local authorities indicated that they had insufficient
enforcement staff. In order to evade local authority fees,
matatu and bus drivers may attempt to pick up passengers
outside of the bus park, and livestock owners may try to
conduct sales outside of the stock auction yard. Without
proper enforcement personnel, it is difficult to monitor
these activities, and the council may lose significant
revenues. It should be noted that some councils get
enforcement help from the Kenya Police and the District
Commissioner's Office, but the quality and regularity of such
assistance varies considerably, and it is not forthcoming at
all in some areas.
The collection problems for some taxes have been
complicated by certain government policies. Collecting
agricultural land rates, for example, used to be less
difficult when much of the agricultural land in the former
settler areas was in large holdings. Since the government
instituted policies of subdividing and redistributing land,
the pressure on revenue collection and enforcement personnel
has increased many fold. Not only are there more ratepayers
to collect from, but they are generally poorer than the
previous landholders and less able to pay the land rates. In
addition, there is a high incidence of absentee land
ownership in some of the areas where subdivision has taken
place, further frustrating the revenue collection process.
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Dishonesty
Corruption is likely to be a problem of varying degree
in most local authorities. Officials in nine local
authorities admitted that it was a serious problem in their
councils. Because of the lack of enforcement and control in
many local authorities, it is relatively easy for revenue
collectors to pocket some portion of the cash that they
collect each day. There are many ways of doing this.
Sometimes the collection officer fails to issue a receipt and
is not challenged by the fee payer. In other cases, the fee
collector and payer may collude and split the proper fee or
some portion of it, sometimes in further collusion with the
enforcement officer. It is also possible for revenue
collectors to trick illiterate fee payers by giving them a
receipt for less than the amount of money they have actually
collected, thus allowing the collector to pocket the
difference unnoticed.
A problem related to the dishonesty of some revenue
collectors is the failure of some local authority officers to
take proper investigative and/or disciplinary action against
employees suspected of or proven to be cheating. Some local
officers will argue that "the employee he replaced was worse"
or, "the process of hiring and firing is too difficult and
time-consuming", or "he is a brother-in-law of one of the
councillors." Some of these officers may also be misusing
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public funds, or they may be fearful of losing their jobs or
undermining their working relationships with their councils.
Lack of Enforcement Authority
Lack of proper enforcement authority was mentioned by
officials in 17 of 26 local authorities as being a major
problem, even in those councils that are adequately staffed.
In some cases, local authorities do not have proper by-laws
for some sources of revenue. This is a problem especially in
places where residents are aware of the lack of by-laws and
refuse to pay the tax in question. The lack of by-laws is
sometimes due to negligence on the part of the local
authority, but it is often due to long delays in approval of
submitted by-laws by the Ministry of Local Government and the
Attorney General's Chambers, as discussed earlier.
Even in places in which proper by-laws are in place,
local officers lack strong legal authority to collect some
sources of revenue and the legal machinery for collection is
very complex and cumbersome. The primary example of this is
land rates, which is one of the most important sources of
local authority revenue in Kenya, both in urban areas and
rural areas where it is permitted. There are certain things
local authorities can do to enforce land rate collection,
such as require tenants of a plot in arrears to pay rent to
the council instead of the landlords. However, in addition
to being politically difficult to implement in some places,
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the power of force is not really there. The local authority
itself cannot fine or take delinquent taxpayers to jail, nor
does it retain the power of sale for serious defaulters. It
must operate through the national legal system, which has
several disadvantages. First, there are long delays in the
legal system, and recovery of revenue usually takes a great
deal of time. Second, most local authorities do not have
their own advocate and must therefore hire one to represent
them. Legal costs are often so high that they are not
covered by the revenue that would be collected in a
successful case. There are also several instances in which
lawyers have kept all of the money recovered from those
prosecuted by the local authorities. In such cases, the
local authority is faced with the undesirable choice of
instituting further costly legal proceedings or simply
dropping the matter to minimize their losses.
Local Political Pressure
Political pressure is another major revenue collection
problem faced by some local authorities. officials in eight
local authorities cited it as a major obstacle to better
collection. This problem stems from the fact that taxes are
universally unpopular and elected councillors who wish to be
re-elected have a great desire to be popular.
As a result, there are sometimes cases when councillors
intervene in an attempt to prevent water from being turned
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off for default on the water/sewerage bill, to prevent
tenants from being evicted for not paying rent on
council-owned housing, etc. Councillors are often reluctant
to raise taxes and charges, even if they have not been raised
in some time and the council is consistently running a
deficit. This is true not only because of the popularity
issue, but also because councillors are sometimes major
landowners or prominent businessmen in the local area, and
they see the higher taxes as having a direct negative effect
on them.
Delinquency of Government of Kenya (GOK) & Parastatals
Another important problem faced to some extent by almost
every local authority examined in this study is the
delinquency of government agencies and parastatals in
submitting the taxes, charges, and payments they owe to local
authorities. Officials in 16 local authorities cited this as
one of their most serious revenue problems. In some cases,
local authorities claim to be owed millions of Kenyan
shillings by these delinquent groups. The problem seems to
persist for several reasons. First, the claims of local
authorities are sometimes disputed by the alleged defaulter
and the disputes have not been properly resolved, even after
many years. The most frequent case of this is Kenya
Railways, but it is a problem with others as well. Second,
GOK ministries rarely budget enough money for their district
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offices to be able to pay for such local authority services
as sewerage and water and for payments in lieu of taxes.
Thus, revenues from district offices are sometimes very late
or never arrive. Finally, local authority officers lack any
real authority to enforce the collection of such revenue.
The local authorities cannot easily turn off the water
supplies of such services as schools, prisons, and hospitals,
and they cannot force central government ministries or other
local authorities to pay for such services. In some
instances in which a local authority has tried to take a
debtor local authority or parastatal to court, the MLG has
intervened on the grounds that it is not good to involve a
sister local authority or important parastatal in litigation.
In essence, this revenue has become uncollectible from a
practical point of view.
Local Government Internal Structure: Relationship Between
Elected Councillors and Appointed Officers
There are always some natural tensions between elected
and appointed officials in any system of government, and the
local authority system in Kenya is no exception. These
tensions need to be monitored so that neither group is able
to use its position of responsibility and authority
improperly. As noted earlier in the discussion of revenue
collection, local politics sometimes seriously interfere with
the fiscal operations of local government.
In some local authorities, there is local political
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pressure for spending not in the public's best interest, and
there may also be cases of improper use of council funds by
councillors and/or officers. The first problem often takes
the form of projects that are undertaken to benefit a small
group of people or to help assure that re-election votes will
be forthcoming. Such projects may not be inherently bad, but
the money might have been spent better.
The problem of improper use of council funds is a
difficult one to deal with. It is clear, however, that lack
of proper internal auditing in many councils is a tremendous
contributing factor to this problem. The generally poor
expenditure control in most local authorities and the lack of
independence of internal auditors, both of which were
discussed earlier, are major factors that inhibit more
accurate and honest monitoring of local authority
expenditure.
A problem often cited by local authority officers
regarding their relationship with elected councillors is the
lack of training of some councillors, especially in more
rural areas. Although these councillors have been duly
elected and may truly represent their constituency, some may
be uneducated or even illiterate, and they may not fully
understand the way the local government system works.
Although such councillors are often very open to the advice
of their appointed officers, some can create problems because
their idea of how things are done may be unrealistic. A
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councillor who knows absolutely nothing about finance, for
example, may be elected Chairman of the Finance Committee of
his council, and he may try to tell the treasurer how to run
the finances of the council. Although this problem is not
very widespread, it does cause serious problems in the
affected councils.
In some local authorities, local officers seem to create
some of their own problems with the council by forming
alliances with groups of councillors with whom they tend to
agree. This type of behavior may cause resentment on the
part of other councillors, who then may try to make life more
difficult for the local official. The end result may be that
some taxes do not get collected and some services do not get
provided. Local officials and elected councillors have a job
to do, which requires that they maintain a professional
relationship. Forming alliances may undermine the overall
goodwill and stability of this relationship and should be
avoided as much as possible.
Summary of Public Finance and Institutional Issues
Chapters 5 and 6 have discussed the major public finance
and institutional issues relevant to an evaluation of the
fiscal role of local government in Kenya. As discussed in
Chapter 5, the pattern of services provided by the central
government and local authorities in Kenya is basically
rational on economic grounds. There are a few services for
293
which responsibility is not clearly or rationally assigned or
self-assigned, but the basic division of responsibilities is
normally reasonable. Local governments in Kenya also have
access to a wide variety of revenue sources, at least
legally. In reality, however, there are problems with both
service provision and revenue generation.
The most significant problem facing a majority of local
authorities is a lack of access to sufficiently productive,
reliable, and collectible financial resources. Many sources
of local authority revenue are relatively static, subject to
extreme fluctuations in response to changes in the local
economy, or subject to arbitrary control by the central
government. In many areas, local taxes are inequitable and
inefficient, although a variety of offsetting factors
probably prevent serious spatial efficiency effects from
occurring.
The correspondence between expenditures and revenue
sources is, in general, fairly reasonable for municipal
councils, but often inadequate for councils in rural areas.
Across all types of councils, there are unsatisfactory
guidelines and procedures for setting tax rates and user
fees. The lack of a rational basis for determining rates and
charges often means that they are set at a level inadequate
to cover the costs of service provision. There is also a
lack of central government grant programs for local
authorities even though they are clearly needed.
294
Major intergovernmental and institutional factors have
the most dramatic impact on the ability of local authorities
to perform their fiscal functions. Most importantly,
restrictive, cumbersome, and inefficient policies and
procedures in the Ministry of Local Government can cause or
further complicate some local authority problems. The
inconsistent and arbitrary assignment of revenue authority to
local authorities is particularly a problem. It leads to
enormous fiscal disparities and differences in spending
levels across local authorities. Less serious, but
significant, are the poorly defined and inconsistently
implemented relationships that exist between local
authorities and certain central government institutions,
including the District Development Committees and some
government ministries.
Local institutional deficiencies are significant in most
Kenyan local authorities. Poor financial management, lack of
employee incentives, and inadequate training, some of which
could be improved by central government intervention,
exacerbate many local authority revenue and expenditure
difficulties. Probably the most serious local institutional
constraint is the revenue collection problems that exist in a
majority of local authorities. Some of these collection
problems are beyond the control of local authority officers.
Dishonesty, lack of collection and enforcement staff, lack of
compliance by government agencies and parastatals, lack of
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legal enforcement authority, and political pressure are all
significant problems in many areas.
The result of these problems and constraints is that a
majority of local authorities in Kenya are struggling to make
ends meet, and some have been for many years. Many
consistently run deficits, and a significant number are
heavily in debt, which they are unable to repay. Access to
capital is inadequate, investment in infrastructure is
generally low and maintenance is poor, and many services are
of low quality and are provided at insufficient levels.
The various types of local authorities suffer in
different ways. Older, more established municipal councils
are plagued by an inability to provide major services
adequately and to maintain or replace deteriorating
infrastructure. Newer municipal and town councils are faced
with finding a way to provide basic infrastructure without
the massive infusion of central government aid that helped to
build the infrastructure in the older urban areas. County
councils are in a particularly precarious position: many of
them, especially in the more rural areas, are able to provide
few tangible services, have few sources of revenue, and
maintain relatively large employee rolls.
The bottom line is that many local authorities in Kenya
are in very poor shape. If they continue to exist in their
current state, some will be able to do little more than
inadequately provide a few services and continue accumulating
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debt. Thus, the Government of Kenya is faced with the
difficult problem of deciding what it wants to do about local
authorities.
If local authorities in Kenya are going to be able to
exist over the long term in any fiscally meaningful way, it
eventually will be impossible to avoid implementing major
reforms in the local government system, particularly with
respect to institutional relationships and procedures. Some
required reforms can most likely be instituted fairly easily,
while others are more politically controversial and difficult
to implement. Although the problem of limited human and
financial resources greatly affects the fiscal role and
performance of local government, political constraints have
clearly been the major obstacle to more effective local
government in Kenya. Meaningful reform cannot take place
unless there exists the political will required to strengthen
local authorities and accord them a more substantive role in
the country's development process. The next chapter will
look at a variety of possible reforms of the local authority
system in Kenya.
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CHAPTER 7
STRENGTHENING THE FISCAL ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN KENYA: OPTIONS FOR REFORM
The previous chapters were critical of many aspects of
the fiscal role and operation of local government in Kenya.
The failures of local government negatively affect the
efficiency of resource use and the quality of life.
Inefficient and ineffective local authorities have an impact
not only on the provision of local services, but also on the
progress achieved in implementing national development
strategies. As discussed in Chapter 1, local government is
only one component of an integrated and coordinated system of
national and local institutions that should be working
together in pursuit of common goals. To the extent that
local authorities are unable to meet their share of the
responsibilities, the attainment of national development
goals is undermined.
The task of this chapter is to discuss potential
reforms of the various dimensions of the local government
system on which the evaluation in Chapters 5 and 6 was based.
These include service provision, revenue generation, and
institutional issues. These distinctions are somewhat
artificial because all of these areas and issues are highly
interrelated. Some reforms, however, are more related to one
particular area than the others. The interrelationships
298
across areas will be explicitly recognized and discussed, and
the relative importance of various reforms will be noted.
Some of these reforms could begin almost immediately if the
Government of Kenya is willing to take action. Other reforms
will take a longer time to institute, because more careful
thought and research are required or because there are
particularly difficult implementation problems resulting from
major political, technical, financial, or legal constraints.
With some of these reforms, there are very clear steps that
will need to be taken in order to correct or alleviate a
particular problem. In other cases, there are a variety of
options that could be considered to improve the situation.
National Political Considerations
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, local authorities in
Kenya are responsible for only a small percentage of public
spending. Nevertheless, they do provide many basic public
services to the people of Kenya; therefore, they have an
important role to play. They also have the potential to make
a much greater impact on the quality of people's lives than
they currently do. Unfortunately, a variety of political,
economic, and institutional constraints prevent many local
authorities from meeting their potential. Most of these
constraints are within the power of the central government to
deal with, at least to some extent. A carefully planned
program of public policies and interventions could
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tremendously strengthen local authorities and enable them to
fulfill their responsibilities more effectively than at
present. Some of these policies could have an almost
immediate effect, while others would be slowly felt over a
period of years.
It is far from clear that the Government of Kenya has
any genuine interest in strengthening local authorities. It
was well documented in Chapter 4 that the central government
seems to have done everything in its power to take
responsibilities away from the local authorities over the
years since independence. It is not at all an exaggeration
to state that the central government is largely to blame for
the poor state of Kenyan local government today. In recent
years, particularly in the wake of the August 1982 coup
attempt, the government has continued to implement policies
designed to consolidate power at the center in the hands of
the ruling party, and it has greatly neglected local
authorities.
Despite this historical tendency towards strong
centralization, there is reason for some optimism that local
government in Kenya will be strengthened. Many of the issues
discussed in Chapter 1 clearly apply to Kenya. The country's
population and service demands are rapidly growing at the
same time that ministerial budgets are being cut, pointing to
the possibility of greater reliance on local authorities. In
addition, it is being increasingly recognized by central
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government officials that local authorities have an important
role to play in implementing national development policies,
as was discussed in Chapter 1. In the case of Kenya, the
government must face the fact that its rural-urban balance
strategy, as discussed in Chapter 3 and Appendix IV,
crucially depends on the ability of local authorities to
function effectively. In the years since independence, the
government has seen many decentralized development projects
collapse because there was not adequate administrative,
implementation, and recurrent financial capacity available at
the local level. National politicians publicly praise
Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 and the rural-urban balance
strategy as a salvation to Kenya's worsening employment and
population problems, but no concrete steps have yet been
taken to strengthen local government. What many national
leaders may not realize is that they are destined to
experience a major development policy failure if they do not
do something about the problems of local government.
The reality of the situation is that, even if local
authorities are substantially strengthened, they will not
present any threat to the powerful control over the country
exerted by the central government. Local authorities are
creations of the central government and can be dissolved at
any time by the Minister for Local Government. The only
negative effect that central government officials are likely
to experience from strengthening local authorities is that
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some individual Members of Parliament may end up facing
strong election challenges from local authority councillors
whose councils have been successful in improving service
provision to the people in their areas. Some may argue that
strengthening local government means strengthening tribalism,
but this is little more than an overused excuse for inaction.
The major impact of effective local authorities will be the
provision of better local services to Kenyan citizens.
During the next few years, the will of the Kenyan
Government to revitalize local authorities will be seriously
tested. The central government's intention to strengthen
local government has been highlighted in policy documents,
speeches, and the press. A lot of promises have been made,
and both the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of
Planning and National Development are busy preparing
proposals for strengthening local authorities, particularly
in the areas of revenue generation and increasing the size
and quality of staff. Some of the reforms the Government of
Kenya may wish to consider as it reviews the future of local
authorities are outlined in the following sections.
Service Provision Reforms
As discussed in Chapter 5, the pattern of service
provision that has emerged among levels of government in
Kenya is fairly good. It is true there are few specific
service requirements of most types of local authority, and it
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would make sense for the central government to issue explicit
guidelines about what types of services should generally be
undertaken by different types of council. Most local
authorities, however, have independently attempted to provide
a reasonable package of services. This is particularly true
of municipal and town councils, which take responsiblity for
many of the same types of urban services traditionally
provided in the developed countries. Many of the rural local
authorities, however, are weak, and it is possible to make a
strong case for expanding the role of county councils.
As noted in Chapter 4, since being relieved of several
major responsibilities in 1969, many of the county councils
have been functionally marginalized. Some Kenyans, who have
begrudgingly supported the existence of local authorities as
token agents of grassroots participation, certainly see this
as a desirable thing. They would argue that county
councils, particularly the fairly inactive ones, should be
abolished and their few responsibilities turned over to the
central government ministries. This would not be desirable,
however, because of varying preferences due to different
economic bases, the limited resources of the central
government, and the geographical inaccessibility of some
areas. Given all of the high-visibility rhetoric about
decentralization in Kenya in recent years, the abolition of
county councils is very unlikely, even if they remain only as
token institutions.
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A far more worthwhile effort would be to define a
unique and productive role for county councils to augment
their current responsibilities. It is clear, for example,
that enhancing the role of local authorities, particularly
county councils, as marketing and distribution facilitators
would give them a useful role to play as well as provide an
important service presently lacking in Kenya. Although most
county councils currently facilitate marketing through the
provision of markets and stock auction yards, many of these
facilities are located only in one or a few major trading
centers that may be inaccessible to many district residents.
Also, there are no good sources of current marketing/price
information on a decentralized basis available in Kenya.
Collecting and distributing weekly information on the
availability and cost of goods in the districts is a good way
of helping people to decide where to buy and sell their
products. This type of service could have an important
impact on private sector development in the area.
Development would be enhanced further if county councils
could work to improve impassable roads, which presently
hinder the distribution of both agricultural inputs and
agricultural products grown in their districts. Preliminary
results of a study of rural-urban linkages in Kenya, which is
still in progress, suggest that poor access roads in the
rural areas are the most significant constraint to the timely
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distribution of agricultural inputs and production.1
Improvement of trade in particular areas would give a major
boost to county council self-sufficiency and ability to
provide services to the people, because most county council
revenues are based on private-sector trading activity.
Some strong proponents of local authorities would go so
far as to suggest that county councils should shoulder the
coordination responsibilities currently undertaken by the
District Development Committees, which were explained in the
previous chapter. In most cases, counties and districts are
geographically identical, and it is argued by proponents of
decentralization that local authorities are the true
representatives of the local people. Whatever the merits of
this point of view, it is very unlikely that the functions of
the DDCs will be transferred to local authorities. This
would represent a strengthening of local government at the
expense of the Office of the President that would be
unacceptable to many national politicians and other leaders.
In any case, it does make more sense for the central
government rather than local authorities to take the lead in
coordinating development activities undertaken by different
levels of government. It is very likely that the DDCs and
1 This study, which will continue into mid-1988, is a
cooperative effort of the Government of Kenya, the United
States Agency for International Development, the Harvard
Institute for International Development, and SARSA/Clark
University. It is being conducted in the town of Kutus,
which is located in Kirinyaga District of Central Province.
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the District Focus for Rural Development are here to stay in
their present form, at least for the foreseeable future.
As far as specific services are concerned, it was
argued earlier that most services that could be considered
local in nature are, in fact, provided locally, while those
that exhibit economies of scale or externalities are provided
centrally. One exception to this pattern is education. It
would be reasonable for the central government to allow local
authorities greater responsibility for the provision of
education. Cultures and needs differ from area to area, and
this could be reflected in the curriculum through local input
while still maintaining minimum standards for basic common
disciplines; however, as noted in Chapter 5, this is not
likely to happen. The educational system is a valuable
political tool of the central government, and its devolution
to local authorities is not politically feasible.
The other two major services that display problems in
their pattern of provision are water and veterinary services.
Both can be provided locally, but may require central
government intervention for equity reasons and because of
potential externalities. The problem is not that both of
these services are sometimes provided by the central
government and sometimes by local authorities. Rather, the
issue is that there are no explicit and rational guidelines
by which to make the assignment decision. This has resulted
in a situation in which some local authorities who could
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adequately provide these services are being subsidized by the
central government. In other cases, local authorities who
cannot provide an efficient level of services are receiving
no central government assistance. In the case of water,
there is an additional point of concern because of the
potential for it to provide a good source of surplus revenue
to the councils. Guidelines for assigning both water and
veterinary services to levels of government need to be
developed.
Another issue related to service provision is the
widespread inequity in the spatial pattern of service
provision within many local authorities. People in some
areas of local authorities have good service provision, while
people in other areas have few or no services. In some
cases, this is reasonable because certain services are only
required in certain types of areas. It may be justifiable,
for example, to provide street lighting in urban centers, but
such services are not required in other areas. Selective
provision of some other services may not be justified, and
the local authorities should make efforts to provide them
more uniformly. That will be unlikely in many local
authorities, however, until their financial and managerial
capacity is improved.
In summary, inefficient assignment of service functions
between the central and local governments is not a major
problem. The poor quality of service provision in many
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councils and the tremendous variation in per capita
expenditures across councils largely result from inadequate
revenue generation, intergovernmental and institutional
problems, and administrative and managerial constraints.
Revenue Generation Reforms
As noted in Chapter 5, the revenue-expenditure linkage
is fairly reasonable for municipal councils. Most of the
revenue generation problems of municipal councils come from
poor collection and administrative problems rather than from
lack of access to income commensurate with service
responsibilities. This is not true of many county councils,
which clearly do not have access to enough income to provide
even their few services, much less assume the expanded role
outlined earlier. This can only be solved by standardizing
revenue sources available to them and/or allowing some
alternative sources of revenue.
Revenue generation is the most crippling problem of
Kenyan local authorities, even in those areas that may seem
to have a good correspondence between revenues and
expenditures. Many of the sources of revenue available to
local authorities are inelastic or unstable, and some local
authorities are very reliant upon one or two main sources.
There are many types of income legally open to local
authorities in Kenya, but differences in economic base,
problems in revenue collection, and administrative decisions
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by the Ministry of Local Government can effectively close off
important options for many local authorities.
There are four major revenue generation policies in
Kenya that will need to be implemented by the central
government in order to insure that local authorities can
effectively play a significant fiscal role. First, authority
to use existing sources of income should be extended to all
applicable local authorities, unless there are special
circumstances that suggest otherwise. Second, standard and
rational guidelines for setting tax rates, fees, and user
charges must be developed and used by all local authorities.
Third, in many areas, it will be necessary to provide access
to additional sources of revenue. Finally, steps must be
taken to improve revenue collection. The first three policy
areas will be examined in this section, and the fourth will
be discussed in the section on local institutional reforms.
Extension of Authority to Use Existing Sources of Income
The first step that should be taken towards improving
the revenue position of local authorities in Kenya is
standardization of the set of revenue sources allowed to
local authorities to as great an extent possible. The
inconsistency of current policy causes tremendous, but
artificial, disparities in fiscal capacity across local
authorities. There are four main types of revenue currently
allowed to Kenyan local authorities. These are land rates,
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user fees and charges, business and trade license fees, and
production taxes (cesses). All local authorities are allowed
to collect business and trade licenses and user charges, but
there is no standardization of access to land rates and
cesses. If some local authorities are going to be permitted
to use a revenue source not allowed to others, there must be
some reasonable justification. For some revenue sources,
standardization will require research and take time, but for
others the process can be undertaken quickly.
Perhaps the most obvious source of revenue not being
collected by many local authorities is cess. Officials from
19 of the 26 councils examined in this study cited expansion
and standardization of cess as an important step for the
Government of Kenya to take in order to improve the revenue
position of local authorities. Some local authorities, as
noted earlier, have been collecting cess since colonial days,
but many have not been allowed to do so. It would seem fair
that all local authorities in areas where land rates are not
feasible should be allowed to charge a small standardized
cess of perhaps one to three percent on whatever is produced
within their jurisdiction, whether agricultural or
industrial. Local authorities provide basic services to
farmers and manufacturers alike, and in many cases get little
or no revenue from these producers. The Government's recent
announcement of its intention to allow all county councils to
charge a fixed percentage cess on a standardized group of
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agricultural products is a major step in the right direction,
but it is not going to do much for poorer urban areas or
arid/semi-arid rural areas where livestock trading is the
main economic activity.
An alternative to allowing more widespread use of cess
would be to abolish all cesses and substantially upgrade the
use of land rates. In rural areas, a few county councils do
have rates on agricultural land, but most do not rely on this
source of revenue to any significant extent. It essentially
taxes the same base as cess; therefore, the two should not be
used together. The advantage of cess is that it is based
upon the value of production, thus a true tax on economic
activity. It is possible, however, that such a tax would
have some disincentives for production. Land rates may have
the problem of being regressive, but they are more stable
because they are based on the value of the land and are less
likely to decline in low production years.2 In addition,
collecting a fixed rate on land provides an incentive to
produce as much as possible, because any surplus over the
value of the rates will be kept by the farmers as profit. A
problem arises in that land rates are very difficult to
collect without proper enforcement authority and adequate
collection personnel. In contrast, most cesses, at least
those levied on cash crops, are collected by the marketing
2 It should be noted that a problem may still exist to
the extent that some farmers/landowners do not have cash
income sufficient to pay the tax.
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board of the crop in question rather than by the local
authorities. The issue of cesses versus land rates is an
important issue and merits further consideration by the
Government of Kenya. Greater standardization of either would
deal with many of the efficiency and equity effects of local
authority finance discussed in the previous chapter and would
provide an enormous boost in the revenue capacity of many
councils. Because of the substantial administrative costs
and problems associated with land rates, however, cesses are
clearly a more reasonable short-term solution to the revenue
problems of rural local authorities, despite their potential
lack of stability and efficiency loss.
The use of land rates in urban areas is greatly in need
of improvement. In addition to the collection problems,
lack of enforcement authority, and delays in revaluing land,
all of which were discussed in the previous two chapters,
there are other problems as well. In some urban areas, only
a small percentage of the land is rated, even in the town
centers. This means that shopkeepers and other businessmen in
the surveyed area pay taxes on their land, while a
businessman with a similar operation one block away in an
unsurveyed area pays no land rate at all. This practice is
obviously highly inequitable and inefficient--both businesses
may get the same services, but only one ends up paying for
them. Every effort must be made to survey fully all of the
central town areas of local authorities.
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As noted in Chapter 5, there are substantial lags in
the revaluation of land in local authorities. This can
greatly reduce the elasticity of land tax revenue. Although
local authorities are technically allowed to raise the rate
levied on the base during years when no revaluation occurs,
many local authorities are unable to take advantage of this
option because of strong local political pressures against
it. Even if the local authorities do raise their rates,
collection is difficult because of the lack of enforcement
authority.
Another issue with land rates in urban areas is that
they are levied only on the unimproved site value of parcels
of land. There is a great deal of debate on the issue of
taxing the developed value of land. On the one hand, a tax
on improvements is likely to increase revenue yields, and it
may improve efficiency to the extent that more developed land
makes more intensive use of services financed from land
rates. There is also the possibility that a tax on
improvements will be more vertically equitable. The use of
an improvements base, however, may tend to discourage
intensity of land use and to encourage the speculative
withholding of land from the market. Research in Kenya has
suggested that a limited movement to tax the developed value
of land would be productive, at least in a few of the largest
municipal councils. However, there would be major
administrative problems to overcome, which might be
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insurmountable in the short-term [Bahl and Mant, (1976)].
The lack of standardization of land rates and cesses,
both within and across local authorities in Kenya, has
potential equity and efficiency effects. As noted in
Chapter 5, the magnitude of the efficiency effects is not
likely to be large, but the equity effects can be enormous.
These could be alleviated, to a great extent, by having a
more generally applied tax on land or economic activity.
Standard Guidelines for Setting Tax Rates, Fees, and Charges
A problem common to all local authorities regardless of
the adequacy of their revenue base is the lack of standards
and guidelines for setting tax rates. This is true even for
user charges and license fees, which all local authorities
are allowed to levy. The need for some degree of rationality
and standardization is evident. Without them, the local
authorities may not only fail to recover costs and raise
sufficient revenues to provide their services and repay their
debt, but may also generate efficiency and equity effects.
A comprehensive review of all fees, charges, and taxes
used by Kenyan local authorities should be undertaken by the
Government of Kenya. On the basis of that review, the
Ministry of Local Government should issue guidelines for
local authorities to use in setting revenue rates and for the
Ministry itself to use in considering revenue rate requests.
License fees should be set within certain bounds that would
314
vary by profession, type of local authority, and wealth of
local authority. Many types of fees and charges in local
authorities should be differentiated on the basis of size,
location, or other business characteristics. Some local
authorities already make liberal use of such distinctions,
but others do not use them at all. As a result, merchants in
city centers who are relatively wealthy and get substantial
services may pay the same license fees as merchants in poorer
rural areas, or large-scale traders may pay the same fees as
small-scale traders.
Given the existence of unexplained fee differentials
across certain professions and the possible underutilization
or irrelevance of many types of fees, it would be desirable
to simplify the fee and charge structure. Charges could be
more standardized across comparable professions within local
authorities, and fees that are unlikely to generate revenue
could be removed from the schedule. These actions would
reduce inequities in fee levels across professions as well as
streamline the schedule of fees and charges. Another
possibility might be to charge license fees on the basis of
volume of business (in Kenyan Shillings) instead of type of
profession or trade. Finally, some commercial and
professional service providers are currently not required to
pay any license fees, including wealthy professionals such as
doctors and lawyers. This exclusion should be revoked
because there is no good economic basis for it.
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User charges should be set at least high enough to
cover costs of service provision, interest charges, and
replacement investment, unless there is adequate
justification for the subsidization of particular services.
The Government of Kenya should consider allowing local
authorities to institute fees and charges for certain free
services, such as health care, on an ability-to-pay basis, or
the quality of health care provided by local authorities is
likely to decline as the demand for their services continues
to increase. In Nairobi, for example, the Director of
Kenyatta National Hospital, the largest public health
facility in the country, recently announced that adult
patients should go to the clinics run by the Nairobi City
Commission rather than to the hospital. The City Commission
is not in a position to bear this financial responsibility
without additional revenue. Longer-term fee and charge
policies will require continued research and monitoring.
In order to set user charges properly, the Government
should develop measures of cost effectiveness and standards
for the provision of local authority services. These would
also permit the identification of excessive spending on labor
and materials for specific services, enabling action to be
taken to adjust costs to a reasonable level. It is
important to recognize that this may cause other problems.
For example, many local authorities are likely to discover
that they employ more people than they need for service
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provision. Although it may be politically difficult to
dismiss excess staff, it may at least be possible to use them
more productively in another position.
One last important point to make about setting tax
rates, fees, and charges is that they must be revised on a
regular basis unless they are ad valorem taxes. As noted in
the previous chapter, the failure to revalue land regularly
and to increase fixed fee charges is one of the chief causes
of the inelasticity of the local authority tax base in Kenya.
What has happened frequently in the past is that no increases
were made for years. When the councils reach a point of
desperation and try to raise the rates or fees by a large
percentage all at once, there is tremendous political
opposition, which prevents the increases from passing the
councils, and leaves the local authorities in a desperate
financial condition. Some fixed-fee local taxes could be
made ad valorem, while others could be indexed to the
increase in consumer prices. These measures would increase
the elasticity of the local tax base substantially.
Raising Revenue From Nonresident Service Beneficiaries
The Government of Kenya should investigate the
possibility of instituting some mechanism for local
authorities to recover revenue for services provided to the
residents of other jurisdictions. The current situation is
not efficient in some places because nonresidents use the
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services of local authorities without paying for them.
Possible solutions could include a fee system, a tax that
would fall on nonresidents who use services, or a
compensatory grant from the central government. The simplest
solution for general cost recovery would be to allow a small
local sales tax. This would be easy to collect and would
cover retail activity in the formal sector that escapes
market and trading fees. In cases where it is possible, such
as health care, fees should be charged for the use of
specific services.
Alternative Sources of Revenue
Even if existing revenue sources were more generally
allowed to local authorities and they were able to improve
their current revenue collection problems greatly, some local
authorities would not have enough revenue to provide adequate
public services and to deal with their outstanding debt.
There are a number of potential revenue sources that are not
being exploited by local authorities, which could greatly
improve their financial position. If the local authorities
are ever going to be strengthened into entities capable of
doing a substantially better job of providing public
services, many will need to have access to additional sources
of revenue. In order to diversify the local revenue base,
the Ministry should consider the introduction of additional
revenue sources to local authorities where appropriate. This
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will require substantial research, including an examination
of the potential revenue yield of alternative taxes as well
as their potential efficiency and equity effects. This
section will suggest some options for alternative sources of
revenue that should be considered.
There is strong support among local authority officials
for revival of the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) or the
institution of a new local payroll tax. This would greatly
enhance the revenue capacity of all types of councils, but
would largely benefit the urban areas where the formal sector
is important. It is an easy tax to administer because
collection is done by employers, and in its previous form, it
was a criminal offense not to pay it, so there was good
compliance.
At the request of the Ministry of Local Government, the
Cabinet has approved the institution of a new tax called the
local service levy, which is similar to the old GPT. This is
a small, roughly proportional local tax on those who have an
identifiable source of income over a minimum level. 3
Cabinet Paper CAB (87) 33 of April 1987 suggested that
initial rates should range from 10 shillings per month for
those with a gross monthly income of 700 shillings to 100
shillings per month for those earning over 6000 shillings.
3 The original intention of the Ministry of Local
Government was to have a modestly progressive tax on income,
but this idea was dropped because it was considered to be
politically unacceptable.
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The Cabinet paper leaves open the possibility that local
authorities could vary from this modest scale with the
approval of the Minister for Local Government, and the scale
could be raised over time. This tax will significantly
enhance the revenue base of councils in urban areas. The tax
will particularly benefit Nairobi, which is expected to raise
more than 5 million pounds from it annually. The tax is so
small that it should not cause any significant distortions in
behavior. Although it has been approved, the tax is not yet
in use.
In response to the MLG Cabinet paper on the local
service levy, the Cabinet recommended that some form of the
local service tax be applied to businesses. The MLG is
tentatively suggesting that a development levy of 0.1 percent
of authorized share capital or total assets of businesses be
instituted by local authorities. This matter requires
further study because businesses are already relatively
heavily taxed by local authority land rates, at least in the
larger cities, so that the proposed development levy is a
form of double taxation. In addition, authorized share
capital may not be an appropriate measure of either business
ability-to-pay taxes or use of local services. Finally, such
a tax may be deductible from the profit and loss account of
businesses, thereby reducing the base on which Government's
corporation tax is levied. If an additional local tax on
business is to be instituted, it may be preferable to allow a
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small local add-on to Government's corporations or sales tax.
One important source of revenue often underutilized in
certain areas is tourist activity. Tourism is the lifeblood
of some local authorities in the way that agriculture or
industry is in others, yet local authorities have no access
to tourist-related taxes in many areas. It is true that
county councils with game reserves in their jurisdiction can
get significant revenues from entrance fees, but this is only
true where the game reserves belong to the councils.
National park revenue belongs to the central government, and
local authorities get little or no revenue benefit despite
the fact that they bear some of the service burden generated
by tourism. The bed occupancy tax is fully under the control
of the central government, so that local authorities get
little more than meager license fees once a year from tourist
hotels. Although tourism generates a great deal of economic
activity in some areas, it generates negative externalities
as well. Tourist resort areas in the Coast Province, for
example, may place heavy service demands on local authorities
but generate little revenue. Some form of local authority
tourist tax would help to redress this highly inequitable and
inefficient situation. A tourist tax also has the advantage
of allowing local authorities to export a portion of their
tax burden to nonresidents, who in this case are often
relatively wealthy foreigners. The most logical option would
be a local add-on to the central government bed occupancy
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tax.
Allowing more local authorities to be water providers,
to the extent it is feasible to do so, would enhance their
revenue capacity, as would more widespread use of other
revenue-generating activities, such as housing estates,
slaughterhouses, busparks, and hotels. In some districts, it
would be possible to develop new game reserves as a source of
revenue for county councils.
There are also a number of other smaller or special
sources of revenue that have not been tapped by some local
authorities. Charges for parking fees and other
automobile-related taxes in more urban areas are one example.
Others might include grazing fees for livestock and special
assessments for specific capital projects in areas where
there is ability to pay for such projects. An example of the
latter would be apportioning some of the costs of road
development to adjacent plot owners, which has been done
successfully in some areas of Nairobi.
An alternative approach to allowing local authorities
some of the above sources of revenue would be to allow them
the option of adding some small local percentage to central
government taxes. As long as the existing central government
tax rates are relatively low, a small local add-on by local
authorities will not be very distortive, and would be very
productive for local authorities; furthermore, centralized
collection is, in many cases, more administratively efficient
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than local collection. One possibility might be to allow
local authorities to add a small percentage to the national
sales tax. Another possibility would be to allow local
authorities a small percentage of the motor vehicle license
fees and/or the motor fuel tax. Some portion of this revenue
could be used for road construction and maintenance, a costly
service which most local authorities do not have the
resources to provide adequately.
Local authorities obviously do not need access to all
of the sources of income discussed in this section, but some
new sources are certainly appropriate for many of the
councils. The Government of Kenya needs to review its
priorities and decide on some options that provide reliable
sources of revenue for local authorities and are efficient,
equitable, and politically feasible to implement.
Intergovernmental Institutional Reforms
A number of intergovernmental institutional problems
were discussed in the previous chapter. These take a variety
of forms. In some cases there is a failure of particular
agencies or authorities to live up to their responsibilities,
resulting in operational difficulties for local government.
There are also problems with poorly defined intergovernmental
relationships and significant unexploited opportunities for
intergovernmental cooperation. These intergovernmental
institutional problems contribute to the poor fiscal
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performance of local authorities in Kenya.
In order to provide local services adequately and
efficiently, institutional reforms will have to be
implemented at all levels. The entire integrated
intergovernmental system has to operate in a coordinated
manner. The central government ministries that monitor
and/or assist specific aspects of local government operations
must function efficiently, and the provincial/district
administration under the Office of the President must ensure
that the decentralized activities of the ministries and the
local authorities are coordinated and in support of national
development goals. In addition, the local authorities should
be able to work formally with each other on the provision of
specific services in order to improve efficiency. Finally,
fiscal operations in the local authorities, where the
services are actually delivered, must conform to some minimum
standards. Intergovernmental institutional reforms are
discussed in this section, while local institutional reforms
are examined in the next section.
Local Authority Interjurisdictional Cooperation
The lack of intergovernmental cooperation among local
authorities was described in the previous chapter. The
Government of Kenya should encourage local authorities to
take advantage of the provisions in the Local Government Act
that allow them jointly to provide mutually beneficial
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services. Most local authority officials are aware of these
provisions, but seem reluctant to take advantage of them even
when there are situations in which their councils could
clearly benefit from them. It is up to the Ministry of Local
Government to take the lead in educating local authority
officers about the possibilities and procedures for
exploiting the opportunities available to them in the
interests of greater efficiency. It would be possible to
devise some incentives to encourage interjurisdictional
cooperation in cases where it is appropriate.
It would also be efficient in some cases to use the
regional development authorities to facilitate the provision
of certain services over multiple local authority
jurisdictions. Water, for example, is a service that could
be more efficiently provided in certain areas by a regional
authority because of scale considerations and externalities.
Local authorities might be directly involved at some level,
or their participation might be confined to payments to the
regional authority for services rendered. Some additional
regional development authorities may need to be created to
serve areas where they do not currently exist.
Ministry of Local Government
The previous chapter explained how the Ministry of
Local Government (MLG) generates a number of serious
constraints on the functioning of local authorities in Kenya.
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The need for the MLG to standardize guidelines for assigning
revenue sources and setting tax rates and charges has already
been discussed in this chapter. In addition, there are many
other steps that could be taken to improve the functioning of
local authorities as well as the efficiency of MLG
operations.
The Government of Kenya should improve staffing and
training in the MLG to facilitate more rapid and standardized
processing of local government requests and submissions
regarding budget estimates, schedules of fees and charges,
by-laws, employment decisions, etc. There should be clear
designation of MLG officials with responsibility for
particular geographic and substantive areas. Local authority
officers should know exactly whom they should see about
specific problems and requests.
Some MLG junior officers clearly know very little about
how local authorities work and what their problems are. This
situation could be improved by establishing a program to
acquaint newer and less-experienced members of the MLG staff
better with how the local authorities operate on a day-to-day
basis. They could be sent to work in local authorities for a
specified time period to work first-hand with local authority
officers. Alternatively, local authority officers, who are
now civil servants under the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission, could be brought to Nairobi to work in
the MLG for a period of time.
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To the extent permitted by the Local Government Act,
there should be greater delegation of authority both within
the MLG and between the MLG and the PLGO/local authorities.
This will allow for greater administrative efficiency in both
the MLG and the local authorities. It may be necessary to
consider options for reforming the Local Government Act over
the long term because some of the provisions of the Act can
be conservatively interpreted to proscribe meaningful
decentralization. The Government of Kenya is supposed to be
in the process of setting up an interministerial committee to
investigate the need for reforms in the Local Government Act.
The MLG urgently needs to institute a simplified and
standardized accounting code for local authorities. The
current system tends to be complex, but varies significantly
across local authorities and even for some individual local
authorities over time, making analysis and comparisons across
councils and across time very difficult. A new system will
take time to develop fully, but its design can begin
immediately. The World Bank is ready to provide the funds
for such an exercise, which is currently in the planning
stages at the MLG.
The MLG should use the new accounting system to develop
a time-series database on local authority finances. This
type of information will facilitate the work of the Ministry
in monitoring the financial position of local authorities,
developing guidelines for setting tax rates and charges, and
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establishing revenue collection targets for the councils.
The evidence collected in this research suggests that some
local authority revenue sources are highly inelastic or
unstable and that costs of service provision vary
dramatically across councils, but these issues need to be
understood better through formal analyses of time-series
data.
Finally, a Research Section should be established in
the Ministry of Local Government to supervise the collection
and monitoring of local authority data and to provide ongoing
research support to the Finance and Planning Sections. The
Ministry may need outside technical assistance for some of
its research, while it builds up its own capacity, but this
should be coordinated with the Ministry's own work and
supervised by Ministry officers.
Other Ministries and Provincial Administration
The problems that other central government ministries
and offices can raise for local authorities were discussed in
the previous chapter. The central government can only deal
with this situation by insisting that operating ministries on
which local authorities are dependent for planning,
engineering, and other technical expertise fulfill their
responsibilities in a timely fashion. If the President
mentioned the issue just once in a speech, the offending
ministries would be frantically working on rectifying the
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situation the next day. Some of these ministries are plagued
by persistent resource shortages that prevent them from
meeting their responsibilities to local authorities, so that
it may be necessary for the central government to provide
additional support. Over the longer term, a better solution
is to build up the technical capacity of the local
authorities, but this will not eliminate the need for the
local authorities to depend on other ministries and offices
to some extent. Local authorities are required by acts of
Parliament, for example, to obtain permission from certain
ministries before they undertake particular activities, and
they must also obtain approval of their by-laws from the
Attorney General.
In recent years, there has been much closer interaction
between local authorities and the provincial administration
because of the District Focus for Rural Development strategy,
but much more effort needs to be made in this direction. No
matter how they feel about District Focus, the local
authorities must accept the fact that it is now the way
things work. Also, they should realize that there are
certain important advantages to having a close relationship
with the provincial administration, and that the goal of
coordinating all development projects in the districts is a
worthy one.
There is a lot of unrealized potential in the District
Focus strategy, and the central government should try to tap
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it. There is a need for greater clarification of the
relationship between local authorities and the District
Development Committees, and a well-articulated set of
guidelines for inter-council cooperation and coordination
should be developed. The DDCs could also help local
authorities with financing certain types of projects. This
issue, however, needs to be thought out carefully, or
problems could result. If the DDC undertakes the funding of
selected local authority projects, it must do so in a way
that does not foster an unhealthy degree of competition among
local authorities for limited project funds.
If a more effective and well-defined role for the DDCs
vis-a-vis local authorities can be developed, great benefits
for both the local authorities and the districts may be
realized. In addition to providing intradistrict
coordination of development activities, the DDC should ensure
that these activities are consistent with national
development goals and strategies. This is particularly
important as the Government of Kenya prepares to initiate the
District Development Fund and to begin implementation of the
rural-urban balance strategy outlined in Sessional Paper No.
1 of 1986 and discussed in Chapter 4.
Intergovernmental Grants
Even if local authorities improved revenue collection
and were granted additional sources of revenue, there remains
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one issue that the Government of Kenya has not attempted to
solve: some local authorities are so impoverished and have so
few types of economic activity that they will remain in poor
financial shape even with improved administration and new
sources of revenue. Although there are grants to needy
councils provided by the MLG for some of the very poorest
councils, there is no systematic way of measuring such need
and channeling grant funds to these councils. In the
interests of equity and to guarantee basic service provision,
a system needs to be developed to allocate the scarce grant
resources of the MLG to those local authorities who need it
most. In the absence of such a system, the likelihood of
using such grants for political favors is greatly increased.
In addition, the grants currently being given to needy local
authorities are in many cases only nominal sums that do not
go very far in helping these local authorities solve their
revenue problems.
The needed intergovernmental aid system could be
designed in a variety of ways. It might, for example, be a
transfer program that provides direct grants to local
authorities from central government revenues on the basis of
a formula that rewards tax effort and limited fiscal
capacity. Alternatively, there could be a tax-sharing system
whereby a certain percentage of a national tax or taxes is
remitted to local authorities according to some reasonable
distribution criteria.
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It is well recognized that the resources of the GOK are
limited, and that Sessional Paper #1 of 1986 has outlined
plans to channel funds to areas in local authorities
designated as Rural Trade and Production Centers. The idea
of intensively developing infrastructure in high potential
areas is an excellent one because of its expected impact on
overall economic development, but it does not lessen the need
to do something about the poorest councils. Additional
resources need to be identified for grants to needy local
authorities if these grants are to have any meaningful
impact.
Local Government Debt
This study has not closely examined levels of debt
outstanding or repayment records of local authorities. Good
data on this are difficult to get because of the way in which
the Local Government Loans Authority keeps its records and
the reluctance of many local authority officials to discuss
the topic in detail. LGLA accounts are currently being
updated, but the information is incomplete and confidential.
Available evidence indicates that total outstanding local
authority debts to the LGLA exceed two billion Kenyan
shillings, at least several hundred million of which are in
arrears. About 89 percent of this debt is estimated to be
held by fewer than 20 municipal councils. Many of the
indebted local authorities have made little or no attempt to
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repay.
The Government of Kenya should begin to think about
devising a reasonable plan for dealing with the local
authority debt problem. Forcing local authorities to pay
back their loans fully to the Local Government Loans
Authority is not necessarily the solution to the problem, and
it may not even be possible. Even if they improved revenue
collection and were granted new sources of revenue, local
authorities might use a high percentage of the additional
income on debt repayments for a significant period of time if
they were forced to repay too quickly. Residents of the
local authority would be paying higher taxes, but at least
for some period of time, perhaps see few benefits in the form
of improved and/or expanded services. This could create
local political problems.
It should be recognized that many of the outstanding
loans to local governments are old and were the result of the
poor planning, lack of management skills, and perhaps
dishonesty of local authority and/or Government officials who
may have retired or changed jobs long ago. There is also the
issue that local authorities are owed large sums of money by
Government and parastatals. The financial claims of both
sides are in some cases so enormous that full repayment on
either side may be extremely difficult. It seems likely,
therefore, that Government may at some point need to work out
a loan forgiveness and/or rescheduling plan that is fair to
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all parties.
Any type of loan forgiveness or rescheduling scheme
must be designed very carefully, however, so as not to reward
those local authorities that can be proven to have been
negligent and/or dishonest. In some cases, it is certainly
true that loans have not been repaid for reasons beyond the
control of local authority officials despite their good
intentions. Any scheme for loan forgiveness or rescheduling
should reward those councils that have done their best to
service their debt and, at the very least, not penalize those
that have been unable to pay. In some cases, however, it may
be possible to demonstrate that some relatively well-off
councils have failed to make payments due to negligence or
corruption, and these councils should be dealt with more
severely.
Some elements of the donor community interested in
strengthening local authorities might consider the
possibility of devising an arrangement for helping to repay
central government and/or parastatal debts to local
authorities on the condition that local authorities then
repay their debts to the central government. This could be
done, for example, by attaching a conditionality to a new
loan made by a donor to the Government of Kenya. Before the
loan is applied for its intended purpose, the central
government could use the funds to settle its debts and
perhaps those of the parastatals to the local authorities in
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full or up to some amount to be decided on in the case of a
particular local authority. The local authorities would be
required to use these funds for the purpose of settling their
outstanding debts to the Local Government Loans Authority and
other central government institutions to which it is
indebted. The LGLA would not be allowed to use any of these
funds that are owed to the central government--they would be
immediately credited to outstanding LGLA loan accounts with
the Treasury.
A plan of this nature would not completely erase the
debt problem because some local authorities may owe the
central government more than the central government owes
them, and vice versa. It would, however, reduce the
magnitude of intergovernmental claims, put many local
authorities in a better financial position, and help to
recapitalize the Local Government Loans Authority or the
institution that replaces it. The local authorities, the
central government, and the parastatals would still have
various claims on each other, but the only case in which debt
would have increased would be that the parastatals would owe
more money to the central government to the extent that some
of their debts to local authorities had been paid with money
lent to the Treasury.
In order to design and implement a plan of this nature,
the government needs to have better data on the local
authority/central government/parastatal mutual indebtedness
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problem. Efforts should be made to quantify as accurately as
possible other local authority debts as well as central
government and parastatal debts to local authorities.
Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986 calls for the
reorganization of the Local Government Loans Authority into a
Municipal Development Bank. Although existing debt problems
urgently need to be dealt with first, recapitalizing and
strengthening the institution that funds most local authority
capital projects is an important and necessary goal. The
credibility of the agency that supports local authority
investment should be re-established.
The MLG is likely to recommend that the new institution
be established under the Companies and Banking Acts. A
privately held and commercially viable institution would be
able to attract private capital, increasing the pool of
capital resources available to local authorities and taking
some of the burden of financing local authority investment
from the central government. Offering loans at closer to
commercial rates than at present would force local
authorities to take on projects with a higher rate of return
and encourage timely repayment by raising the penalty for
defaulters. Although it is unlikely that local authorities
as a group will be able to generate substantial net savings,
at least in the short term, commercial rates may stimulate
local authority savings to some extent. Even short-term
savings would earn interest for local authorities and provide
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funds to loan to other local authorities.
The new local authority lending institution should only
finance commercially viable projects. Of course, some
necessary local authority projects are not going to be self-
financing, and there should be central government provisions
for lower cost loans or grants for these types of projects.
The District Development Fund, which was set up with donor
money to fund projects in support of the rural-urban balance
strategy, is one possible source of funds for nonbankable
projects. Recent experience suggests that additional donor
funds are likely to be available for such purposes.
Local Institutional Reform
The previous chapter emphasized the degree to which
local institutional problems have a negative impact on the
performance of local authorities. This section will
recommend some policies for alleviating obstacles to the
efficient operation of local authorities caused by local
institutional deficiencies.
General Reforms
The numerous administrative and managerial problems of
local authorities that constrain their fiscal activities were
briefly outlined in Chapter 6. Whatever other steps the
Government of Kenya may take to strengthen local authorities,
it will be necessary to deal with administrative and
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managerial constraints if the local authorities are going to
be able to operate effectively. Some of the needed reforms
can be initiated by local authorities, but support and
incentives from the central government are likely to be
required in many cases.
As discussed in the previous section, accounting
procedures in Kenyan local authorities are unnecessarily
complex and diverse. They should be simplified and
standardized to facilitate better financial management, so
that reliable financial information is available. This
implies that auditing of local authorities by the central
government must also be conducted in a more timely fashion.
The Ministry of Local Government and the local
authorities should jointly devise and institute better
revenue and expenditure control management techniques,
including budgeting and planning, cash flow management, and
strengthening the role of the internal auditor. These
procedures should be implemented on a rationally designed,
step-by-step basis. There is no sense, for example, in
requiring local authorities to prepare three-year forward
budgets if they are still unable to prepare a single year's
budget properly.
The Government of Kenya should intensify its efforts to
train local authority officers and employees at all levels,
and should formally institute relevant training for
councillors as well. The training should be on-going and, in
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some cases, on-site in order to have the best possible
impact. Incentives for promotion and advancement should also
be implemented in an effort to increase staff productivity.
Reforming Revenue Collection
The difficulties of revenue collection are probably the
most crippling of all local authority administrative
problems. The Ministry and the local authorities should
institute policies designed to strengthen local authority
revenue collection and expand enforcement staff and
techniques, including the solicitation of formal cooperation
from the Kenya Police and the District Commissioner and the
introduction of better collection and monitoring procedures.
Institutionalized cooperation between the local authorities
and properly empowered enforcement authorities could go a
long way towards improving the revenue collection
capabilities of the local authorities.
The pocketing of public funds by local authority
employees could be somewhat reduced by hiring better screened
and better trained collectors, rotating and monitoring
collectors and enforcement officers, instituting better pay
and bonus systems for more productive revenue collectors, and
where possible, instituting checks on and control of the
revenue-collection process. It would be extremely helpful to
institute multiple record-keeping and cross-checking of
receipts and records in areas where this is feasible. In
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many slaughterhouses, for example, there are at least three
sets of records kept regarding the number of animals
slaughtered--those of the slaughterhouse master, those of the
operator who transports the animals to market, and those of
the health inspector. All of these people charge on a per
animal basis, and their records should be in exact agreement.
In some cases there may be a fourth set of records if there
is a local tannery. In general, it would be helpful to
implement revenue control measures that require independent
record-keeping by at least several individuals.
In order to help reduce corruption, the Ministry of
Local Government should educate clerks and treasurers about
MLG and Public Service Commission rules and regulations to
encourage them to take action against dishonesty. The
Ministry needs to assure local officers that they will be
fully backed for doing everything in their power to take
action against dishonesty at any level in their councils.
Better internal auditing, revenue collection incentives, and
more efficient monitoring of these types of situation by the
MLG could help reduce the problem of dishonesty among the
local authority officers themselves.
Local authorities clearly need stronger enforcement
powers for land rates, and a local court system for local
matters would greatly expedite local authority collection
proceedings. The councils would also benefit from a pool of
trained lawyers who had experience in land rate recovery
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cases. As many local authorities could not afford a full-
time advocate, it might be possible for the MLG to retain a
group of advocates, who could be hired out on a
fee-for-service basis to the local authorities.
Reforming Intra-Council Relationships
The Ministry of Local Government should institute a
system for greater monitoring of the relationship between
local authority officers and elected councillors in order to
deal with the problems in this area discussed in the previous
chapter. One of the major problems is the exertion of
political pressure for certain expenditures to be made or
certain taxes not to be collected. Pressures for spending on
favored activities will never be eliminated, but improved
guidelines for project feasibility studies and evaluation,
which are currently being developed and disseminated by the
Ministry of Local Government's Planning Section, can help to
some extent by formalizing procedures and standards for
project selection. Better auditing and MLG review of
projects might also help reduce inefficient spending. On the
revenue generation side, some of the reforms discussed
earlier, such as greater standardization of allowable revenue
sources, explicit guidelines governing the periodic increase
of tax rates, and better and more independent auditing,
should reduce, to some extent, local political control over
revenue collection.
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A major issue is the lack of familiarity on the part of
some councillors with important financial and administrative
issues. There are several potential ways of dealing with
this problem. One is to have minimum education or experience
requirements for councillors, or at least for those who will
chair the various major committees of the council. It must
be acknowledged, however, that educated councillors are just
as capable of causing problems for local authority officers
as illiterate ones. Minimum education requirements obviously
cannot be considered a panacea for tensions and
misunderstandings between elected and appointed officials.
Another idea would be to offer a comprehensive training
seminar for elected councillors to educate them on their
responsibilities and powers as well as the role of their
appointed officers. Some training of this nature has been
experimented with by the Ministry of Local Government, but it
raised a number of strong complaints from a few local
authority officers. These officers claimed that some
councillors came back with a misunderstanding of their role,
and they tried to order the officers to do certain
unreasonable things. In the opinion of the officers, the
seminars for councillors created more problems than they
alleviated. They argued that these seminars should actively
involve local officers as well as councillors to reduce the
probability of generating such frictions and
misunderstandings.
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In general, there seems to be a relatively productive
and cooperative relationship between councillors and officers
in many councils. It is clear, however, that there are a few
problems that could be alleviated to a marked degree by
greater discretion and patience on the part of some officers
and councillors, the institution of a few new regulations,
and the improvement of both the external and internal
auditing procedures in local authorities.
Agenda for Additional Research
This chapter has raised a number of important research
questions related to the fiscal role and operation of local
authorities that the Government of Kenya needs to answer,
related particularly to options for revenue generation, the
reform of institutions that affect local government
performance, and improving the administrative and managerial
capacity of local authorities. In addition, there are a
variety of other research topics that would provide useful
information for the Government as it considers the problem of
what to do about local authorities and some of the specific
issues raised in this chapter.
One area of great interest is the overall financial
position of local authorities, particularly how it is
changing over time and how deficits are being financed. As
noted in Chapter 4, recent evidence suggests that the
financial position of some local authorities has been
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steadily deteriorating over time, and that deficits are
frequently being financed by drawing down the balances of
various types of separate fund accounts. The Ministry of
Local Government needs to understand better the nature and
extent of this problem if it is ever going to be able to
design and implement significant measures to improve the
situation.
A detailed comparison of estimated budget figures and
actual revenue and expenditure figures across councils would
also be extremely useful. The limited evidence collected in
this study suggests that the two sets of figures often show
very little similarity to each other. This indicates, at
least in some cases, that the council budgets submitted to
the Ministry for approval bear very little resemblance to
reality. This type of misinformation can lead to poor
decisions by the Ministry and continued problems in local
authority finances.
Some measures of fiscal capacity and fiscal need should
be developed for Kenyan local authorities. only if revenue
possibilities and expenditure requirements are understood
more fully will it be possible to know which local
authorities are truly able to finance service provision in
their jurisdictions. For those local authorities who are
financially unable to provide services, the Government of
Kenya must decide whether it will provide grants to make up
the income shortfall, transfer some services to a Government
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of Kenya ministry, or devise some other solution to the
problem over the long term.
Summary of Major Reforms
The present system of local government in Kenya is
plagued by a variety of deficiencies and constraints that
undermine its effectiveness. Many of these problems are
highly interrelated, so that attempts to make reforms in one
area will be unsuccessful without reforms in related areas.
Although some reforms are clearly more urgent than others,
there are serious deficiencies in most aspects of the Kenyan
system, requiring that many reforms be implemented more or
less simultaneously in order to be effective. This section
will summarize the major reforms that are needed and give a
sense of their priority in the reform process.
The division of service responsibilities that has
evolved between the central and local governments in Kenya is
fairly reasonable on economic grounds. There are a few
improvements and clarifications that should be made in
service assignment, but for the most part, local authorities
have a clear role to play. The exception to this is the
county councils, which could be given the expanded and
productive role of facilitating marketing and distribution
within their districts. This should not be attempted,
however, until local government fiscal and managerial
capacity have been improved.
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In spite of generally reasonable service assignment, a
majority of local authorities are unable to fulfill their
service responsibilities adequately because of a wide variety
of constraints on their operation. The most significant
problems are in the area of revenue generation. Although the
revenue-expenditure correspondence is not very good in many
rural councils, the councils in urban areas should have
adequate resources to meet their requirements. In reality,
this is often not the case because revenues in most local
authorities frequently grow more slowly than service demands.
There are tremendous obstacles to revenue collection, and tax
rates, fees, and charges are rarely set in a rational and
standardized manner; furthermore, local authorities do not
have control over the sources of revenue that they are
allowed to use. The end result of these problems is a
revenue yield that is inadequate and a local tax system that
has an inelastic base and violates principles of equity and
efficiency to various degrees.
A number of steps could be taken to moderate the
revenue problems of local authorities and some of their
undesirable effects, the most important of which involve
institutional and procedural reforms. Standardization of
access to sources of income across local authorities and more
general application of taxes within local authorities would
help alleviate the problem of revenue inadequacy, lessen the
dramatic differences in per capita spending across local
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authorities, and reduce efficiency and equity problems
induced by the existing tax system.
Other reforms related to revenue generation should be
implemented at the same time. More frequent revaluation of
land, institution of selected ad valorem taxes, and periodic
revisions or indexing of fixed-fee taxes and charges could
substantially increase the elasticity of the local tax base.
Unstable sources of revenue, such as cesses, are a more
difficult problem to deal with, particularly in the short run
and in rural areas. Over the long run, a movement towards
greater reliance on land rates could improve the situation in
a majority of local authorities.
After strengthening and standardizing existing sources
of local authority revenue, the central government should
turn to the issue of additional sources of revenue, which are
likely to be necessary in many local authorities. This
chapter has suggested a variety of specific options for new
sources of revenue. The actual mix of revenue sources that
should be used is a decision that needs to be made by the
Government of Kenya. Before that can be done, more detailed
research needs to be conducted on the revenue yield and
potential effects of the options discussed here. Some
sources will be appropriate for particular types of places,
but not for others.
Capital financing is a problem that goes hand-in-hand
with recurrent revenue deficiencies in the vast majority of
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Kenyan local authorities. Many local authorities are not
credit-worthy because of inadequate revenue bases and poor
managerial capacity, which result in an inability to service
existing debts and responsibly assume new ones. Measures to
improve fiscal capacity have already been discussed, and
steps to strengthen managerial capacity will be outlined
below. The problem of existing local government debt to LGLA
and central government/parastatal debt to local authorities
must be dealt with by the Government of Kenya in a way that
does not create undesirable incentives and discourage
continued local authority capital investment. Also, the
Local Government Loans Authority, the central government
institution that provides most of the financing for local
government capital projects, should be recapitalized and
restructured so that it provides the additional resources
required to meet the growing demand for local authority
infrastructure investment, and so that it operates more
effectively and efficiently.
An additional significant revenue problem for the local
authorities with low fiscal capacities is the lack of
intergovernmental aid, which has contributed to the enormous
variations in expenditures and service quality across
councils. More substantial block grants distributed
according to a clearly defined and equitable formula would
help to correct this situation. In some cases, grants might
be given to ensure the provision of particular basic
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services.
Any significant reform of local authorities will have
to deal with a number of major intergovernmental
institutional problems that have plagued their fiscal
performance. Greater efficiency in resource use could be
attained if a number of institutional reforms were
implemented. The arbitrary assignment of revenue sources by
the Ministry of Local Government to local authorities has
already been discussed. In addition, the MLG, which is
supposed to supervise and assist local authorities, often
constrains them in other ways as well. The Ministry has too
much control over local authorities, and it is very
centralized and inefficient in its own operations. There is
a need for the Ministry to decentralize, to train its staff
better, to be more aware of local authority problems and
needs, and to provide greater support and technical
assistance to the local authorities. Other ministries on
which the local authorities critically depend for specific
services or assistance should also be given the resources and
incentives required to fulfill their responsibilities in a
more timely and effective manner.
Local authorities themselves have not taken advantage
of provisions in the Local Government Act that provide for
intercouncil arrangements for service provision, despite the
potential for such arrangements to increase efficiency in
certain areas for particular services. The District
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Development Committees also have a primary role to play in
coordinating the development activities of central government
ministries and local authorities within the districts. There
is a great deal of potential for such coordination to lead to
better-planned and more-efficient service provision, and
efforts should be made to define the process more clearly
than it is as present and to ensure that it is implemented
more effectively.
Finally, a variety of local administrative and
managerial problems stand in the way of effective local
authority performance. These must be improved at the same
time that the revenue reforms discussed above are being
implemented. Enhanced revenue capacity and improved access
to capital for local authority investment will be wasted
without improved management and administration. Dealing with
most of these local managerial and administrative problems is
likely to require various degrees of central government
assistance, ranging from simple guidelines to substantial
technical assistance.
It is first necessary to institute standardized and
simplified accounting and record-keeping systems. Better
techniques for cash-flow management, revenue and expenditure
control, and budgeting would also greatly improve the use of
local resources. The introduction of a system of incentives
and good training programs would increase the capacity and
enhance the performance of local authority employees.
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The local management problems with the most significant
impact on local authority performance are in the area of
revenue collection. Lack of collection and enforcement
staff, inadequate enforcement authority, political pressure,
and dishonesty are all major obstacles to better revenue
collection, which could be alleviated to some extent by a
variety of specific policies. Many of these problems are
largely the result of insufficient resources, while others
could be improved by correcting specific local institutional
arrangements.
The conclusion that must be drawn from this analysis is
that the current state of local authorities in Kenya is not
very promising. However, even with all of its problems,
Kenya probably has one of the most effective systems of local
government service provision in Africa. The situation could
be improved dramatically by a package of well-designed
policies and interventions, which are aimed at removing major
constraints on the effective fiscal operation of local
authorities. A concerted effort should be made to strengthen
not only the Ministry of Local Government and the local
authorities, but also other ministries involved in local
service provision and the District Development Committees,
which coordinate local development activities. All of these
institutions must have adequate authority and access to human
and financial resources sufficient to discharge their
responsibilities effectively. Greater decentralization would
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make the system generally more efficient and free up the MLG
to monitor the local authorities more effectively than they
currently do as the local authorities try to achieve a
national standard in their performance. MLG staff time and
resources should be concentrated on the places where they are
most urgently needed, and those local authorities with good
management and adequate capacity should be given additional
autonomy.
Many of the policies and reforms discussed in this
chapter will not be easy to define operationally and put into
practice. Political constraints may even preclude a
significant reform process in spite of the present rhetoric
about strengthening local authorities. As discussed several
times in this thesis, the type of support currently being
expressed for local authority reform has been voiced on
previous occasions without satisfying results.
If economic logic prevails over purely political
considerations, reform may begin to proceed as soon as the
middle of 1988, when the Minister for Finance presents his
budget speech to the Parliament. If the reforms outlined
here are accepted or others are devised by the Government of
Kenya, some may have to be implemented on an experimental or
incremental basis. If policies and reforms are shown to be
successful in some areas, they can be expanded gradually to
cover other local authorities, with the ultimate goal being
the revitalization of the institution of local government in
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Kenya. Success in this endeavour will require a serious
commitment and cooperative effort from local authorities, the
Ministry of Local Government, and the Government of Kenya, as
well as additional support from the donor community.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: THE FISCAL ROLE OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Local government has not traditionally played a major
fiscal role in most developing countries for a variety of
reasons. Colonial powers often did not want to institute
meaningful decentralized democracy because they feared losing
control of their territories. Many of the countries that
colonized Africa, Asia, and Latin America had centralized
government systems at home, and these were more or less
directly transferred to the colonies, but with an even more
limited role for decentralized government in many cases.
Even in developing countries where attempts were made to
establish meaningful local government, local institutions
often remained weak because local cultures accepted the
foreign institutions slowly, and there was a lack of human
and financial resources to develop them adequately.
The Future of Local Government in Developing Countries
Since obtaining independence, many developing countries
have kept strong central governments. In some areas, this is
due to cultural influences, but the major reason in many
countries is a desire or perceived need to establish strong
central control for purposes of stability and nation-
building. Centralization is imposed in some developing
countries largely to keep a particular tribe or newly
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established indigenous elite class firmly in control. Early
development economists and planners supported the
prerogatives of those in power by maintaining that
centralized development was more efficient and could lead to
higher rates of growth, creating income through multiplier
effects that would eventually benefit the masses.
During the past ten years or so, there has been some
turnaround in the tendency towards centralization in the
developing world. Although governments in many developing
countries are likely to remain highly centralized, there has
been at least some explicit recognition that decentralization
has definite benefits. This change in thinking has occurred
for a number of reasons. First, centralized economic
planning and development policies have not been very
successful in many developing countries, and this has
generated movements to institute decentralized decision-
making processes and greater reliance on the market in
pursuit of more efficient resource use. Second, worldwide
economic conditions have created serious difficulties for
developing countries, and this has prompted them to look to
largely untapped local resources in the face of growing
populations and public service demands. Third, more
awareness by a better-educated population of the problems in
their own countries as well as of events and conditions in
the rest of the world has increased pressure on governments
in developing countries to strengthen democratic
355
institutions. Local governments, as agents of both
decentralized decision-making and grassroots participation,
have benefitted from this movement. It is likely that they
will continue to grow in importance in many developing
countries in the years to come.
Analyzing and Evaluating Local Government
in Developing Countries
Despite the recent interest in strengthening local
government in the developing world, the public finance
literature has generated little new work in this area. This
thesis has attempted to develop a basic framework for
analyzing the fiscal role and operations of local government
in developing countries through a detailed study of Kenya.
Analyzing an appropriate fiscal role for local
government in developing countries is a difficult task for a
variety of reasons, the major one being that countries in the
underdeveloped world are extremely diverse. Although
developing countries share certain common characteristics,
there are substantial differences in degrees of development,
dominant cultures, colonial histories, degrees of
tribal/ethnic homogeneity, types of constitutions and forms
of government, tenure as independent nations, and ways of
organizing and operating institutions. All of these areas
are highly related in the sense, for example, that the form
of government and the way institutions are organized may
depend on local customs, colonial history, and political
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climate.
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the heterogeneity of
developing countries in the above areas leads to significant
differences in the organization and operation of their local
government systems. There are different degrees of fiscal
centralization of the public sector and different numbers of
levels of decentralized government. There are varying
degrees of political decentralization and grassroots
participation, different assignments of service
responsibility, and greatly varying fiscal capacities both
within and across developing countries. Central governments
in developing countries also differ widely in the extent to
which they grant decentralized government autonomy in
revenue-raising activities and the expenditure decision-
making process. Many fiscal differences across local
authorities in a particular developing country may be due to
arbitrary and inconsistent decisions by the central
government rather than decisions taken by the local
authorities themselves.
As argued throughout this thesis, these differences
make the process of analyzing local government in developing
countries a somewhat eclectic exercise. There are standard
rules that must be followed and institutions that must be
considered in analyzing certain economic issues, such as
international trade, monetary, and fiscal policies. The
rules of the game are far less clearly defined when looking
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at the fiscal role of local government.
General Economic Principles
A basic economic theory of local government has been
defined in the context of the developed countries. This was
reviewed and its relevance for developing countries discussed
in Chapter 3. Although there are some definite problems with
trying to apply this theory to the underdeveloped nations,
many of the basic principles set forth in it and economic
theory in general should be followed in analyzing the fiscal
role of local government in the developing world. Given the
major political, institutional, and cultural differences
between developed and developing countries and the extreme
diversity along many dimensions across developing countries,
however, each case must be analyzed and interpreted in its
own particular context.
The general economic principles of adequacy,
efficiency, and equity should guide any analysis of the
fiscal role of local government in developing countries. A
local revenue and expenditure system should be adequate to
provide basic services and meet national and local goals as
revealed through the political process. Efficiency in
service provision requires that the public sector step in
where the market fails to provide what the people want and
that types and levels of public services correspond with the
needs and preferences of the people, which may vary across
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space. Efficiency considerations also demand that the
production costs of these services be as low as possible in
terms of scale and factor proportions without adversely
affecting the quality of services to a level unacceptable to
the beneficiaries. Tax policies should be designed in order
to minimize effects on people's decisions about the types and
levels of economic activity that they engage in and where
they do so. Finally, to as great an extent as possible, the
principles of vertical, horizontal, and geographic equity
should be respected.
Special Considerations in Developing Countries
As has been highlighted earlier, developing countries
differ from the developed countries in a variety of
significant ways that must be taken into consideration when
analyzing the fiscal role of local government. If these
factors are not taken into consideration, fallacious
conclusions based on the experience of the developed nations
will likely result. If attempts are made to implement
policies based solely on these conclusions, they are probably
doomed to fail, and they may generate additional problems.
Public Service Provision
A variety of special factors must be considered when
analyzing the problem of service provision in developing
countries. First, there is often an expanded role for the
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public sector to play in developing countries. Services that
would normally be provided by the private sector in more
developed countries, such as markets, slaughterhouses, and
veterinary services, may have to be provided by the public
sector in the developing world because of weaknesses in
private institutions, scale considerations, and significant
externalities.
As discussed in Chapter 3, preferences for types of
public services could be either more or less homogeneous in
developing countries than in developed countries, depending
on whether there are wide variations in economic base and the
degree to which such variations affect the mix of public
services required as production inputs. Due to widespread
poverty, however, preferences for levels of public services
in developing countries are likely to be more homogeneous
than in developed countries. People would be expected, for
the most part, to be interested in the provision of a minimum
level of basic public services rather than different levels
of a wide variety of services. To the extent that
preferences for types and levels of public services are
relatively homogeneous, provision should be more centralized.
Geographic isolation, however, may preclude centralization or
regionalization of services. In addition, it may be more
administratively efficient and politically expedient to keep
certain services, which might by their nature warrant more
centralized provision, at a decentralized level of
360
government. Depending on the particular case, this may be a
regional or local government.
Economies of scale and externality considerations must
be taken into account when assigning services to different
levels of government in developing countries. Economies of
scale may suggest more centralized provision or the need for
forming intergovernmental bodies to provide services across
several decentralized units of government. The latter option
is likely to require substantial central government
intervention because of the general weakness of local
authorities in developing countries. Externalities may be
less important in developing countries because there are
less-developed internal economic linkages and greater
geographic isolation than in a developed economic system.
More adequate infrastructure, however, can help to generate
greater internal integration of the economy and may thus be
seen as an important national development priority. Certain
types of public services, such as inter-area highways that
facilitate trade, for example, will generate positive
externalities. In addition, there are special types of
externalities that may be important in developing countries,
such as those generated in the areas of human and veterinary
health care because of the semi-nomadic lifestyle of some
indigenous peoples.
Service provision in developing countries may be
complicated by differences from the developed countries in
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the way local authority jurisdictions are defined. In
developing countries, urban local governments may well have
large areas under their jurisdiction that are actually rural
and agricultural land. Similarly, some rural local
governments may be responsible for the provision of urban
public services in urban centers within their jurisdictions
that are not separate local authorities. This heterogeneity
of needs within some local authorities can greatly complicate
service requirements.
Finally, there may be alternative arrangements for the
provision of some types of services in many developing
countries. Self-help movements, nongovernmental
organizations, charities and religious institutions all have
a significant role to play in service provision in many
countries. These services should be coordinated by the
government and taken into account when planning government
expenditures. Although self-sufficiency is a long-term goal,
local governments should certainly take existing and
potential alternative service provision arrangements into
account when planning the use of their own scarce resources.
Revenue Generation
Revenue-generation systems are extremely diverse across
developing countries. In some cases, local authorities are
responsible for raising all of their own revenue, while in
other cases, they are almost entirely dependent on central
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government transfers. Different combinations of local and
national revenues will make sense in different cases. The
important consideration is to insure that revenues are
adequate and appropriately based and that existing sources
are as equitable and generate as few efficiency effects as
possible.
Although different revenue-raising arrangements will be
required in different situations, there is likely to be a
more important role for central government transfers and
loans to local governments in developing countries. Some
local authorities in these countries are located in remote
areas where few opportunities for economic activities exist.
Without central assistance, they are unlikely to be able to
function in any meaningful way. Possibly the most important
revenue area for central government intervention is capital
financing. Few local authorities in developing countries are
likely to be considered eligible for commercial credit, and
they probably could not afford it even if they were. Thus,
the central government may have a vital role to play in
helping to finance local government investment expenditures.
To the extent that local authorities in developing
countries rely heavily on the central government for
transfers, difficult choices may have to be made because the
problem of scarce resources is likely to be more severe than
in developed countries. The central government, in its
attempt to achieve national development goals, may have to
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concentrate its limited resources in areas where they will be
most efficiently and productively employed, rather than using
grant revenues to effect greater equalization of local fiscal
capacities. This suggests that there may need to be a
nonuniform, asymmetric application of resources across local
authorities, leaving some in much better shape than others.
In many developing countries, there is likely to be a
problem with general coverage of economic activity by the
local tax system. The sources of local revenue currently
employed may be in use largely because of convenience or
because they were inherited from a colonial administration,
rather than because they were selected as part of a well-
designed local tax system. This may lead to efficiency and
equity problems, as well as a lack of correspondence between
expenditure responsibilities and revenue-generating capacity.
There is likely to be a need for reforming local resource
mobilization practices in many developing countries.
Local government in developing countries may have
access to additional sources of revenue because of their
possible expanded functions and the role of other service
providers discussed above. Markets, slaughterhouses, stock
auction yards, and similar economic bases may be major
sources of revenue in some areas. In addition, income,
labor, and materials may be available through self-help
movements and nongovernmental organizations. Such resources
can greatly alleviate local resource constraints, especially
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if they are explicitly taken account of in the local
government planning and budgeting process.
Nature of the Economy and Resource Considerations
The nature of the economy has an important effect on
the types of public services required by the population and
the sources of income available to local authorities. As was
shown in the Kenya case, the local economic base determines
whether residents primarily need urban services, agricultural
services, or livestock services. Diversities in economic
base also have an important effect on the types of revenue
that the local authority can raise. The nature of the local
economy may even preclude a viable local public sector funded
from local sources. If the local economy is dominated by
barter transactions or if the revenue bases are highly
mobile, for example, it will be inefficient, and perhaps
impossible, to levy a monetary sales tax.
Human and financial resource constraints also have a
major impact on what functions a local government can
undertake. Financial constraints can be alleviated by
transfers if the central government or the donor community is
in a position to provide them. Lack of technical and
financial expertise on the part of local government managers
and employees is a much more difficult problem to overcome.
Different solutions, such as centralization of services,
central government or donor provision of technical expertise,
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and the development of training programmes, will be
appropriate in different situations and over different time
periods.
Institutional Considerations
The structure of national and local institutions must
be well understood when analyzing the fiscal role of local
government in developing countries. Institutions are
difficult to change and may be impossible to work around
effectively, largely because political forces use
institutions to maintain the status quo, no matter how
inefficient or inequitable. In some cases, however, internal
and intergovernmental institutional reforms in the realm of
the possible could go a long way towards improving the
functioning of local government.
The deficiencies of local government institutions and
their tendency not to take advantage of possibilities for
interjurisdictional cooperation have already been discussed.
The existence of these deficiencies often dictates that there
be greater monitoring and stronger control of local
government by central government institutions in developing
countries than might be justified in the developed countries.
However, in some cases, such as Kenya, the degree of control
is so great and its administration so inefficient that the
central government probably makes the situation worse than it
would be if local government were left on its own. A balance
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must be struck between local autonomy and central control,
and this will vary across countries at different stages of
development and with different capacities.
Local government in developing countries is also likely
to rely on a variety of institutions of higher levels of
government for tcn c)__'; ass Ine at_ les unti loca
capacity is built up over time. This being the case, it is
important that these more centralized institutions do as much
as they can to provide quality assistance in a timely
fashion. Their failure to do so can cripple local authority
performance.
In some developing countries, local authorities are not
even important actors in an integrated multi-tiered system of
government. They often exist alongside decentralized offices
or agencies of the central government within the same
geographic boundaries. In such cases, the central government
agencies may have greater responsibilities and access to more
productive sources of revenue than the local authorities. In
these situations, it is appropriate to question whether the
local authorities should be abolished or strengthened, and
the answer may well differ in different cases. It is the
responsibility of the central government to see that all
levels of government have a productive role and commensurate
power defined on reasonable and defensible grounds. In
addition, it is normally appropriate for the central
government to be responsible for coordinating the development
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and service activities of these various levels of government.
Local inadequacies in technical and administrative
capacity, as discussed above, are likely to be important
constraints in most developing countries. There are also
other local issues that greatly affect the ability of local
authorities to discharge their responsibilities properly. In
particular, many local authorities in developing countries do
not have reasonable administrative procedures and
accounting/recordkeeping systems. This is, in part, a result
of poor training and central government regulations, but it
is also partially due to the inertia of local government
managers and their unwillingness to change the way things are
done. Administrative procedures and accounting systems
should be simple and appropriate to the local circumstances.
In addition, inadequate personnel policies may lead to
a great deal of waste and inertia among local employees.
Poor pay and benefits, lack of clear goals and standards for
promotion, and a scarcity of incentives may lead to poor
employee performance, which translates into inadequate
service provision and significant undercollection of
revenues. Many of these issues could be dealt with by local
action, at least to some extent, in most developing
countries.
Cultural Considerations
Cultural factors must also be taken into consideration
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when analyzing the fiscal role of local government in
developing countries. The nature and extent of cultural
effects are likely to vary dramatically across developing
countries. In some places, their effect may be highly
significant, while in others it may be negligible.
Some cultural factors may have a general effect on the
possibilities for developing local government institutions in
developing countries. It was noted in Chapter 2, for
example, that some Asian cultures tend to be authority-
oriented and provide an ideal climate for a highly
centralized government system. In contrast, many African
cultures have a long history of some form of local self-
government and should be more culturally receptive to the
development of participatory local government institutions.
Other cultural factors may affect specific aspects of
the local government system and interpretation of the
theories traditionally used by economists to analyze them. A
few examples will illustrate this point. The idea of
individual preferences versus social preferences was
discussed in Chapter 3. To the extent that social
responsibilities to family, tribe, and homeland are more
significant than individual preferences for moving to another
location to improve one's standard of living, mobility may be
less important than in the developed countries. Thus, the
relevance of the proscription on decentralized
redistributional policies for mobility reasons and the
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importance of Tiebout-type behavior may be significantly
diminished. Cultural factors can also affect service demands
and the appropriateness of particular tax bases. If
livestock or land, for example, have a particular religious
or cultural significance to a certain tribe or ethnic group,
attempts by the local government to tax these bases may be
contentious and/or futile. On the other hand, religious
taxes may be an effective means to raise revenue in some
countries. Finally, if behavior that is considered corrupt
in western societies is culturally acceptable in some
developing countries, this must be taken into consideration
when analyzing local government systems. There are also many
other ways in which cultural factors could influence the
organization and operation of local government in developing
countries.
Political Considerations
Political factors are often the most important
constraints on local government in developing countries, and
they often greatly influence the other areas discussed above.
Many developing countries are politically immature. Their
lack of political stability creates an atmosphere in which
meaningful decentralization may be very difficult. As was
argued in the case of Kenya, however, it is probably possible
in many developing countries to strengthen local government
without any threat whatsoever to the stability of the central
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government or to the power of the ruling groups. The need
for political stability may easily be used as an excuse for
maintaining the current regime, which may have its basis in
the military, a particular dominant tribe or ethnic group
that does not wish to share power, or a newly emerging
indigenous elite who do not wish to share their wealth.
Clearly, strong political forces can effectively block
decentralization.
The central government may reserve a particular public
service or source of revenue for its own use even when it is
not necessarily appropriate to do so. The central
government, for example, may keep most or all of the most
productive and elastic sources of revenue for itself and
leave the less-desirable ones for local governments. There
may be ideological or political motives for the central
government to maintain full control over certain important
service functions, as was argued to be the case with
education in Kenya. In such cases, there may be few
prospects for genuine reform of the practice in question.
Local political considerations may also have an
important effect on the fiscal role of local government.
Although this is true to some extent in developed countries,
the possibilities for abusing the system for personal and
social gain are likely to be greater in developing countries
than in developed countries because of poorly developed
institutions and inadequately enforced laws and regulations.
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Even if the guilty parties are caught in the act, justice may
not be served and there will be no deterrent to others who
want to do the same thing. There may be actions by local
politicians leading to spending not in the public interest,
as well as pressures on local authority officers not to
collect the revenue thaIs d-ue to them. These activities
can greatly undermine the effectiveness of local authorities.
Research Considerations
When conducting research on the fiscal role of local
government in developing countries, it is important to be
aware of certain conditions and situations related to the
research environment that may differ from or be more extreme
than in the developed countries. Probably the most important
of these is the realization that most developing countries
are unitary states, which are fairly recent creations. They
are politically as well as economically underdeveloped, and
the issue of decentralization is a sensitive one. Thus, the
research must be conducted in a manner that reflects an
awareness of the sensitivities involved. Even if this is
done, there may be changes in political climate that affect
the work and over which the researcher has absolutely no
control.
It is also important to recognize that procedures and
facilities taken for granted in the developed countries may
not be available in the developing world. It may take some
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time to locate documents in complex and antiquated filing
systems even in the central government ministries, and
photocopying facilities may not be available to facilitate
retrieval of information. Telephones, good roads, reliable
public transportation, and basic lodging may not exist in
some areas, and local governments may be very geographically
dispersed, complicating the process of scheduling and meeting
appointments with local authority officials. Cultural
barriers and general suspicion of strangers may hinder the
prospects for good access to and reliable information from
local authority officials, particularly if the researcher is
a foreigner.
Finally, there are likely to be serious difficulties in
comparing data collected from different local authorities in
the same country. This is also a problem in some of the
developed countries, but the situation in developing
countries is likely to be more severe. The central
government may not keep any information on local authorities,
and there may be very different systems for keeping financial
information in different local authorities. Financial years,
income and expenditure categories, and levels of aggregation
may differ dramatically across local authorities, and any of
these may differ over time for individual local authorities.
For all of these reasons, doing research on local
government in developing countries requires careful
preparation in advance of starting the fieldwork. It is
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important to have a good sense of the political climate,
relevant cultural factors, and deficiencies or bottlenecks in
institutions, procedures, infrastructure, and facilities, all
of which may affect the research substantially.
Conclusion
Analyzing the fiscal role of local government in a
developing country is an interesting and challenging
undertaking because of the current interest in the topic and
the lack of research attention that has been paid to it.
There are certain problems in using the economic theory of
local government as the basis for analysis because it was
developed in the context of the developed countries.
Nevertheless, the economic theory of local government and
public finance theory provide a set of basic generalizable
principles, which can be used as a starting point for the
analysis.
Despite the general applicability of economic theory,
there is a need to take a much more interdisciplinary
approach to analyzing the fiscal role of local government in
both developed and developing countries. Analyzing the
economic role of decentralized government is much more
constrained by political and cultural factors than is the
analysis of some other economic topics and institutions, such
as macroeconomic policy and international trade management.
The importance of context in analyzing the fiscal role of
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decentralized institutions cannot be overemphasized,
particularly in less-developed countries. There are
significant differences between the developed and developing
countries, and contextual factors relevant to local
government organization and performance vary dramatically
across developing countries as well. Although general
economic principles can be used as one basis for analysis, a
much more comprehensive framework encompassing a wide variety
of other contextual factors is required to assess
realistically an appropriate fiscal role for local government
in a particular developing country.
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APPENDIX I
LOCAL AUTHORITY SITE VISITS1
Local Authority Type of Council District
Bungoma County Bungoma
Gusii County Kisii
Isiolo County Isiolo
Kipsigis County Kericho
Lamu County Lamu
Mandera County Mandera
Marsabit County Marsabit
Meru County Meru
Muranga County Muranga
Nakuru County Nakuru
Samburu County Samburu
Turkana County Turkana
Wareng County Uasin Gishu
Bungoma Municipal Bungoma
Eldoret Municipal Uasin Gishu
Embu Municipal Embu
Kericho Municipal Kericho
Kisii Municipal Kisii
Province
Western
Nyanza
Eastern
Rift Valley
Coast
Northeastern
Eastern
Eastern
Central
Rift Valley
Rift Valley
Rift Valley
Rift Valley
Western
Rift Valley
Eastern
Rift Valley
Nyanza
1 These local authorities were visited as part of the fieldwork
conducted for this research. Some local authority names are listed as
both county and municipal councils. Large urban areas in particular
districts are often designated as municipal councils and have the same
name as the county council. In Bungoma District, for example, two
councils were visited, Bungoma County Council and Bungoma Municpal
Council.
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Nyanza
Coast
Eastern
Central
Rift Valley
Western
Central
Eastern
PROVINCIAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICE SITE VISITS
Province
Central
Coast
Eastern
Northeastern
Nyanza
Rift Valley
Western
Provincial Capital Town
Nyeri
Mombasa
Embu
Garissa
Kisumu
Nakuru
Kakamega
The map on the following page shows the provincial and district
boundaries in Kenya and the sites of the field visits. On the page
after that is a list of the districts in each of the provinces in
Kenya.
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Kisumu
Malindi
Meru
Muranga
Nakuru
Busia
Karatina
Kitui
Municipal
Municipal
Municipal
Municipal
Municipal
Town
Town
Town
Kisumu
Kilifi
Meru
Muranga
Nakuru
Busia
Nyeri
Kitui
LOCATIONS OF SITE VISITS
SUDAN
KENYA ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES
ETHIOPIA
&
&
&
)
,ij
UGANDA
z,
0
TANZANIA
-- -- .-...II..c
* = municipal or town council in study
& = county council in study
# = provincial capital and municipal council in study
@ = provincial capital, local authority not in study
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INDIAN
OCEAN
LIST OF PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS
CENTRAL PROVINCE
Kiambu
Kirinyaga
Murang'a
Nyandarua
Nyeri
NYANZA PROVINCE
Kisii
Kisumu
Siaya
South Nyanza
COAST PROVINCE
Kilifi
Kwale
Lamu
Malindi
Mombasa
Taita-Taveta
Tana River
EASTERN PROVINCE
Embu
Isiolo
Kitui
Machakos
Marsabit
Meru
NAIROBI PROVINCE
RIFT VALLEY PROVINCE
Baringo
Elgeyo Marakwet
Kajiado
Kericho
Laikipia
Nakuru
Nandi
Narok
Samburu
Trans Nzoia
Turkana
Uasin Gishu
West Pokot
WESTERN PROVINCE
Bungoma
Busia
Kakamega
Nairobi
NORTHEASTERN PROVINCE
Garissa
Mandera
Wajir
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APPENDIX II
DEFINITIONS FOR REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES
A. REVENUE
CESS: tax on agricultural production; also used to refer to
local taxes on hides and skins, miraa export and livestock
export.
BUSPARK FEES: charges paid by public transport operators for
use of the local authority's central bus park; normally a fee
paid each time the operator enters the park to pick up
passengers.
CONSERVANCY CHARGES: fees paid for conservancy services
(trash collection).
GRANTS: all types of grants from the Government of Kenya for
current account expenses, including grants to needy councils
and teachers salaries grants.
HOUSE RENTS: rents on houses owned by the local authority,
tenant purchase revenues, and all other housing revenue.
INTEREST: interest on bank accounts and investment.
MARKET FEES: market entrance fees, livestock auction fees,
and stall rents in local authority markets.
NURSERY FEES: nursery school fees only.
PLOT RENTS: rents paid on commercial plots owned by the local
authority.
POLL RATE: area poll rate (head tax).
RATES: all types of land rates (taxes): urban site value
(unimproved) rate, area rates, and agricultural rates.
SEWERAGE CHARGES: monthly service charges and connection
fees.
SLAUGHTER FEES: charges for livestock slaughter and transport
from local authority slaughter houses and slabs.
STOCK FEES: livestock auction fees.
TOTAL INCOME: all income from all sources except tourism;
only the excess of tourism revenues over tourism expenditures
is included.
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TOURISM FEES: game reserve entrance fees, lodge rentals,
income from hotels and hostels, etc.
VETERINARY FEES: all fees for veterinary (dipping,
vaccination, etc.), agricultural, and forestry services.
WATER CHARGES: rural and urban water supply charges, meter
rents, and connection fees.
WORKS CHARGES: conservancy, plan fees, construction permits,
sanitation charges, vehicle and equipment rentals, etc.
B. EXPENDITURES
ADMINISTRATION: clerk's department, treasurer's department,
revenue collection, enforcement, and miscellaneous
administrative expenses.
CONSERVANCY: conservancy (trash collection) expenses.
COUNCILLORS: councillors expenses, travel allowances, Mayor's
Parlor, miscellaneous items.
ENGINEER: planning, drawing, and valuation.
HOUSING: rental and tenant purchase housing.
LIVESTOCK: stock auction yards.
MARKETS: markets, trading centers and stock auction yards;
also sometimes includes bus parks.
NURSERY SCHOOLS: teachers salaries and other nursery school
expenses.
PRIMARY EDUCATION: teachers salaries and other school
expenses.
PUBLIC HEALTH: hospitals, clinics, and drugs.
SEWERAGE: sewerage expenses only.
SLAUGHTER: slaughterhouses and slaughter slabs only.
SOCIAL SERVICES: social services, nursery schools, special
schools, orphanages, sports facilities, youth centers, and
parks.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE: total expenditure in all categories except
tourism.
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TOURISM: game parks, lodges, hotels and hostels.
VETERINARY SERVICES: dipping, vaccinations, drugs, tree
nurseries, demonstration shambas, and all other veterinary,
agricultural, and forestry services.
WATER: water supply only.
WORKS: buildings, roads, vehicle garages, public
conveniences, conservancy, sanitation services, etc.
C. SURPLUS/DEFICIT
SURPLUS/DEFICIT: includes all revenues and expenditures for
county councils except tourism revenues and expenditures; for
municipal councils includes only general fund finances.
TOTAL SURPLUS/DEFICIT: deficit or surplus including all
sources of revenues and expenditures.
NOTE: Some of the income and expenditure categories defined
above are aggregates and may include some items that are
also listed separately. Disaggregate income and expenditure
items may not always add exactly to total revenue and
expenditure figures for a given local authority. Some
miscellaneous items do not fit well into any of the
disaggregate categories, but are included in the total figures.
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APPENDIX III
PROBLEMS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
This appendix discusses some major conceptual and
empirical problems with the data analyzed in Chapters 4 to 6
and it explains how some of these problems might affect the
results of the analysis. There are a few general problems
with the finance data, as well as problems in the estimation
of population and wealth, two important variables used in the
analysis. Population was used to put income and spending
data on a per capita basis, and both population and wealth
were used in the regression analysis of total expenditure.
Finance Data
The finance data used in this analysis are not fully
complete and compatible for all income and expenditure
categories across all local authorities. The most difficult
problem in assembling the income and expenditure data was the
lack of uniformity in the way local authorities collect and
report financial information. Markets, for example, are
sometimes in a category of their own, but in some local
authorities are reported under the treasurer's department,
the clerk's department, the social services' department, or
the housing fund. Slaughterhouses are sometimes a separate
department, but frequently listed under other departments,
such as markets, works, public health, sanitation, or
veterinary services. Even services such as water and
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sewerage do not always have their own departments. They are
sometimes reported under works, engineering, or public
health.
Another data problem was the wide variation in the
level of aggregation of financial data across divisions of
local authorities and income and expenditure categories.
This is particularly an issue in county councils, where
financial data are sometimes reported separately for
individual divisions and trading centers. It was usually
possible to extract or calculate the required data from these
records, but in a few cases, the data for trading centers are
classified under broad income and expenditure categories that
could not be disaggregated. These are but a few examples of
the tremendous variation in the way local authorities keep
accounts and records.
Attempts were made to standardize revenue and
expenditure categories so that comparisons could be made
across local authorities. These categories are defined in
the previous appendix (Appendix II). This standardization
process involved using disaggregate data to reclassify some
types of revenue or expenditure from one category to another.
Thus, in some cases, the data used in this research will not
closely resemble the summary information presented by local
authorities in their official annual budget estimates.
In some cases, it was not possible to disaggregate
sources and uses of income data sufficiently to be able to
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assign consistent and correct numbers to all income and
expenditure categories for all local authorities. Some local
authorities do not keep records in a way that permit this.
Thus, despite every effort to be consistent, there are some
unavoidable distortions in the data.
These disaggregation and reporting problems strongly
point to the need for the Government of Kenya to provide the
Ministry of Local Government with the funds to develop a
standardized accounting system for local authorities. This
would facilitate the work of both local authorities and the
Ministry as well as provide analysts with a reliable database
for making cross-council comparisons.
Only one year of data, fiscal year 1984, is formally
analyzed in this study.1 A study covering a longer time
period would obviously have been more useful, but there were
a number of major obstacles involved in obtaining time-series
data. Some local authorities are unable to provide printed
copies of budget estimates for even a single year much less
several, so that information had to be copied by hand,
photocopied, or calculated from other records. It was also
sometimes difficult to get information from the treasurer's
1 Because of the 1984 drought, that year was not a
typical one and is therefore not an ideal choice for the
analysis. It is, however, the most recent year for which
data are generally available, and using an earlier year would
have caused comparability problems because local authorities
changed from a calendar fiscal year to the Government of
Kenya's fiscal year (July 1 to June 30) at different times
during the first few years of the 1980s.
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records because they were unavailable, undecipherable, or
being used in attempts to produce audited final accounts.
Photocopying facilities were often unavailable or difficult
to get access to. Another problem is that as local
authorities change chief financial officers over time, there
are sometimes changes in how records are kept. Finally, in
recent years most local authorities have switched from
keeping records on a calendar year basis to a Government of
Kenya fiscal-year basis, making comparisons across time more
difficult.
For all of these reasons, it was decided to focus on an
in-depth analysis of one year of financial information for
all of the local authorities being studied. The year 1984
was selected because it is the most recent year for which
actual (as opposed to budgeted) income and expenditure data
were generally available. Some sense of how revenues and
expenditures change over time was also obtained from those
local authorities for which several years of data were
readily available.
It should also be noted that the accounts of some of
the local authorities examined in this study have not been
properly audited. There is no way of verifying the accuracy
of these figures. Nevertheless, these data have been used in
the study because they are the only information available.
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Population
The population figures used in this analysis have some
limitations that should be recognized. The most recent
population census in Kenya was conducted in 1979, while the
financial data being analyzed are for 1984. The Central
Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Planning and National
Development does provide population projections for districts
in years between censuses. Because county councils are in
almost every case geographically identical to districts, the
district figures were used to estimate county council
populations. The 1984 district population projections
(assuming constant mortality and fertility) were adjusted
downward by subtracting from them the estimated 1984
populations of municipal and town councils located in the
district. This was done because county councils are
theoretically responsible for service provision in all areas
of a district that are not serviced by municipal or town
councils, including urban councils.
There are two problems with this definition of county
council population. First, the municipal and town council
populations that were subtracted from district totals were
not available from the Central Bureau of Statistics and had
to be roughly estimated, as will be explained below. Second,
it is clear that county councils do not provide services or
collect revenue uniformly in all areas under the councils'
jurisdictions. To analyze the issue of per capita spending
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or income properly, it would be necessary to know two things:
(1) What portion of the county is actually covered by the
service or revenue collection?; and, (2) What is the per
capita expenditure or income within the relevant population?
Needless to say, such information is not available.
Other issues arise in the case of municipal and town
councils. Because no population figures for these councils
are available from the Central Bureau of Statistics, five
methods were used to calculate a set of estimates for 1984.
The five results were compared, and it was decided to use the
figures based on annual average population growth between the
1969 census and the 1979 census, with certain adjustments
made for those councils suspected of having grown faster.
This was considered to be about as reasonable an estimate as
any given the existing data constraints.
The other problem with municipal and town council
population figures is similar to one of those discussed
regarding county councils: total population is used in the
analysis rather than serviced population. As with county
councils, service provision and revenue collection are not
uniform within municipal and town councils. Some municipal
councils are completely urbanized, while others have
substantial rural areas within their boundaries. There are
rough estimates available of the breakdown between urban and
rural land within municipalities, but using these data might
obscure other issues. Some municipal councils do collect
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revenue and provide services in rural areas of the council,
while others do not collect revenue and provide services in
some urbanized sections.
Wealth
The measure of wealth used for county councils is a
measure of local economic surplus, i.e., a measure of the
ability of the county council residents to produce beyond
their subsistence needs. It is developed from two sources.
The first source is household saving from the Central Bureau
of Statistics Household Budget Survey of 1981-82. This
survey was conducted largely among small landholders in rural
areas of districts, so that the saving figure is used as a
measure of surplus for that segment of the population. The
Central Bureau of Statistics data are household figures, but
were converted to per capita figures using data on persons
per household by district from the 1979 population census.
The second type of information used in constructing a
measure of wealth for county councils is per capita
centrally marketed agricultural and livestock sales, which
include output sold through parastatals, marketing boards,
and producing companies. This information is used as a rough
measure of surplus production by large-scale farmers and
ranchers. These sales figures were added to the small-holder
per capita saving figures described above to obtain a crude
measure of per capita wealth for county councils.
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It is possible to argue that property value would be
the best way to measure wealth in county councils, including
both urban land in the trading centers under the jurisdiction
of the council and agricultural land. This information would
be very difficult to obtain for several reasons. First,
reliable data about rated land in small urban areas and
trading centers are not readily available. Second, some
areas of urban land where trading activities take place in
county councils have been neither formally surveyed nor
rated. Third, much agricultural land in county councils is
neither rated nor taxed. Agricultural land taxes do exist in
some councils, but the tax is often a fixed sum per acre, and
there is no easy way to put a value on the land. In some
councils that have no tax on agricultural land, there is a
tax on agricultural output (cess). However, it is sometimes
only on one or a few crops.
For all of these reasons, it was decided to use the
measure of economic surplus discussed above as a crude
measure of county council wealth. Nevertheless, it must be
pointed out that there are a few serious flaws in the data
used to construct this measure. First, not all districts
were included in the Household Budget Survey from which the
small-holder savings figures were taken. Some northern and
eastern districts, which are semi-arid and populated largely
by nomadic herders, were not covered in the survey. Several
of the county councils in this study were among those not
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included in the survey, so their effective per capita
savings figures are zero. It can be argued that zero is an
appropriate measure of savings in a formal economic sense.
Few of the pastoralists in the semi-arid areas are involved
in the formal sector, most are not likely to have much use
for significant amounts of Kenyan currency, and a high
percentage probably lead a subsistence existence.
Nevertheless, there is clearly wealth in the area, primarily
in the form of livestock, and it is unsatisfying to have it
excluded from the measure of surplus.
Another problem with the measure of county council
wealth revolves around the use of centrally marketed
agricultural and livestock sales in the calculation of the
data. This is probably a reasonable measure of surplus in
some cases, but the measure does not fully reflect the value
of economic activity in the local agricultural sector in some
districts. Furthermore, a significant percentage of
centrally marketed agricultural output is produced by small
holders in some districts, leading to an element of
double-counting in the overall measure of wealth. Perhaps
more importantly, the marketing organizations rarely do
business in some of the northern and eastern districts.
There is little or no agriculture in these semi-arid areas,
so the agricultural marketing groups have no occasion to do
business here. Livestock-related organizations, such as the
Kenya Cooperative Creameries and the Kenya Meat Commission,
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do not often go to these areas for at least several reasons.
First, the costs and distance involved in transporting
livestock and milk from the northern districts may seem to be
prohibitive. Second, the animals in these dry areas may be
(or at least are perceived to be) of an inferior quality--
poorly nourished compared to their southern counterparts, and
perhaps more likely to be diseased due to a lack of available
veterinary care. Third, the main business of the livestock
marketing groups is in central and southern Kenya. If they
can satisfy their needs for meat and milk locally, they will
not be bothered to set off for the distant parts of the
country. Meat in the northern districts and many other rural
areas is marketed and processed through local auctions,
county council slaughterhouses and slaughter slabs, and local
butcheries. In more rural areas, people take care of their
own requirements.
Despite all of the above objections to the measure of
county council wealth used in this study, it was used for
lack of a better alternative. Efforts are currently underway
in the Ministry of Planning and National Development to
construct a better indicator of county council wealth, but
the new data will not be ready in time for use in this study.
The measure of wealth used for municipal and town
councils differs dramatically from the one used for county
councils. The municipal council measure is land value per
capita, a very reasonable measure of wealth for urban areas.
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Land valuation is a good measure of the level of economic
activity in a local authority and will directly affect the
demand for public services as well as the ability of a
council to raise public revenue. Land taxes, although not as
significant as in some western countries, are an important
source of revenue for municipal and town councils in Kenya.
Furthermore, many local authority taxes are raised from
formal sector businesses (business license fees, buspark
fees, slaughter fees), and informal sector activities (market
fees and hawker fees). Finally, if land values are
correlated with economic activity, they will also be related
to demand for municipal services such as housing, roads,
water, and sewerage, which are important service activities
and/or sources of revenue for local authorities,
particularly municipal councils.
For all of these reasons, land value per capita is
expected to be a good measure of wealth in urban areas.
Nevertheless, there are a few problems with using land values
as a measure of wealth in municipal councils. First, all
urban land is valued on the site only. The value still rises
with the level of economic activity, but it is not as good a
measure of economic activity as valuation based on
improvements. Second, land in Kenya is revalued only every
five years, but it is done at different times for different
local authorities. Most of the revaluing is done by the
Ministry of Lands and Settlement, which is very much behind
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schedule in its work. Thus, land values in different local
authorities were assigned at different times, and there are
no measures of equalized valuation. This means that land
values are not strictly comparable across all local
authorities. Finally, some local authorities have
significant areas of commercial and residential land that
have not been formally surveyed and valued by the Ministry of
Lands and Settlement. This also leads to comparability
problems across local authorities.
Despite the data problems outlined in this appendix,
the type of analysis provided in this paper is believed to be
a step in the right direction in terms of trying to
understand variations in patterns of local authority finance
and their causes. The problems point to the importance of
more extensive and uniform data collection by the Government
of Kenya if better analysis of local authority finance and
the district-level economy is to be conducted in the future.
Possibilities to improve the quality of local authority data
are currently being explored by the World Bank and the
Ministry of Local Government.
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APPENDIX IV
TRADITIONAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES VERSUS THE
NEW RURAL-URBAN BALANCE STRATEGY IN KENYA
Kenya has followed a fairly consistent urban
development policy since independence. In 1986, however, the
Government defined a new type of urban development policy.
This appendix reviews both the traditional and new policies.
Traditional Urban Development Policies
Traditional urban development policies in Kenya have
focused primarily on physical planning. They have involved
attempting to establish a hierarchy of urban service centers
through strategies designed to coordinate land use by
carefully planning the location of investments in physical
infrastructure and implementing incentives to affect the
location of new industry. These policies were carried out in
the context of a set of priorities that included
redistribution, a strong emphasis on social services, and an
attempt to promote regional balance by shifting the focus
away from the largest cities towards the smaller urban areas
throughout Kenya.
The planned network of urban centers was designed to
provide a hierarchical arrangement of towns and village
settlements. The different levels of the hierarchy were
supposed to be given different functions and to provide
different types of infrastructure commensurate with their
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role and the size of their service area. The four levels of
designated service centers are: Urban Centers, Rural Centers,
Market Centers and Local Centers. These centers respectively
were to serve catchment areas of 120,000, 40,000, 15,000, and
5,000 people. The 20 municipalities in Kenya are special
cases of Urban Centers referred to as principal towns, and
generally provide a still higher level of services.
Problems With Traditional Urban Development Policies
Although some advances have been in urban development in
Kenya, these traditional urban policies have not had the full
expected impact, particularly on the smaller urban centers,
for a variety of reasons. First, implementation of these
policies required a great deal of local capacity and
coordination among many different Government of Kenya
ministries. The local capacity was often extremely
deficient, and coordination was often difficult to organize,
particularly at the level of dealing with the specifics of
particular local investments. In addition, these traditional
policies looked at the problem of urban development in
isolation rather than in the broader context of agricultural
and rural development in the hinterland surrounding urban
areas. Even though the policies were supposed to strengthen
local economies throughout the entire country, they focused
essentially on providing infrastructure and encouraging
commercial and industrial development in some of the larger
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secondary urban areas. The Government of Kenya now argues
that urban development policy is only one part of a
comprehensive development strategy and that it must take
account of rural-urban linkages, agricultural productivity,
and overall macroeconomic policies and priorities. Finally,
a variety of changing circumstances in Kenya required a
degree of flexibility and responsiveness that the traditional
urban development policies were unable to provide.
Changes in the Kenyan Economy
Several major changes have occurred in Kenya during
the past decade. These changes have had an important impact
on the nature of the priorities required to be dealt with by
Government of Kenya policies. The first of these changes is
that the rate of population growth has been on the rise,
while the rate of economic growth has generally been slower,
partially due to a declining productivity of investment. The
government believes that this situation necessitates focusing
more on increasing the growth of income rather than on
redistributing it. Policies should therefore focus on
concentrating scarce resources in areas with high, but
unrealized, potential where investments are likely to bring
higher yields and create more productive employment
opportunities. Urban policies designed to deal with these
issues would be consistent with broader macroeconomic goals
and explicitly recognize the role of the rural-urban system
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in the national economy.
A second major change that has occurred in Kenya in
recent years has been the rapid growth of public expenditures
and the rise in Government deficits. The implication of this
development is that Government expenditures cannot continue
to expand at their historical rate, and the Government of
Kenya must try to focus on self-financing and more productive
public investments. This means putting less emphasis on
social services, such as health and education, and more on
basic infrastructure services, such as water, electricity,
and roads. It also requires that a greater emphasis be
placed on cost recovery in projects where this is feasible.
Finally, it suggests that the central government may have to
reduce its role in managing certain policies such as urban
development and rely more on local authorities, which are
often underutilized and have untapped revenue potential.
The last major change in Kenya's economic situation that
impacts on urban policy is the dramatic rise in foreign debt
to what might be considered unhealthy levels. This suggests
that the Government of Kenya must reduce its dependence on
foreign capital and the large-scale projects that this
capital is often used to finance. The government plans to
use its own scarce resources more productively, and job-
creation policies should focus on the informal sector and
small-scale enterprises, where employment is much less
expensive to create than it is in larger enterprises.
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Other Economic and Demographic Factors
In addition to the factors and changes outlined above,
several other facts of Kenya's present reality have figured
prominently into the design of the new rural-urban balance
strategy. The high rate of population growth necessitates
that the Government design policies to absorb the expected
growth in the labor force during the coming years.
Agriculture is and will remain for the foreseeable future the
backbone of the Kenyan economy. However, because most of the
arable land in the country is currently under cultivation and
because of the fear that the largest cities have grown too
large, it is expected that the bulk of new jobs will have to
be created in the nonagricultural sector in smaller urban
centers in the rural areas outside of Nairobi, Mombasa and
Kisumu. With only an estimated 15 percent of its total
population living in urban areas, Kenya is a highly
underurbanized country. However, the growth of urban
population is expected to increase at a rate of about seven
percent per annum during the next 15 years. The reliance of
the national economy on the agricultural sector and the
expected increase in urbanization will create a situation
that demands a strategy designed to promote a process of
interactive rural-urban development.
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The Rural-Urban Balance Strategy
The rural-urban balance strategy outlined in Sessional
Paper No. 1 of 1986 and currently being implemented by the
Ministry of Planning and National Development is being hailed
as the beginning of a new generation of urban development
policy in Kenya. This strategy explicitly recognizes and
deals with the interactive effects between rural and urban
areas, the linkages among different sectors of the national
economy, and the Government of Kenya's principal growth
priorities. It is designed to promote the development of a
well-serviced urban system that facilitates the distribution
of agricultural production, provides inputs and support
services to both the agricultural and nonagricultural
sectors, and generates productive nonfarm employment in
urban centers and rural areas. The success of this strategy
will depend to a great extent on other Government of Kenya
strategies aimed at raising agricultural productivity and
farm incomes, which will generate increased demand for
nonagricultural goods and services produced in the small
towns and rural areas.
Objectives
The main objectives of the rural-urban balance strategy,
as outlined in Chapter 4 of Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986,
are:
(a) To avoid the excessive concentration of population in
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Kenya's largest cities;
(b) To promote the vigorous growth of secondary towns and
smaller urban settlements through the development of
agriculture;
(c) To foster production linkages between agriculture and
other sectors of the economy, between rural areas and local
service centers, market towns, gateway towns and secondary
cities; and,
(d) To bring renewed economic growth to all regions of the
country, so that even the least-developed regions can share
in the general growth of the economy.
Rural-Urban Balance Strategy Policies
The Government of Kenya's rural-urban balance strategy
focuses on three major policy areas: Rural Trade and
Production Centers (RTPCs), strengthening local authorities,
and creating informal sector employment. Each of these will
be briefly discussed.
Rural Trade and Production Centers
To achieve these objectives in the context of the
overall framework outlined above, the Government of Kenya
will focus on three principal policy areas. First, it will
concentrate scarce resources in designated small towns to be
known as Rural Trade and Production Centers (RTPCs).
Resources will be used to provide basic infrastructure and
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services designed to support the growth of agricultural and
nonagricultural activities in the urban center and its
surrounding hinterland. Thus, the strategy is designed to
exploit and strengthen both sectoral and rural-urban
linkages. This RTPC effort will be coordinated by the
Ministry of Planning and National Development, which will
work closely with the District Development Committees in
establishing RTPC sites and planning investment packages.
Implementation support and funding for these RTPC investment
packages will be provided by the District Development Fund, a
new section established in the Ministry of Planning and
National Development. Many other operating Government
ministries will also have an important role to play in RTPC
implementation. The RTPC Programme will focus on small urban
centers, but the Government will continue to support
development projects in larger centers as well.
Strengthening Local Authorities
The second component of the Government's strategy will
be to strengthen local authorities to enable them to play a
more substantial and effective role in promoting local
development than they presently do. As noted earlier, the
Government of Kenya will need to rely more heavily on local
skills and resources in the coming years than it has in the
past.
The Government has been concerned for some time about
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the effectiveness of its local authorities. They are
supposed to play a major role in service provision at the
grassroots level but have been plagued by a variety of
institutional and operational difficulties, as discussed in
the main text. The most significant problems of the local
authorities are inadequate sources of revenue, institutional
bottlenecks, and poor financial management.
For several years, the Government has recognized these
problems and taken some steps towards alleviating them. The
Ministry of Local Government (MLG) has instituted the
preparation of Local Authority Development Programmes, long-
range capital plans that have been developed in a sample of
local authorities and will soon be required of all of them.
The Government has been investigating additional sources of
revenue for local authorities and has already made some
proposals in this area. An extensive training programme in
financial management for local authority officials has also
been set up, and the MLG has developed revised local
authority financial regulations. Other important work on
strengthening local authorities, including the development of
a standardized accounting code for local authorities and
reforming MLG procedures for monitoring local authorities, is
also planned or underway. Many of these measures, however,
are procedural in nature and will not be effective unless
more basic institutional problems are corrected. For
example, local authority officer training will not have much
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effect unless centrally-imposed constraints are relaxed,
greater accountability is introduced, and a system of
effective incentives is implemented.
Pursuant to Sessional Paper No. 1 of 1986, the
Government is also working on plans for restructuring the
Local Government Loans Authority (LGLA) into a Municipal
Development Bank. The LGLA, which is the main source of
finance for local authority investment, has had increased
demands on its resources because of the rapid growth of local
authorities and has experienced some problems that could be
alleviated through reorganization.
Given some additional administrative training and
revenue-raising and enforcement powers, the Government of
Kenya believes that local authorities have the potential to
play a major role in the development, operation, maintenance,
and expansion of the RTPCs and other local development
projects. The strengthening of local authorities will also
require a strengthening of the capacity and operating
procedures of the Ministry of Local Government and a
reorganized Local Government Loans Authority.
Promoting the Informal Sector
The final major component of the rural-urban balance
strategy is the implementation of policies to promote the
growth of productive nonfarm employment opportunities in the
rural centers. As noted earlier, rapid population growth and
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limits on the expansion of employment in agriculture and
formal sector industrial and commercial activities require
that the bulk of new employment be generated in small-scale
enterprise and informal sector activities. Policies to
stimulate this sector would include agricultural pricing
policy and support programs that raise farm income, lower
tariffs on inputs used by small-scale manufacturers, and an
investment incentive structure that encourages the
substitution of labor for capital in order to encourage more
labor-intensive small-scale activities. In addition,
policies aimed at expanding training opportunities,
increasing the flow of information, augmenting credit
availability, and removing legal constraints on
kiosk-operators and hawkers would have the potential to
expand employment in the informal sector greatly.
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